AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

EXPANSION OF SHI'A SCHOOLS (1960-2009): FACTORS AND DYNAMICS

by
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Literature on politics-education interaction proposed that the politicians operating governments have been employing different sorts of educational strategies to direct or control the conduct of education. Few studies have dealt with one of the most significant political dimensions for education systems, that of power relationship among a nation's majority and minority ethnic, social-class, and religious groups. Moreover examining the political development of the Lebanese Shi'a community in relation to education is not an issue that has captured much scholarly attention. Therefore, this study pictures political-educational strategies employed by a religious group, the Shi'a of Lebanon, as a conscious tool to obtain greater share of the economic and political power which has been held in large measure by the nation's dominant group, the Christians.

This study attempts to answer the following questions: a) what factors contributed to the expansion of Shi'a schools in Lebanon? b) How did this expansion occur? c) What role did the expansion of the educational institutions have in the community political mobilization?

The study came to a conclusion that the wider cause of these groups based on religious conviction greatly influenced the vigor with which educational activities was undertaken. Actually, the Shi'a schools' system emerged as institutions that empower the culturally marginalized segments of the population by creating proud around Shi'a identity, the fact that accelerated the political mobilization of the community. As such, the impact of the religious political parties has been the Islamization of the citizenship discourse among Shiites in Lebanon in addition to radically politicizing educational institution-building as a crucial component of political legitimacy.

Data were collected from the analysis of historical and school documents. The author carried out personal interviews with officials, parents and members of the institutional organizations. A constant comparative and interpretational approach to data analysis was used to create categories, to identify recurrent themes in the primary and secondary sources. Personal judgment was used to weave together the findings into a coherent story of how particular events, individuals and groups in the recent past initiated the rise and expansion movement of Shi'a schools in Lebanon and helped it gain momentum.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Religious and ethnic movements have emerged since the 1960s demanding various forms of political autonomy for some culturally distinct regions and groups in the world (Ahmad, 2001; Ajami, 1986; Hamzeh, 2004; Norton, 1984 & 2007). This recent religious and ethnic resurgence has generated theoretical ferment among scholars interested in finding out conditions under which political mobilization in pursuit of religious and ethnic objectives are most likely to occur (Halawi, 1992; Norton, 1984 & 2007; Saad, 1996).

The present study on the emergence of the Shi'a community in Lebanon belongs to this genre of studies. It sheds light on the current Lebanese Shi'a political mobilization by focusing on the development and growth of Shi'a schools (1960 – 2009). This study analyzes this issue both as an index as well as a product of this mobilization. The players whose activities are taken as illustrations are the Shi'a Amal and Hezbollah movements.

Some of the factors that were taken into consideration when surveying the spread and dissemination of the Shi'a educational activities included the size and location of the schools and the date of their establishment, the programs of study adopted and the teachers and administrators in charge of directing the schools. The extent to which educational services develop depends on public demands for those services and on purposive variables such as the strategic needs and goals pursued by elites in pursuits of their economic, political, religious, and sectarian objectives.

The researcher is aware of the difficulty of obtaining the information specified

above which is essential in elucidating what these schools are, and what they do. Official information published by the government is often incomplete; there is a tendency to lump all religious schools together as parochial, thereby ignoring important differences in their genesis, purposes and evolution.

In fact, before the arrival in 1959 of Musa al-Sadr, the charismatic clergyman who mobilized the Shiite community in Lebanon, the clergy had little to do with the formation of Shi'a group consciousness. Grasping the potential of social services as a means of outflanking the traditional elites, Musa al-Sadr, underwrote a string of religious and vocational schools in the early sixties to penetrate and establish a solid base of support for his movement among the Shi'a masses. Moreover, the references in the media to Hezbollah's various social programs, frequent as they are, describe their achievements in the construction, agriculture and health sector, yet they offer no clear picture of their vital work in the field of education (Harik, 1994; Norton, 1987 & 2007). On the surface, some of Hezbollah's activities no doubt share features common with other Shi'a sponsored educational activities, but differences do exist, and some of them are of major importance. Exploration of the terrain and conducting comparisons that take different modes and types of schools established is important.

Purpose of the Study

By what process did the Shi'a since the early 1960s till our present day, the year 2009, expand their schools in Lebanon and how? This process of change, its dynamics, speed and intensity are at the very core of Shi'a political mobilization. I explored this mobilization process through two aspects. The first aspect, the "why" of the process, may be described as the social and economic progress of the community. The second

aspect, the “How” of the process, may be denoted the educational development of the Shi’a.

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the dynamics which encouraged Lebanese Shi’a political and religious parties to initiate, expand and diversify their involvement within their constituencies in educational activities which is manifested by the development of Shi’a schools. An attempt is made to explore the role played by the Shi’a educational institutions in the community political mobilization.

- Explore the factors leading to the expansion.
- Describe the process of this expansion.
- Examine the role of the educational institutions in political mobilization through finding out the goals as well as the organizational processes of those institutions.

Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What factors contributed to the expansion of Shi’a schools in Lebanon?
2. How did this expansion occur?
3. What role did the expansion of the educational institutions have in the community political mobilization?

Methodology

The research design is a historical case study, which is predominantly a qualitative research tradition (Merriam, 1998). This type of research employs techniques that combine historical and case study design. In applied fields such as education, historical case studies have tended to be descriptions of institutions,

programs, and practices as they have evolved over time (Carr, 1967). In our case study, description of Shi'a educational institutions is conducted from a historical perspective.

Rationale

Political Development of the Shi'a in Relation to Education

Educational institutions and their functions are often used by political bodies to maintain or augment political power (Murray, 1983). The nature of this function of education in a society is reflected in the question: to what extent can the educational enterprise serve as a conscious tool for effecting major changes in the political order?

Private schools are generally freer than public schools from government regulations. However, this does not mean that private schools are not as politicized as public ones. Sometimes they do enjoy great autonomy, but other times the conduct of private schooling is very much influenced by outside groups, such as the religious organizations that maintain parochial schools and furnish financial support (Murray, 1983).

Literature on politics-education interaction proposed that the politicians operating governments have been employing different sorts of educational strategies to direct or control the conduct of education (Kraft, 1980). Few studies have dealt with one of the most significant political dimensions for education systems, that of power relationship among a nation's majority and minority ethnic, social-class, and religious groups (Murray, 1983). Moreover examining the political development of the Shi'a in relation to education is not an issue that has captured much scholarly attention. Therefore, this study pictures political-educational strategies employed by a religious group, the Shi'a of Lebanon, in their effort to obtain greater share of the economic and

political power which has been held in large measure by the nation's dominant group, the Christians.

Lack of Scholarly Attention and Relevant Studies

The educational literature on Lebanon includes many studies dealing with the contributions and educational achievements attained by private foreign and local religious groups. Few of them have dealt with the educational efforts of the Shiite community. The researcher could not find any studies that have dealt with the expansion of Shi'a schools since the 1960s and thereafter. The purpose of this study is then to attempt to fill a major gap in Lebanese educational history by tracing the development of Shiite education from the early 1960s till the present day, the year 2009.

Neglect of Historical Studies

A criticism of the general historical studies of modern Lebanon is that they generally neglect to examine in any depth the political activities of the Shi'a. This is principally because the Shi'a were marginalized for much of the republic's history (Ajami, 1986). In fact many historical studies of modern-day Lebanon have been written to reinforce the idea, prevalent among Western scholars, that Lebanon is essentially Christian (Deeb , 1988). Consequently, accounts of Mount Lebanon focus on the region's Maronite history at the expense of its Muslim, Sunni and Shi'a population. A good example of this pro-Maronite bias can be found in a comment by Harik (1968). He notes that when Shi'a rule in the north was replaced by that of the Shihabs, the Matawilah were crushed and the industrious and law-abiding Maronites were encouraged to replace them in Kisrwan.

Despite the fact that the 1932 census data recognized the Shi'a as the third largest confession in the country, there was little incentive to study a group whose political clout was modest relative to their numbers. Albert Hourani's brief comments, in his 1946 book, well captured the sentiments of scholars who were to follow him. Hourani (1946) notes the backwardness of the Shi'a and their low standard of living, and he remarks that their first need is for a reformed social organization and improved economic conditions.

Document Current Conditions

In addition, many of the major works on Lebanese history and politics (Salibi, 1976; Hudson, 1968) were written more than a quarter of a century ago. Even the recent works by Norton and Ajami were both written in 1986 well before the end of the civil war. Much has happened since that time to both the Lebanese Shi'a and the Shi'a in other countries in the region. Indeed this study addresses what the recent literature on Shi'a politicization has largely overlooked, namely, that an important segment of these masses expressed its dissatisfaction with the status quo in Lebanon (Halawi, 1992).

Significance

The developing world is rife with ethnic, religious diversity and conflict, and the pattern of political growth exhibited by Lebanon's Shi'a could well reoccur in countries experiencing similar situations (Norton, 1987). The emergence of new sectarian-based reform movements with their use of social and educational services such as those we find in Lebanon is clearly likely to be replicated; in fact the Shi'a community examined in this study, with the use of educational strategies to achieve political and economic

goals, exhibits characteristics common to many groups in less-developed countries, for example, Malaysia, Cameroon and China (Murray, 1983).

Therefore, this study will explore in some detail a variety of facets of such politics- education relationships. It will describe politicization of education by showing the extent to which groups outside the education system are effective in directing and controlling the conduct of education.

Moreover, this study presents a more contemporary picture of the Shi'a educational institutions. This is important to our understanding of where the community is now. It is also necessary if, for a country very likely to experience considerate social and political change, we are to have any chance of predicting where that community will be in the future.

Limitations

The researcher was aware of the difficulty of getting access to those institutions. In fact, some of them did not allow the researcher to conduct interviews freely with the various administrators in charge of those institutions. In addition, official information published by the government is often incomplete and will not answer the researcher's questions. Moreover, the Shi'a of Lebanon, like similar disadvantaged populations in other parts of the Third World, are a people without much written and documented history. The oral material corrected some of this shortfall.

Noteworthy to mention is that access to some institutions was difficult. As a matter of fact, interviews with high officials at Hezbollah educational institutions were not easily reached. The researcher relied mostly on informal interviews conducted with staff members of the Educational Supervision Department. However, documents on the

goals of Hezbollah educational institutions, their administrative mode of work and brochures on their operating schools were provided. Information on funding was acquired from recent studies on Hezbollah done by academics, researchers, journalists, reporters and website articles.

The interview with the director of al-Mabarrat educational institutions was limited in time and in information. The Public Relations and Media Department director provided more of his time to explain about the background and goals of the Association. On the other hand, documents and brochures were provided. The Association website presented much information on the Association.

In contrast, access to Amal Educational institutions was more comfortable. The director of the educational institutions provided all the time needed for the interview. He provided the needed information on the background, goals, mode of work and funding of the institutions. Besides, he facilitated the interviews with other main officials in the institutions. Official school documents, brochures and guides were also made available.

Similarly, Al-Sadr Foundation was open to the field work research. An interview was conducted with the educational director of the Foundation and documents were provided accordingly. The institution's website provides clear information on the background, mode of work and funding of the institution.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Dynamics for Community Mobilization

The development of Shiite education is a product of a number of factors, including social, religious, ethnic and political factors. Those factors were deemed responsible for the community mobilization which allowed the Shiite community to seek more educational opportunities. Therefore, the following section will review studies written on social, religious and ethnic factors of mobilization.

Social Factors of Mobilization

In fact, the Shi'a development is a product of several decades of significant socio-economic change (Norton, 1987). The argument that frames this development is as follows. By the 1960s the Shi'a were exposed to wide-ranging economic change and social disruption, the significance of which is partially anticipated by Karl Deutsch's work on social mobilization. As an indicator of change, the concept subsumes a wide range of variables that when measured over time signal the extent of the changes that are taking place in a given country. Thus, Deutsch (1961), counsels that we pay attention to the following clusters of change: exposure to aspects of modern life (e.g. the media, consumer goods and technology), changes in residence, in particular rural to urban migration, occupational changes, for instance shifts away from agrarian employment, rising literacy rates and changes in income. The Shiite community went through most of the changes mentioned by Deutch and moved from traditional to

modern ways of life; this led to the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new organizations (political, religious, social and educational) that are capable of absorbing the stress arising from change (Khalaf, 1987). The educational institutions are one form of those new organizations. Social mobilization can be defined therefore, as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior (Deutsch, 1961).

Taking Deutsch's concept as his inspiration, Michael Hudson examined social mobilization phenomena in Lebanon and in his 1968 book offered persuasive, if sometimes circumstantial evidence that the country was in the late 1960's undergoing rapid, but uneven social mobilization that posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the "precarious republic" (Hudson, 1968).

Ethnic Factors of Mobilization

In exploring the interplay between leader and led, between catalyst and community, the literature on politicized ethnicity and ethnic mobilization offers a number of rational models. In fact, Rothschild (1981) provides a useful definition of "ethnicity"; he writes: "the terms ethnic and ethnicity are used generally to refer to the political activities of complex collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or presumed ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society." (Rothschild, 1981, p. 9).

Moreover, Olzak & Nagel (1986) define an ethnic enclave as "a structure in which members of an ethnic population develop a common occupational niche,

participate in common ethnic institutions and organizations, and form a dense interaction of network communication, information, socialization, and marital endogamy" (p. 20-21). Olzak & Nagel (1986) argue as well that the existence of strong ethnic enclaves provides first an organizational resource base for collective action and makes ethnic identity a strong determinant of an individual's role in productive activities and community life. They assert that economic expansion beyond the enclave boundaries increases competition with other ethnic populations.

Besides, Olzak &Nagel (1986) define ethnic mobilization as "the process by which a group organizes along ethnic lines in pursuit of group ends". Furthermore, and according to Ben-Dor (1988), for ethnic mobilization to occur and to achieve its aim of restructuring existing conditions, certain prerequisites both of a behavioral and organizational nature have to be fulfilled. This phenomenon occurs when ethnic groups bring their social, economic interest, grievances, claims, anxieties and aspirations into the political arena.

Likewise, Rotschild (1981) added that for ethnic mobilization to occur there must exist first a leadership, be it traditional or religious or aristocratic, desiring and capable of provoking the transformation of the mass bearers of the cultural markers into a self-conscious group; and a competition over scarce economic and political resources.

Besides, Halawi (1992) suggests that, ethnic groups can be seen as involved in manipulating their ethnic identity in order to advance their strategic goals. However the use of ethnicity for the purposes of mobilization requires transformations at the individual and group levels. Deutsch (1961) model suggests that these transformations are in large part a response to the requirements of modernization.

In fact, social processes that fall under the rubric of "modernization" promote

heightened levels of ethnic self-identification. Urbanization deepens ethnic solidarity by exposing the ethnically uneven distribution of resources in most pluralistic societies, and by providing social arenas where competition for valued collective goods such as employment, education, services, etc., is more intense than in rural areas, "and where daily encounters activate collective representations of self and other, we and they" (Young, 1983, p. 655). Urbanization also enhances the creation of ethnic enclaves, family associations and social clubs which help resettle new migrants, and thus promote ethnic allegiance (Olzak & Nagel, 1986). The spread of education creates new strata susceptible to politicization. Modern media, infrastructural development, and other expanded networks of communication intensify "awareness of social competition within national and regional arenas" (Young, 1983, p. 656).

Modernization therefore, contributes to the rapid destruction of political isolation (Weiner & Hoselitz, 1961, p. 173). It also fosters the erosion of traditional political ties, and generates an ethnically conscious leadership with an interest in mobilizing ethnicity "for the purpose of altering or reinforcing systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories" (Rotschild, 1981, p. 2).

Emphasizing the role of leadership in ethnic mobilization, Rotschild (1981) asserts that in the long run the success of any mobilization endeavors depends on the existence of a leadership willing and capable of translating ethnic resources into "politically usable currencies" in the service of group survival and welfare. In fact, the absence of this kind of leadership presented the Berbers in North Africa as an example of unmobilized identities.

It is important to stress here that the argument that ethnicity and ethnic movements are enjoying a comeback is not to claim that ethnicity is more important

than the social mobilization process enunciated by Deutsch (1961), for example, or that ethnicity operates in a vacuum and is thereby independent from a society's socio-economic structures. Rather it attempts to avoid the assumptions that differences between groups would be expected to become of lesser significance in modern and modernizing societies under the combined effects of technology, legal reforms and universal educational systems.

Religious Factors of Mobilization

Despite the general lack of interest by scholars, the relationship between religion and mobilization has attracted the attention of some theorists. The review of this literature addressed general studies on religion and society. Marx (1968), for example, described religion as the opiate of the masses, deadening their awareness of earthly exploitation by offering the misty hope of salvation in the world to come. Weber (1968) and Durkheim (1923), both considered religious sentiment as phenomenon of an earlier, more superstitious age that could not realistically play a part in the continuing construction of modern societies.

Weber (1968) compared northern Europe's development with southern Europe. One of his conclusions was that southern Europe's development lagged behind that of the north, attributable perhaps to the resistance to change imposed by Roman Catholicism. Another conclusion was that northern Europe, because of Protestantism and the Protestant ethnics, developed capitalism. Thus, in Weber's opinion, religious beliefs may promote or hinder economic growth.

Durkheim (1923), sought to go beyond the old distinction between faith and reason, by uniting them into the concept of civil religions. He saw religion performing

significant roles of helping to integrate society by providing means for setting and identifying concepts of morality.

These theorists sought to show a multitude of ways in which religious ideas, institutions, and behaviors serve to maintain society in a positive fashion. They pointed to the ways in which religion affects social integration, influences institutions and patterns of organizations, provides a coherent set of ethical values and behavioral norms, furnishes a sense of meaning, purpose and truth and sustains hope in the face of suffering and death (Durkheim, 1923; Weber, 1968).

Still another proponent of religion to bring about social justice is Cone (1984) who emphasized the need on the global scale for a vision of freedom that includes the whole of the inhabitants of the earth. According to Cone (1984), this global vision will analyze the causes of hunger, poverty, monopoly, exploitation and other social ills. The intellectuals must not allow themselves to be imprisoned by ideas promoted by their predecessors. Rather, they must actively pursue new venues of approach and knowledge.

Likewise, many Middle Eastern theologians' attitudes and behaviors are parallel to those of theologians in the West. Like their Western counterparts, they have taken upon themselves the task of guiding their followers. A somewhat similar call for religious involvement in change comes from a Middle Eastern religious scholar, Ali Shariati. He chastises the system of worship and of education that creates ivory towers for theologians and intellectuals, isolating them from the people (Shariati, 1980). He attacks both the destructive passivity of some clergymen and the non-involvement of the intellectual class. Shariati (1980) argued that the most important shortcoming plaguing the Third World is the lack of communication between the educated class and

the populace. Furthermore, Shariati (1980) claimed that this lamentable gap between the learned clergymen, the learned man and the layman can be narrowed by interaction. The call for mass involvement by theologians in Iran, in Shariati's view, is one of the ways to fill the communication gap. Shariati and Cone both have called for cooperation between the intellectuals and laymen under the blessing of the clergymen. This echoes what Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., who attempted to promote justice and to eradicate class distinction in the United States by exhorting the African American Ph.Ds to work with the "no Ds" in that struggle, stated (Halawi, 1992). The Shi'a schools in Lebanon affiliated with the clergy are a manifestation of this cooperation between the intellectuals and the religious institution.

Besides, the existing literature on the ascendance of political religious movements primarily focuses on socio-economic, political and cultural variables. Socio-economic explanations either emphasize the creation of a vibrant middle class among devout segments of the society as the main catalyst of the rise and success of religious political movements or point to the economically deprived, who turn to religious symbols due to their frustrations (Ahmad, 1991; White, 2002). Lastly, cultural theorists assert that certain religions are more prone to be politicized due to the nature of their religious teachings (Lewis, 1988).

What literature on modernization and religion goes back to the classical post-Enlightenment thinkers, such as August Comte, Karl Marx, or Max Weber, who observed the dissemination of positivist ideas and came to the conclusion, albeit in different ways, that secularization is an irreversible process and the role of religion in public and social life is destined to diminish radically with increasing socioeconomic modernization. This theoretical approach was still the hegemonic view among social

scientists in the 1950s, 60s, and even 70s. Berger (1967) , Lerner (1958), Martin (1979) and Wilson (1966 & 1976), were part of this wave of secularization theorists, who claimed that increasing urbanization, literacy rates, and economic development would diminish religion's public, social and political significance. These theorists establish the relationship between modernization and secularization by using various hypotheses. Some argue that urbanization leads to the disintegration of local communities, which are based on personal relations, and the emergence of societies, which are characterized by contractual relations and norms of efficiency. According to this hypothesis socioeconomic modernization creates diverse occupations and classes. This diversity in socioeconomic status creates a variety of life-styles and concomitantly a demand for a plurality of religious teachings.

Norris and Inglehart (2004) posit that the need for religion in advanced industrialized societies diminishes since people feel existential security due to high levels of wealth, literacy and other welfare-indices in these societies. On the other hand, in agrarian societies with low levels of wealth, literacy and welfare, citizens are concerned for their survival and therefore turn to religion. The positive relationship between modernization and secularization is challenged by other scholars, who argue that religion is psychologically equipped to deal with problems caused by modernity. For instance, Berger (1967), who was one of the contributors to the secularization literature in the 1970s, but later changed his position, argues that modernity undermines the old certainties, and uncertainty is a condition that many people find very hard to bear. Religious movements thrive, because they provide the certainties people yearn for.

Similarly, Bruce (2001) asserts that industrialization threatens the communal values which shaped people's identity in the town. Thus, the residents of the town

embrace a militant religiosity as a defense of their threatened identity. Another critic of secularization theory, Brown (2000) posits that socioeconomic modernization in the Middle East has raised the expectations of urbanizing classes. Yet the expectations of the new literate urbanites could not be met by secular political movements. Hence, these disgruntled men became activists in the rising religious political protest in the region. Thus, both proponents and critics of secularization thesis claim that there is a relationship between socioeconomic modernization and secularization. Yet, as Gill (2001) aptly points out, both sides to the debate use the same independent variable to explain opposing outcomes. It is interesting that the primary explanatory variable proposed to account for decreasing levels of religion in the society is the same variable being posited for the increase in religious activism: modernization. This presents a theoretical conundrum. Where religion is said to be anemic or in decline (e.g. Europe), modernization is the culprit. Where religion is on the rise (e.g. in the United States or the Third World), again it is modernization at work. The same independent variable supposedly explains two diametrically opposed outcomes. Of course, this problem could be resolved by clearly specifying the mechanisms by which different aspects of modernization lead to different outcomes in different contexts.

Keddie (1984), for example, argues that new religious political movements arise in countries in which religiosity of the population is high. Moreover, Bruce (2001), one of the defenders of the secularization thesis, admits that religious activism might replace a trend of secularization in the modernizing context, when it is used by an ethnic group to defend its identity as a minority. These arguments are valuable steps in explicating the contexts under which modernization might lead to the rise of religious movements.

Politics and Education

The previous section reviewed the theoretical literature on mobilization efforts, being social, ethnic or religious and on their effect on communal consciousness. The following section will review the literature on the interaction of politics and education and the literature on the role of education as a change agent.

Role of Education in the Social Order

The question of the schools' role as a social-change agent has been debated by sociologists, political scientists, and educators alike. Some have contended not only that the education system could influence the social order but it had an obligation to do so. Dewey (1963) stated that the school should be an 'embryonic community' but it should not remain passive; rather, it must instead be a lever of social change (Dewey, 1889, p. 43). Counts (1932), in Dare the School Build a New Social Order proposed that if the schools are to be really effective, they must become centers for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization.

However, writers in more recent years have judged Dewey's and Count's suggestions as unduly visionary. The school, they have felt, is far more a follower and reflector of the existing social order than a source of reform. For example, La Belle (1986) reviewed the effect of Latin American non-formal education efforts that were aimed at bettering the lot of the poor; he concluded that while "educational processes have a contribution to make to the resolution of social problems and issues", the educational enterprise of a nation is not a "a panacea for resolving social problems" but is "a rather minor component in multiple intervention processes" (La Belle, 1986, pp. 3-4). In short, he saw education as a reflection of society rather than as a catalyst to social

change. So education has often been viewed as an instrument of social reform, but the extent to which it can carry out this assignment without other major alterations in the social system arising from other sources is a continuing matter of argument.

The Interaction of Politics and Education

Perhaps no case study can better serve as a prototype of the interaction of politics and education than the Central-American country of Nicaragua. From the right wing fiefdom of the Somoza family between 1936 and 1979, the country moved rapidly to the political left since the Sandinista rebels' victory in 1979. Thus, the case provides a study of the inter-actions of politics and education in a nation under both right-wing and left-wing regimes. Kraft (1980) in his study stated that politics and education have been one-and-the same in the Nicaraguan setting. Issues of access to education, literacy, expenditures by the national government, control of the curriculum, vocational and technical education, rural-urban imbalances of opportunity and some ethnic-linguistic conflicts have characterized the education system for years. The responses of the right-wing dictatorship as contrasted with those of the left-wing revolutionaries make Nicaragua one of the most instructive educational environments in the world. Kraft (1980) concluded that in the realm of education in Nicaragua, the trend has obviously shifted from maintaining a status quo conservative role to one of transforming and liberating people.

Patterns of Majority-Minority Group Relations

One of the most significant political dimensions for education systems is that of power relationships among a nation's majority and minority ethnic, social-class and

religious groups.

Murray's (1983) study on Malaysia pictures political-educational strategies employed by the dominant political majority, the Malays (with about 54 percent of the population), in their effort to obtain a greater share of the economic power which has been held in large measure by the nation's largest minority group, the Chinese (with about 35 percent). The political events in this case center on efforts of people in a multicultural society to achieve two contrasting goals: (1) attain political-social unity while (2) the nation's two major ethnic groups, the Malays and the Chinese, seek favored access to educational opportunities in order to enhance their groups' socioeconomic welfare. The study illustrates a variety of educational strategies used by the Malay majority to achieve its aims. It also shows how both sides in this context have been able to defend their actions on the basis of opposing yet reasonable philosophical rationales (Taib, Abdul, Solehan & Abu, 1983). The Malays seek compensation for past injustices so that they can start the socio-economic cultural footrace of life on even terms with non-Malays. In contrast, non-Malays seek even-handed justice with everyone treated the same and no one accorded special advantages by the government.

Shi'a Educational Development

The history of education in Lebanon until independence is largely a history of educational achievements attained by private foreign and local religious groups. The educational literature on Lebanon includes a number of studies dealing with the contributions of these groups, but hardly any of them have dealt in depth with the educational efforts of the Shiite community.

Attiyeh (1972), attempted to fill this major gap in the Lebanese educational

history by tracing the development of Shiite education from the time of traditional religious schools till the time when a more "modern" or secularized form of education has become predominant. This study has only dealt with Shiite educational organizations which were established before 1943. It has dealt with the background and educational activities of three main organizations the Maqasid Society of Nabatieh, the Amiliyya in Beirut and the Ja'fariyyah in Tyre which managed to set the foundations for secular education. It would be noticed, however, that the study mainly dealt with educational developments in Jabal Amel and to a much lesser degree with the other main Shiites area in Baalbek- Hirmel where educational activities at that time were extremely limited. Attiyeh (1972) did not undertake an assessment of the contributions of Shiite schools to the overall educational development of the Shiite community.

Early (1971) studied the benevolent society, Al-Amiliyya of Beirut, which was founded in the early part of the twentieth century by Shiites living in Beirut. This study concerned itself with the educational and social role of the Amiliyya society and its effect on the economic progress of the Shiite community.

At the turn of the twentieth century Early (1971) explained that the new Shiite migrants in Beirut experienced certain tensions and ambiguity as a result of being accorded a low status by the Beirutis and of being ill-equipped to assume many of the available roles in the city. Early (1971), explored how the society was serving the sons of Jabal Amil by providing them with educational services which contributed to uplift the standard of the Shiite community. She also considered the Amiliyya as an agency which functioned to absorb the stresses arising from change in that community. Early (1971) concluded that the evolution of the Amiliyya society demonstrates its ability to meet the needs of a community within an urbanizing society.

Shi'a Politicization and Leadership

What literature there is on the politicization of the Lebanese Shi'a focuses mainly on the works about particular elements of Lebanese Shi'a political activism, be they studies of Hezbollah or the development of Amal (Cobban, 1986; Hamzeh, 2004; Norton, 1987 & 2007; Harik, 2004; Shanahan, 2005) rather than on the political activities of Shi'a outside these groups.

Literature-particularly in English-about the historical development of the Lebanese Shi'a can best be described as patchy. A paucity of written records, and the relatively minor political role played by the Shi'a until recently, has meant that the community generally rates only a passing mention as one of the less relevant players on the Lebanese political scene.

The paucity of research in English on the Lebanese Shi'a community is balanced by the output of scholars, Lebanese and others, at major universities in France and elsewhere.

The works by Talal Jaber (1980) and Salim Nasr (1985) stand out as serious attempts at addressing the issue of Shi'a politicization. Jaber's dissertation is divided into three major sections. The first is an overview of Shi'a society in South Lebanon; its history, economy, and culture. The second analyses the power relationships within the Lebanese Shi'a community in both its religious and socio-cultural dimensions. The third discusses Shi'a politicization by scrutinizing the community's relations with the state and other actors on the Lebanese scene in the period between 1967 and 1974.

Nasr's articles (1985) constitute a significant addendum to our understanding of Shi'a politicization. The first, "Mobilization Communautaire et Symbolique Religieuse," offers a general overview of Harakat al-Mahrumin, its identity, adversaries

and goals. The second and more important article, “La Transition des Chiites vers Beyrouth,” concentrates on the demography and other factors that culminated in the formation of a Shi’a fief in the suburbs of Beirut. The author here provides a very animated picture of Shi’a urbanization, both in the context of the larger evolution of the Lebanese urban space and as a catalyst to transformations in Shi’a political consciousness.

Though the Shi’a were marginal to most studies written in English on Lebanon prior to the 1975 civil war, their mobilization and its ramifications have since attracted scholarly attention. The following section will review the literature on Shiite leadership in charge of the community mobilization.

Among the recently published articles and monographs about this community, the two best known in English remain Ajami’s (1986), The Vanished Imam, and Norton’s (1987), Amal and the Shi’a of Lebanon, originally the author’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago. Both studies dealt with the issue of leadership within the Shiite community.

Ajami conducted a study that explored the leadership of Musa-al-Sadr; his book purports to be a biographical tribute to Sayyid Mussa al Sadr, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shi’a who disappeared in the summer of 1978 while on a trip to Libya. Through his very engaging narrative of the rise of al-Sadr, the author attempts to provide some insights into the “world the cleric adopted”, a world of ruined countryside and scarcity that drove men from this hinterland to the far ends of the earth (Ajami, 1986). According to this account, Sayyid Musa transformed the Lebanese Shi’a history of lament and submission into one of active and open rebellion.

Ajami’s study perpetuates the Western nostalgia for exotics whereby movements

in less “rational” societies are promulgated by charismatic, larger-than-life figures. This is enhanced by the very emotional style of the book. From this perspective, very little, if anything, needs to be said of the objective reality, of the regional contexts in which these movements occur. The essence of Shi’a history in Lebanon, we are told, is indeed what the “Iranian” Sayyid has accomplished. However, without meeting some specific social expectations and collective interests of his followers, Musa al-Sadr could not have influenced the historical events in the way he did. (A more realistic and certainly more humane approach to understanding his place in Lebanese Shi’a history would be to attempt an analysis of the man within the context of his time, his actions, the results he achieved, and most important, within the milieu of his community. Ajami’s subjective interpretation of Lebanese Shi’a history raises serious questions as to the author’s research methods and discount the book as a credible reference on various facets of Lebanese Shi’a society).

Norton’s work (1987), on the other hand, concentrates on tracing the emergence of Harakat Amal. Norton provides valuable insights into the growth of Amal, the environment in which it operated and its relations to other actors on the Lebanese scene. His treatment of the overall political mobilization of the Shi’a, however, remains inadequate for, theoretically, it confines itself to the social mobilization framework of Karl Deutsh and to the exclusion of the very ethnic factors that came to be at heart of the Shi’a movement. Norton does not explore the role, of the non-traditional Shi’a element in Shi’a politics and its consequent impact on the development of the community. Thus a more coherent and comprehensive picture remains to be drawn.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design is a historical case study, which is predominantly a qualitative research tradition (Merriam, 1998). This type of research employs techniques that combine historical and case study design. In applied fields such as education, historical case studies have tended to be descriptions of institutions, programs, and practices as they have evolved in time (Carr, 1967). Merriam, (1998) argues that historical case studies may involve more than a chronological history of an event; to understand an event and apply that knowledge to present practice means knowing the context of the event, the assumptions behind it, and perhaps the event's impact on the institution or participants.

Bodgan & Biklen (1992), in their discussion of types of case study, list historical organizational case studies as one form common in educational research. These studies focus on a specific organization and trace its development. "You might do a study, of an institution, tracing how it came into being, and what it is like now. The key to historical case studies, organizational or otherwise, is the notion of investigating the phenomenon over a period of time. The researcher still presents a holistic description and analysis of a specific phenomenon (the case) but presents it from a historical perspective" (p. 62).

Historical research is essentially descriptive, and elements of historical research and case study often merge. Yin (1994) discusses that historical methods must rely on primary documents, secondary documents, and cultural and physical artifacts as the main sources of evidence. Histories can, of course, be done about contemporary events;

in this situation, the strategy begins to overlap with that of a case study. Thus, the case study relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian repertoire which are direct observation and systematic interviewing. Again, although case studies and historical studies can overlap, the case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence: documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations, beyond what might be available in the conventional historical study (p. 8).

The purpose of this study is to understand the dynamics which were behind the rise and expansion of Shi'a schools in Lebanon; in other words the author needs to investigate why this expansion occurred and by which process. Furthermore, our purpose is to understand the events, organizations, individuals and societal trends that were influential in bringing the mobilization of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. The author will not draw strong causal inferences from the study, but instead will seek to understand Shi'a educational development as historically situated phenomena. In particular, the author will seek to understand how the expansion of Shi'a schools, reflects the values, goals and needs of the Shi'a community in the recent past. Yin (1994, p.9) suggests that for "how "and "why" questions the case study has a distinct advantage. Case study is a particularly suitable design if we are interested in process. Yin (1994) argues that case studies help us to understand processes of events, projects and programs and to discover context characteristics that will shed light on an issue or object.

Sources of Data

This study relied on a variety of qualitative data methods for data collection

namely interviews with the officials, directors and staff of the different educational institutions and the collection of some artifacts and documents specifying the goals and objectives of the educational institutions under study. Qualitative data consists of "direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge" obtained through interviews; "detailed descriptions of peoples' activities, behaviors, actions" recorded in observations; and "excerpts, quotations, or entire passages" extracted from various types of documents (Patton, 1990, p. 10). Collecting data through interviews, observations, and documents, or in Wolcott's (1992) "common, everyday terms" (p.19), data collection is about asking, watching, and reviewing.

This study sought oral history as well as analysis of primary and historic documents. Interviewing (on goals, objectives, funding, programs of study and staff recruitment policy) in this study is more open-ended and less structured. The largest part of the interview is guided by a list of questions or issues, and neither the exact wording nor the order of the questions is determined ahead of time. This format allowed the researcher to respond to the situation at hand, to the emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas on the topic.

The investigator gathered data through some of the visits to the schools and recorded relevant observations. The written account of the observations constituted field notes from which the study's findings eventually emerged.

In brief, data collection in this historical case study involves all three strategies of interviewing, observing and analyzing documents: on-site investigation of the case involved, observing what is going on, talking informally and formally with people and examining documents and materials that are part of the context. As Paton (1990) points

out, “Multiple sources of information are sought and used because no single source of information can be trusted to provide comprehensive perspective… By using a combination of observation, interviewing, and document analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check findings” (p. 244).

In conducting the study on Shi’a educational development, data was collected through two main processes: examination of historical documents and field work.

Document analysis involved examining official records, statements and position papers, and other published materials were consulted to shed some light on the objectives underlying the different ideologies or programs of the groups under study.

Field work included data collected through the following: visits to educational institutions in order to observe their mode of work, organization and behavior and to collect some artifacts and documents. In addition to the above observation, the author carried out personal interviews both semi-structured and open-ended with officials, directors, staff, parents and members of the institutional organizations.

Selecting Participants

Within this study numerous sites were visited, events were observed, people were interviewed and documents were read. The researcher thus considered where to observe, when to observe, whom to observe and what to observe. In short, sampling in field research involves “the selection of a research site, time, people and events” (Burgess, 1882, p. 76).

This study followed a purposeful sampling process. Patton (1990) noted that purposeful sampling is based on the assumption that the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most

can be learned. He argues that to begin purposive sampling, you must first determine what selection criteria are essential in choosing the people or sites to be studied. Patton (1990) recommends specifying a minimum sample size "based on expected reasonable coverage of the phenomenon given the purpose of the study" (p. 1986).

The phenomenon of interest to us is the recent history of the expansion movement of Shi'a schools in Lebanon. To determine the time period encompassed by recent history, the author covered the period starting from the early 1960s till our present day, the year 2009. To trace the movement of Shi'a political mobilization, the author covered the period from the year 1960 which was a major turning point in the community political history under the leadership of Sayyid Musa el- Sadr.

To increase their representation based on geographic location and in a way to represent the various types of private Shi'a schools, the educational institutions under study were selected according to their affiliation; those established by Amal under, first, the leadership of Musa al- Sadr (Al-Sadr Foundation) and later under the leadership of Nabih Berri (Amal Educational Institutions) form one sample; another sample is the institutions established by Hezbollah first under the leadership of Sayyid Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (Al-Mabarrat Schools) and later under the leadership of the new generation of the young clerics who form the backbone of Hezbollah today (Al-Mahdi Schools – Emdad Schools – Al-Mustapha Schools). The institutions were grouped according to their distribution in different areas (Jabal Amel, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Al- Biqua'a and al Hirmil).

The search for primary and secondary sources was grounded in the documents for the selected time period. The author also looked for patterns in the documents, for example, the individuals and groups prominently associated with the movement, and the

types of publications in which their views were expressed (e.g., conferences, proceedings, journals and working papers). As such patterns were found, they were used to search for additional primary and secondary sources.

Data Analysis Procedures

The most basic presentation of the study is a descriptive account; data are compressed and linked together in a narrative that conveys the meaning the researcher has derived from studying the phenomenon. Moving beyond basic description, interpretational analysis was used to identify recurrent themes in the primary and secondary sources. The challenge was to construct categories or themes that capture some recurring pattern that cuts across "the preponderance" of the data (Taylor & Bodgan, 1984, p. 139).

Categories or subcategories (or properties) are most commonly constructed through the constant comparative method of data analysis (Merriam, 1998). Units of data are literally sorted into groupings that have something in common. The task is to compare one unit of information with the next in looking for recurring regularities in the data. As Dey (1993, p. 44) argues that the process is one of breaking data down into bits of information and then assigning "these bits to categories or classes which bring these bits together again if in a novel way".

Following the interpretational analysis the author moved toward reflective analysis (Merriam, 1998). That is, he used his personal judgment to weave together his findings into a coherent story of how particular events, individuals and groups in the recent past initiated the rise and the expansion movement of Shi'a schools in Lebanon and helped it gain momentum.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Lebanese Educational System

Historical Roots

This section explores some of the characteristics of the Lebanese educational system. This system reflects sectarian division in the society and therefore serves to reinforce the traditional cleavages in the country.

In 1535, the Franco-Ottoman Concordat gave French citizens residing in the empire the right to conduct their own religious and community affairs freely. These rights became known as the “Capitulations”. The Capitulations began to spread out, and ultimately included not only French citizens, but Catholics and other Christian residents of the Empire (Hourani, 1946). With the defeat of Turkey in the First World War, Syria and Lebanon were put under the mandate of France. The religious communities were given similarly the rights to carry out their educational matters. A clear statement of this is Article 8 of the mandate:

> “The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose shall not be denied or impaired” (Khalil, 1962).

Two important things are to be perceived with reference to this article. The first is that it includes all communities, Christian and non-Christian, and the second is that its territorial coverage has also been expanded to include the coastal cities of Tripoli, Sidon

and Tyre, plus the towns of Baalbek in the Biqa'a Valley, the majority of whose populations were not Christian (Bashshur,1988).

It was this state of Greater Lebanon that became on May 23, 1926 the Republic of Lebanon, with a new constitution. Article 10 of this constitution echoes Article 8 of the mandate:

> "…The religious communities shall have the right to maintain their own schools, provided that they conform to the general prescription relating to public instruction as laid down by the State" (Khalil, 1962).

This state of affair laid the ground "for a long and serious polarization in education, which was to express a mixture of conflicting forces and trends" (Bashshur, 1988).

Characteristics of the Lebanese Educational System

The Lebanese educational system reflects the sectarian divisions of society. It has mirrored social cleavages, in that most schools represent particular sectarian communities. As far back as 1939, all religious private schools relied mostly on members of their own community. The student population of Muslim private schools was 97 percent Muslim, there were 89.5 percent Druze students in Druze schools and 97 percent Maronite students in Maronite schools (Bashshur, 1988).

Data is available for 1967-8 classifying schools by level and type of control and giving the number of students in each type. Religious schools (Catholic and non-Catholic) included in 1967-8 more than one-third (36.5 percent) of the total number of students, only a little less than the number of students in government schools (39.6 per cent), which leaves less than one-fourth (23.9 per cent) of the total in 1967-8 than they

did in 1939, particularly at the intermediate and upper secondary levels, religious schools continued to attract a large number of students (Bashshur, 1988). This led to another important feature of the educational scene of the 1960s and 1970s: social and economic polarization.

Besides, Valin (1969) found that 75 percent of the population of private schools was Christians, and the majority of Muslim students were found in public schools, and children from more privileged economic backgrounds pursued education in the private system, while the poor were concentrated in the public.

According to Valin (1969), the right of every citizen to a free elementary and secondary education, as guaranteed in Article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution, existed in principle but not in fact. Valin concluded that in Lebanon the reality was one of “scholastic predestination,” i.e., the length and nature of a child’s education was determined by the socioeconomic stratum into which he/she was born (Valin, 1969).

Hence, not only does each sect dominate a given type of school, but most students are concentrated into the same schools as their coreligionists. As late as the mid 1980s, a full 60 percent of Maronite students attended Christian schools, as did 58 percent of Catholic students, 38 percent of Greek Orthodox and 34 percent of Protestant students, whilst 84 percent of Armenians attended Armenian schools. The Sunnis were almost evenly divided between public, Muslim and secular schools, as well as the Druze, an indication of their low socio-economic status (Khashan, 1992).

Furthermore, the educational system has served to institutionalize communalism by means of its fundamental role as the primary agent of socialization. Thus, as well as over representing particular sects, the school system has been characterized by diverse structures, curriculums, languages of instruction and cultural emphases (Farsoun, 1973).

The French schools and the Christian religious schools established by European missionaries in the nineteenth century highlighted certain aspects of western culture and history, to the great detriment of Lebanese national identity (Chamie, 1980). Muslim private schools and public schools stressed on the pan-Arabist, pan-Syrian and pan-Islamist features of the Lebanese religious-cultural heritage. This fragmented nature of Lebanon's schools, has been facilitated by government subsidization, especially by giving government grants to private schools or charity organizations to help them continue functioning with minimal governmental surveillance and with general educational autonomy enjoyed by the private educational sector (Barakat, 1977).

These characteristics of the educational system have not only reinforced sectarian identification, but have promoted the endorsement of foreign reference groups for each of Lebanon's sects. Additionally, such a system has simply emphasized the coincidence of socio-economic and communal cleavages, and concurrently, nurtured the identification of unprivileged community members with their "sect-class" (Farsoun, 1973), with particular reference here to the Shiite community's self- perception.

Within the same context, one's access to quality education in Lebanon was predetermined by one's background and social status. The most prestigious schools were private, often foreign, and usually affiliated to ecclesiastical orders. Bashshur (1988) argued that there is a good reason to believe that there has been mutual reinforcement between the religious affiliation of students and that of the schools they went to, on the one hand, and their socio-economic background on the other. El-Amine (1980) conducted an empirical study in Saida in 1980, produced data that explains this inference. From the collected data, we can see that government schools clearly served the two lower occupational categories of small businessmen and semi-skilled and

unskilled workers (more than 90 per cent of their students came from these two categories), and that they also overwhelmingly served Muslim students (94 per cent of their students were either Sunni or Shiite Muslim). On the other hand, 30 percent of students in Catholic schools came from the two upper-level occupational categories of large-scale real estate owners and businessmen, and higher professionals, and 59 percent of Catholic school students were either Catholic or Maronite Christian. The Muslim schools (the Maqassid and the subsidized Free Islamic School) included only Muslim students who came almost from one sect (Sunni) and the majority of whom belonged to the middle and small business occupational categories (El-Amine, 1980).

The deduction that comes out from this data reveals a strong alliance among Sunni and Shiite Muslims of lower-middle and lower occupational categories and government, Muslim and subsidized private free schools, faced on the other side by an alliance among Christians, a great proportion of whom came from upper occupational categories, but all of whom went to Christian schools. Bashshur (1988) came to a conclusion that the shape and character of the educational scene, was polarized and lacking in balance, equity and justice.

These elite private educational institutions often ignored state edicts regulating private education and took advantage of negligent governmental supervision to implement their own didactic philosophies (Smock and Smock, 1975). Lebanon's private education system prided itself on what it felt was a cosmopolitan diversity in outlooks, media of instruction and curricula. What it could not pride itself with however, were the masses of alienated students that it produced (Halawi, 1992).

Furthermore, the roots of alienation among Lebanese students were as much cultural as socioeconomic. Observers noted that the educational socialization of students

in the foreign private schools served to damage their relationship to traditional cultural frames of reference (Farsoun, 1973; Halawi, 1992; Smock & Smock, 1975). They often pointed to the ensuing estrangement between graduates of these schools and their communities (Hares, 1985). The European language itself helped to perpetuate, on the local level, the hegemonic relationship between Western and non-Western peoples and cultures, center and periphery, colonizer and colonized (Halawi, 1992). In Lebanon, command of the French language was a respected social status. At the Francophone schools, students acquired, along with the language of the mandatory power, the ideological slants of the literature, as well as the value judgments attached to such terms as Levant, Arab, Eastern Civilization, etc. They identified with even reproduced French stereotypical attitudes toward their own native culture, and indeed, toward "natives" everywhere (Halawi, 1992; Smock & Smock, 1975).

School children were thus led to internalize a set of values that were in some crucial respects at variance with those to which they were exposed in their home environment; values which they heard were characteristic of Europeans and had made them as strong, wise and powerful as they were. At the same time the children could not help being aware that these virtues were not practiced by their own families and neighbors. This, naturally, was merely an indirect way of suggesting inferiority. Like its political counterpart therefore, Lebanon's educational system was under pressure (Halawi, 1992; Hares, 1985).

Moreover, Lebanon's private education system served to reinforce the traditional cleavages in the country (Hares, 1985). In 1971, with an estimated 18.3 percent of the total population in Lebanon, Mount Lebanon had 38.2 percent of the total number of schools in the country, compared to 17.8 percent and 22.1 percent for North Lebanon,

12.4 percent and 14.8 percent for South Lebanon, and 10.2 percent and 13.8 percent for the Biqa'a, respectively. Of the estimated 687 foreign private schools in the country in the late sixties, an overwhelming 77.5 percent was concentrated in the Mount Lebanon-Beirut region, in contrast to 9.7 percent in North Lebanon, 6.5 percent in South Lebanon, and 7.5 percent in the Biqa'a (Halawi, 1992). Undeniably, this was predominantly due to the general concentration of missionary activity in that region. But Smock & Smock (1975) indicate that in this period a further skewing of this distributional imbalance was underway. Between 1966 and 1971, the number of schools in each region, public and private, increased by 1.0 percent in Beirut, 1.4 percent in Mount Lebanon, and 0.7 percent in North Lebanon, while it dropped by 0.5 percent in South Lebanon, and 2.5 percent in the Biqa'a (Smock & Smock, 1975).

Distribution of Schools According to Sector and Region

The end of the Lebanese civil war witnessed a development in the number of schools both private and public in different Lebanese regions. Indexes of the Lebanese Educational system were compiled and analyzed by the Lebanese Educational Center for Research and Development for a 7 year period extending from 1996 to 2001. Data were also compiled and analyzed to show the development over 7 years between the years 2000 and 2007. Furthermore, the year 2000 was an important turning point in the educational history of Lebanon; with the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation army from the South and the Beka'a, these regions witnessed a significant development in the number of schools both private and public.

As a matter of fact, the total number of schools in Lebanon for the year 1996-97 was 2646 schools. This number has reached 2671 schools in 2000-2001 with an

increase of 25 schools (Educational Center for Research and Development, 2001).

Besides, public schools constituted 50% of the total number of schools in Lebanon for the year 2001. The number of private subsidized schools has decreased for the years 1996 till 2001 by 17 schools; this decrease was evident in all regions except the South and the Beka'a. For the same period, the private sector witnessed a development in the number of schools. In fact, 12 new schools were established in Mount Lebanon, 10 new schools in the South, 6 in the Suburbs of Beirut, 5 in Nabatiyeh and 1 school in the North. In contrast, the number of schools decreased by 16 in Beirut during the same period.

The following table shows the development in the number of schools both public and private for the years 1925 until 1986.

Table 1

Development in the Number of Schools (1925-1986)

Sector	Year						Total
	before 1925	1926-1940	1941-1955	1956-1970	1971-1985	1986	
public	27	53	363	364	263	323	1393
Private subsidized	7	18	51	132	65	106	379
Private	22	31	87	210	174	516	1040
total	56	102	501	706	502	945	2812

From Educational Center for Research and Development, 1987.

Table 2

Distribution of Schools by Sector and Region (1996-1997)

Region	Sector			Total
	Public	Private Subsidized	Private Paid	
Beirut	61	25	133	219
Suburbs	103	74	286	463
Mount Lebanon	189	46	127	362
North	425	80	140	645
Bekaa	252	97	130	480
South	152	39	79	270
Nabatityeh	127	33	47	207
Total	1310	394	942	2646

Table 3

Distribution of Schools by Sector and Region (2000-2001)

Region	Sector			Total
	Public	Private Subsidized	Private Paid	
Beirut	61	23	117	201
Suburbs	110	71	292	473
Mount Lebanon	186	38	139	363
North	433	74	141	648
Beka'a	257	98	129	484
South	153	37	89	279
Nabatityeh	135	36	52	223
Total	1335	1712	959	4965

From Educational Center for Research and Development, 1997; 2002.

The following table illustrates the development of schools by sector and region for the years 1996 until 2001.

Table 4

Development of Schools by Sector and Region (1996-2001)

1996-2001	Public	Private Subsidized	Private Paid	Total
Beirut	0	-2	-16	-18
Suburbs	7	-3	6	+10
Mount Lebanon	-3	-8	12	+1
North	8	-6	1	+3
Bekaa	4	1	-1	+4
South	1	-2	10	+9
Nabatiyeh	8	3	5	+16
Total	25	-17	17	+25

The following tables show the percentage of schools by region and sector for the years 1996 -1997 and 2000-2001.

Table 5

Percentage of Schools by Sector and Region (1996-1997)

Region	Sector			Total (%)
	Public (%)	Private Subsidized (%)	Private Paid (%)	
Beirut	27.9	11.4	60.7	100
Suburbs	22.2	16.0	61.8	100
Mount Lebanon	52.2	12.7	35.1	100
North	65.9	12.4	21.7	100
Bika'a	52.7	20.2	27.1	100
South	56.3	14.4	29.3	100
Nabatiyeh	61.4	15.9	22.7	100
Total	49.5	14.9	35.6	100

Table 6

Percentage of Schools by Sector and Region (2000-2001)

Region	Sector			Total (%)
	Public (%)	Private Subsidized (%)	Private Paid (%)	
Beirut	30.3	11.4	58.2	100
Suburbs	23.3	15.0	61.7	100
Mount Lebanon	51.2	10.5	38.3	100
North	66.8	11.4	21.8	100
Bika'a	53.1	20.2	26.7	100
South	54.8	13.3	31.9	100
Nabatiyeh	60.5	16.1	23.3	100
Total	50.0	14.1	35.9	100

From Center for Educational Research and Development, 1997; 2001.

The following table shows the percentage of schools by region and sector (2006-2007).

Table 7

Percentage of Schools by Sector and Region (2006-2007)

Region	Sector			Total (%)
	Public (%)	Private Subsidized (%)	Private Paid (%)	
Beirut	2.6	0.7	3.8	7.1
Suburbs	4.1	2.7	11.3	18.1
Mount Lebanon	6.6	1.5	5.3	13.4
North	16	2.8	6.6	25.4
Bika'a	9.4	3.2	4.8	17.4
South	5.7	1.2	3.1	10
Nabatiyeh	5.1	1.4	2.1	8.6
Total	49.5	13.5	37	100

From Center for Educational Research and Development, 1998; 2002; 2008.

The following table shows the total number of schools by sector over the period extending from the year 2000 until 2007.

Table 8

Number of Schools by Sector (2000-2007)

	Number of Schools		
	Public	Private subsidized	Private Paid
2000-2001	1335	377	959
2001-2002	1361	370	967
2002-2003	1366	371	967
2003-2004	1394	368	1014
2004-2005	1405	368	1026
2005-2006	1399	364	1025
2006-2007	1393	379	1040

From Center for Educational Research and Development, 2008.

Table 9

Number of Schools by Sector and Region (2000-2007)

Region	Public		Private Subsidized		Private Paid	
	2000-2001	2006-2007	2000-2001	2006-2007	2000-2001	2006-2007
Beirut	61	74	23	20	117	108
Suburbs	110	116	71	77	292	318
Mount Lebanon	186	186	38	41	139	149
North	433	449	74	80	141	185
Bika'a	257	263	98	90	129	134
South	153	161	37	33	89	86
Nabatiyeh	135	144	36	38	52	60

The following table shows the development in the number of schools by sector and region for the period extending from 2000 until 2007.

Table 10

Development of Schools by Sector and Region (2000-2007)

Region	Public	Private Subsidized	Private Paid	Total
Beirut	+13	-3	-9	+1
Suburbs	+6	+6	+26	+38
Mount Lebanon	0	+3	+10	+13
North	+16	+6	+44	+66
Bika'a	+8	-4	-3	+1
South	+6	-8	+5	+3
Nabatiyeh	+9	+2	+8	+19

From Center for Educational Research and Development, 1998; 2002; 2008.

The above tables show that the public sector had the largest increase for the period (1996-2001) where 25 new schools were built all over the Lebanese territory, matched up with17 private schools for the same period; besides, the greater development is showed up in the Beka'a and in the South where 32 new private and public schools were built for the same period.

For the year 2000-2001 the public sector has the greatest percentage of schools in the North with 66, 8%, in Nabatiyeh 60, 5%, in the Bika'a 53.1% and 54, 8% in the South. The private sector dominates in Beirut with 69, 6% and 71% in the Suburbs for the same period (2000-2001).

In 2007, the total number of schools in all regions for all sectors of the general education has reached 2812 schools out of which 50% are public. Besides, the period

2001-2007 showed a development in the private sector where 81 new private schools were built over the Lebanese territory; in addition 58 public schools were built over the same period. The significant increase is in the Suburbs with 38 new schools out of which 32 are private. Besides, 32 schools were built in the South and Nabatiyeh out of which 15 are private.

In total, it is clear from the above data that the peripheries, Suburbs, South and Biqa'a witnessed an important development in the number of schools both private and public for the period (1996-2007) thus spreading education to regions that were previously deprived.

Education in the Shi'a Community

Historical Overview

The period between (1900-1943). This section will review Shiite education throughout the first half of the Twentieth century. The alliance between religious and feudal leaders influenced the direction of Shiite education at that period. After independence, the low standard education available to the Shi'a came mainly from the public sector.

In fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were few educational establishments in Shiite areas; the only education offered was usually that given by the clerics in Qur'anic schools where basic literacy was taught, or in religious schools where both secular and religious education were available (Al Safa, 1981).

The Shi'a were narrowly involved in secular education and this could perhaps be explained by an examination of Shiite attitudes towards this new type of education. In fact, the main impediment to secular education came from the Ulama (cleric) (Al Amin,

1983). By virtue of their role as overseers of the Moslem legal system, they have been given control over religious, legal and social aspects of society. Likewise education was completely under their jurisdiction, since the teaching of Islamic traditions and religious sciences was the core of all Moslem instruction and knowledge. According to Harik (1968), religious schools exposed students to an education that was centered on Islamic vision as the only means by which to change the oppressive structures of society. These powerful religious institutions took control over the entire community (Harik, 1968).

Although the Shi'a were permitted by their religious law to investigate novel issues because of their wide opportunity of interpretation "Ijtihad" (Jafri & Husain, 1979), the Shiite did not show sufficient receptivity towards any novel contributions that can adjust their traditional Islamic culture. This could be attributed to the strong collaboration between feudal and religious leaders during this period; the feudal authority usually gave instructions on the kind of teachings to be carried out by the religious one. The teachings passed on to the people are said to be utilized to reinforce the interests and status quo of these two leading groups (Halawi, 1992), for the teachings contributed very little towards the education and enlightenment of the people who are described as very "backward" and almost illiterate as a result of their blind following to the Ulama's instructions (Hourani, 1966). It is also added that it was the responsibility of the Ulama (cleric) to watch that the kind of instruction cultivated in Shiite schools did not exceed the religious principles of the Shiite dogma supplemented by eulogies and praises to the power of the feudal notables. This state of affairs resulted in the Shiite educational lag in comparison to other communities in Lebanon (Ajami, 1986).

According to the view outlined above, Shiite feudal and religious leaders seem

to have reinforced each other's positions and collaborated to maintain a stagnant feudal social structure in the name of sustaining Shiite communal identity (Al-Amin, 1983). Given the above claims, it would be expected that these leaders would not favor the development and spread of education among the Shiites. It has been orally related that even during the second decade of the twentieth century, some Shiites feudal lords and Ulama strongly resisted some efforts of the Mandate to establish public elementary schools in the Shiite areas, and that some of the Ulama went as far as issuing legal opinions forbidding the entry of Shiite students to these schools (Attiyah, 1972).

Furthermore, issues such as educational facilities became significant political matters given the fact that local rivalries reflecting patronage alignments continued to affect the cleric's ability to transform any kind of public or clerical association into coordinated action. Their need to satisfy patrons was so intense at times that group paralysis overrode the ability to agree on a course of action for the common good. Even when the Ulama could form organized groups to address particular issues, they could not dissociate themselves from their culture of political dependence (Mallat, 1988). The fate of Jam'iyyat al-Ulama al-Amiliyya is a good example of the lack of clerical independence that encouraged such paralysis. The Society was formed in 1929 largely at the instigation of Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya and brought together Amili Ulama for discussions and actions on mainly educational issues. The Society's main goal was to establish a school for the Amili Shi'a. Despite sufficient money having been collected for the school, a location was never satisfactorily established; Mughniyya wanted it at Tyre, to improve the standing of his patron Kazim al-Khalil, and Shaykh Muhsin al-Amin wanted it at Nabatiyya, due to his links with Yusuf al Zayn (Shanahan, 2005). In the late 1930s, after the death of Shaykh Mughniyya, the Society was dissolved without

the school ever having been built.

In fact, the patronage of Ahmad bey al Assaad, the most famous feudal lord in Jabal Amel during the first half of the twentieth century, played an important role in limiting the spread of education in that area. For him, the thought that a modern system of education would serve the peasantry and change things would definitely establish chaos and disorder in his sphere of influence; schools had to be denied if his power and authority were not to be undermined or challenged (Ajami, 1986).

Even though the difficulties to spread education in the Shiite areas were so intense, significant efforts for the establishment of Shiite private schools were launched by the Amiliyya society. The Amiliyya Society was founded in 1923 to provide educational services to the Shi'a migrants in Beirut. Probably one of the most impressive periods in the evolution of the Society's educational program was from 1937 to 1948. It witnessed a phase of expansion of activities to the South, with the opening of village schools. The first school was opened in Hariss in 1937. The following year, fifteen more were opened. The village schools opened by the Amiliyya were a significant, but short lived, contribution to the educational life of the South. By 1944, the village schools of the Amiliyya were closed. It is doubtful that a desire among the society's general membership to abandon village schools played any role in this event. Indeed it stems from the opposition of southern Zu'ama to the Amiliyya project (Attiyah, 1972).

The period between (1943-1990). With the birth of independence, the condition of the Shiite community became more or less defined as a part of the multi-sectarian society which independent Lebanon came to be. Hence the political and social

uncertainties, which the Shiites had experienced up to the period of Independence and which had influenced the scope of their educational efforts, have lessened to a considerable degree by 1943. Assuming the validity of this observation, it is quite likely that Shiite private education after that date needs to be studied in the light of the new status of the Shiite. It is well known that since independence, public education in Lebanon has been expanding considerably (Attiyeh, 1972; Hares, 1985; Smock & Smock, 1975). Thus, it is expected that at least some of the energies that had been earlier directed by various Lebanese communities towards establishing their own schools would now be channeled towards pressuring the government to provide public school opportunities for the various communities, especially those that do not have a strong network of private schools and that includes the Shiite community. Consequently, the study of Shiite education after independence could hardly be separated from efforts to seek the establishment of public schools in the regions with a high Shiite population.

As a result of the limited opportunity to formal education available to the Shiite community, their general level of literacy was low; only 31 percent of the Shiites could read or write in 1943, in comparison with 68 percent of the Catholics (Nasr, 1985). The fact that Mount Lebanon, the Maronite stronghold, had the highest level of literacy in Lebanon, while the South and the Biqua'a had the lowest, attests to the above observation (Hudson, 1968). In a similar vein, the ratio of students to regional population was highest for the Beirut- Mount Lebanon area and lowest for the South and the Biqa'a, as reported by the IRFED mission in 1959 (Hudson, 1968).

Table 11

Analphabetism by Zone of Residence (1974)

	Population (%)	Analphabets (%)
Beirut	2.5	4.9
Suburbs	9.7	16.5
Other Cities	5.9	7.7
Mount Lebanon	14.9	15.8
North Lebanon	16.7	11.9
South Lebanon	26.1	19.3
The Biqa'a	36.6	23.5

From Yves Schemeil,1976.

According to the above table, Beirut with 2.5% of the total population has only 4.9% of its inhabitants analphabet in contrast to the South with 26.1% of the total population has 19.3% of its population analphabet.

Moreover, the Shi'a poverty resulted in their substandard education. While 73% of the Lebanese are literate, only 21% of the Shiite are (Schemeil, 1976). Using 1971 data, Chamie (1980) noted that they were the most poorly educated (50% with no schooling vs. 30% state wide). In his 1968 study, Michael Hudson found that in the two regions where the Shi'a predominate, al-Biqa'a and the South, Only 13% of Shi'a students attend secondary schools. This is at least five points fewer than all other sects. Tabbara (1979), analyzing educational differentials, found that in 1971, only 6.6% of the Shi'a had a secondary education, whereas 15% of the Sunni and 17% of the Christians had similar training. Analphabetism in 1971 reached 31 percent among Shi'a husbands and 70 percent among Shi'a wives, while it was only 13 percent and 20 percent respectively among non Catholic Christians. Moreover, the Shiites who did

attend school completed the lowest number of academic years, with an average of 1.6 years for woman and 3.3 years for men, presumably only reaching the primary level (Chamie, 1981). Only 2 percent of Shi'a husbands had university degrees as compared to 8 percent for non Catholic Christians, 6 percent for Catholics and Sunnis, and 3 percent for the Druze (Fiches du Monde Arabe, 1983).

This educational deficiency of the Shi'a is partially due to their confessional education allocation. Citing official Lebanese government statistics for 1974, Sharif (1978) found that while the South had about 20 percent of the national population, it received less than 0.7 percent of the state budget with the lowest amount allocated to the building of schools and the spread of education.

Noteworthy to mention that, the community's low level of education relative to other communal groups was only compounded by the poor quality of education they were subject to. This was due to the fact that 68% of the students in the South and 51% in the Beka'a attended public schools in 1966 (Receuil de Statistiques Libanaises, 1970). Within the same context, the study conducted by Khuri (1975) of the suburbs of Chiyah and Ghobeiry, at a time when the former was overwhelmingly inhabited by Maronites, emphasizes this claim. Khuri (1975) explored the difference in educational services between Ghobeiry and Chiah. This difference did not lie in the number of schools but in the way they were organized. In Ghobeiry, sixteen of the twenty-three schools which combined Kindergarten and elementary programs are run for profit by single entrepreneurs. Many have no playgrounds, no laboratories, and no teaching aids; school equipment is limited to chairs, desks and blackboards. Five of the other schools offer intermediate educational programs (up to tenth grade) and two secondary programs. Three of the intermediate schools and one secondary school are owned by

single entrepreneurs; the rest are public schools. In Chiah, on the other hand, there are fourteen schools: four offer secondary programs (two pubic, two private) three intermediate (two public, one private), six elementary (one public, five private), and one Kindergarten (private). One of the private secondary schools, and two of the five private elementary schools, and the Kindergarten are run by Catholic orders; they are duplicates of those found throughout the country. They offer two advantages in education: high quality and a standard curriculum. They are better staffed and equipped. The programs they teach are so standardized throughout the country, leading from elementary school to college, that the student loses no credit if he transfers from one school to another or from elementary to secondary or from secondary to college. Although expensive, these schools are in high demand. The other private schools are run and owned by individual entrepreneurs; they are better equipped and staffed than those in Ghobeiry. Apparently, the knowledge the people of Chiyah have about modern education forces the school "businessmen" to observe a minimum of educational standard. On the other hand, because of the fact that most parents in Ghobeiry had low level education, the quality of private education there is, to put it mildly, below standard (Khuri, 1975).

The same state of affair prevailed in 1982; the Shi'a were exposed to low quality of education. 58 percent of Southern students received public education, as did 47 percent of the Biqa'a student population. In those areas, public schools were below standard in staffing and equipment. In juxtaposition, 84 percent of all Mount Lebanon's students were students of private schools, in addition to the 77.5 percent of all Beirut's students. (General Statistics, 1982-1983). The fact that the majority of these private schools followed either a French or English curriculum further widened the educational disparities between the communities.

In 1991, the Shiites still exhibit a high degree of public school attendance. In his survey, Khashan (1992) compared communities rather than regions; he found that 46.5% of the Shiite university students had been to public schools before entering university. Along with the Druze, only a negligible number had attended Christian private schools and only a minority had received a secular education. In short, only 12 percent had attended foreign private schools, in contrast to 70 percent of Maronites, 92 percent of Protestants, 75 percent of Catholics, 70 percent of Greek Orthodox and 31 percent of the Sunnis (Khashan, 1992).

Adding to the above claim that the Shi'a exhibited a high degree of public school attendance, only 27 percent of all Shi'a students had completed their secondary school education in 1988 (Hanf, 1993). By 1990, almost one-third of the entire Lebanese secondary school student body was composed of Shi'a (Hezbollah Consulting Center for Studies and Documentation, 1995).

However, signal of growth and improvement began to surface at the end of this period noting an increase in the education of women. In that context, progress was made in the period between 1969 and 1990 where the proportion of female to male students in the South and Biqua'a increased. Initially, males were overrepresented, especially at the secondary school level in all Lebanese regions. In the South for example, there were 1068 male students versus 539 female students in 1969. By 1990, the number of females outnumbered that of males by 37 percent in the South and by 22 percent in the Biqua'a (General Statistics, 1990-91). Such statistics considered the enhanced social prestige accorded to Shi'a women, on account of their incorporation into the educational system.

Over and above these developments, the number of Shi'a students who attended

private schools also increased over this period. Whereas only 32 percent of students in the South were enrolled in private schools in 1966, their number grew to 42 percent in 1982 and reached its zenith in 1990, with 49 percent of all students attending private schools. For Baalbek alone, the number of private school students grew from 6381 in 1968 to 27371 in 1990, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the number of schools and teachers (General Statistics 1990-91).

Progress was also pronounced at the university level. Although it was noted above that only 7 percent of all Shiites received a university education in 1987, in the Shiite suburbs of Haret Hreik and Burj-el-Brajneh, 15 and 12 percent of all inhabitants, respectively held university degrees. In the southern town of Nabatiyeh, 16 percent of all residents had completed a higher education, indicative of the intrusion of social mobilization into rural regions (Hanf, 1993). By 1990, one-third of all Shi'a secondary school graduates proceeded to university and in turn, 35 percent of all Shi'a university graduates pursued postgraduate studies. On the national level, one quarter of all university graduates were Shi'a, as were 23 percent of all postgraduate students (Hezbollah Consulting Center for Studies and Documentation, 1995).

The Expansion Period (1990 – 2009)

The year 1990 marked the end of 15 years of civil war and the beginning of a new era of construction and development. The educational sector among others witnessed a period of growth in the different Lebanese regions and especially in the regions inhabited by the Shi'a community. In this research study we looked at the 1994 educational statistics as a starting point for the building process that was initiated in 1990 at the end of the civil war. A comparison with the 2007 educational statistics is

made to look at the current Shii educational condition.

The following tables show the development in the number of both schools and students in the various districts of the South and in the Southern Suburb of Beirut, mainly inhabited by Shiite population over the period extending from 1994 until 2007.

Table 12

District of Bint Jbeil: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	40	71.4	41	57.75
Private Subsidized	8	14.3	12	16.9
Private Paid	8	14.3	18	25.35
Total	56	100	71	100
		Students		
Public	7881	61.9	7479	44.85
Private Subsidized	3312	26	4244	25.45
Private Paid	1544	12.1	4947	29.67
Total	12737	100	16670	100

Table 13

District of Saida: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	44	57.9	49	56.4
Private Subsidized	15	19.75	14	16
Private Paid	17	22.4	24	27.6
Total	76	100	87	100
		Students		
Public	8811	49	13041	52.9
Private Subsidized	4795	26.6	5602	22.7
Private Paid	4394	24.4	6027	24.4
Total	18000	100	24670	100

Table 14

District of Tyre: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	66	62.25	77	60.15
Private Subsidized	15	14.15	15	11.7
Private Paid	25	23.6	36	28.15
Total	106	100	128	100
		Students		
Public	17778	50.4	22943	50.3
Private Subsidized	5133	14.6	5602	12.3
Private Paid	12344	35	17027	37.4
Total	35255	100	45572	100

Table 15

District of Nabatiyeh: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	45	72.6	56	58
Private Subsidized	7	11.3	16	16.5
Private Paid	10	16.1	25	25.5
Total	62	100	97	100
		Students		
Public	11184	54.55	15679	44.8
Private Subsidized	1697	8.27	5898	16.85
Private Paid	7625	37.18	13407	38.35
Total	20506	100	34984	100

Table 16

Haret Hreik and Burj Brajneh: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	17	18.7	24	18.9
Private Subsidized	22	24.2	30	23.6
Private Paid	52	57.15	73	57.5
Total	91	100	127	100
		Students		
Public	6694	19	10546	20
Private Subsidized	7544	21.3	10862	21
Private Paid	21121	59.7	30096	59
Total	35359	100	51054	100

Table 17

Chiah and Ghobeiry: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Public	15	18	13	25.5
Private Subsidized	30	35.7	22	43.1
Private Paid	39	46.4	16	31.4
Total	84	100	51	100
		Students		
Public	2971	12	5529	25.5
Private Subsidized	9720	39	6135	28.3
Private Paid	12198	49	10011	46.2
Total	24889	100	21675	100

The following table shows the development in the number of Shiite schools with the development in the number of students going to those schools over the period extending from 1994 until 2007.

Table 18

Shiite Associations: Schools and Students (1994; 2007)

	1994		2007	
	N	%	*N*	%
		Schools		
Nabatiyeh	1	1.6	7	11.35
Saida	0	0	5	5.75
Bint Jbeil	0	0	7	9.85
Tyre	9	8.5	15	11.7
Chiah & Ghobeiry	5	5.95	5	10.4
Haret-Hreik & Burj-Brajneh	0	0	9	7
		Students		
Nabatiyeh	2074	10	8408	24
Saida	0	0	3001	12.16
Bint Jbeil	0	0	2670	16
Tyre	4857	13.8	7354	16.5
Chiah & Ghobeiry	3061	12.3	6100	29.6
Haret-Hreik & Burj-Brajneh	0	0	8332	16.3

From Center for Educational Research and Development, 1994; 2007.

The above data shows an important development in the private sector; as a matter of fact, in the district of Bint Jbeil, 28% of the schools were private in 1994 with 38% of the students' population going to private schools. In 2007, the percentage of private schools in that district rose to 42% with 55% of the students' population going to those schools. Similarly, in the district of Nabatiyeh, 27% of the schools were private in 1994, this percentage rose to 42% in 2007. The student population going to private

schools in that district moved from 45% to 55% for the same period of time. Besides, schools that belong to Shiite associations were nonexistent in some regions and their number was modest in others. In the district of Bint Jbeil, only one Shiite school existed in 1994, and this is mainly due to the Israeli occupation; after the withdrawal of the year 2000, 7 Shiite schools were established. The same token for the region of Haret Hreik and Burj Brajneh, 9 Shiite schools were established by 2007.

Although, the period extending from 1994 until 2007 according to the above data showed an expansion of the Shiite educational institutions with an increase in the percentage of students going to those institutions, the percentage of public school attendance in the South is still high with approximately 45% in the district of Bint Jbeil, 53% in the district of Saida, 50% in the district of Tyre and 49% in the district of Nabatiyeh, which explains the reliance of a large segment of Southern students on public education .

Factors that Hindered the Development of Shiite Education

This section of the chapter will review the factors deemed responsible for hindering the development of Shiite education. Historically, the Shi'a were misrepresented in Lebanon and in the Arab world, both at the local and regional level; their educational achievements were ignored. Adding to that, the Shi'a religious beliefs consent to dissimulation as a means for self-preservation; this led to the loss of a large segment of their history mainly in the educational realm. Furthermore, the socio-economic backwardness of the Shi'a is a major cause of their educational underdevelopment. Therefore, this chapter will examine the historical, religious and socio-economic factors that hindered the development of Shiite education.

Historical Factors

Local. Most books written on Lebanon concerning its Shi'a community accord less than passing remarks that deal with its history and its cultural contribution. Urquhart (1860), a nineteenth century traveler, considered them "unclasssible"; Fouad Ajam (1986), himself a Shi'a from South Lebanon, characterized their history as "one of submission". The recent "Shi'a awakening" (Sicking & khairallah, 1974) in Lebanon is an important phase in a continuum largely ignored by Lebanese and Arab historians for ideological reasons and, in general, by a historiography that is more often a reflection of the power relationships in the respective societies. Any examination of the dynamics creating this situation has to consider the convergence of certain local and regional factors (Halawi, 1992). Among these factors, we find the social organization of the early Shi'a in Lebanon and the transformation of the Maronite community into a "historic bloc," (Charara, 1977; Jaber, 1980; Salibi, 1965), with all the consequences that affected other communities, the persistent hegemony of successive Sunni dynasties in the eastern Arab world, coupled with the rise of non-Arab, Iran, as the only Shi'a power in the Muslim world and the dissimulation of the Shi'a religious beliefs (Halawi, 1992).

In effect, the harsh conditions that their land was exposed to, hide their history. According to Shi'a narratives and folktale, this was attributed to the Crusaders and to Ahmad Pasha al- Jazzar, Ottoman (Wali) governor of Syria (1720- 1804), who destroyed the important Shi'a libraries of the emirate of Bani Ammar in Tripoli (1058-1109) and those of Jabal Amel respectively (Al Safa, 1981; Al Urfan, 1910). Besides, the history of the Shi'a offers only a narrow and partial formulation of key movements in Shi'a history. More importantly, it invalidates and makes ambiguous much of the

influential sources of that history (Halawi, 1992).

Effectively, through textbooks and official government publications, the history of Mount Lebanon, and in particular that of the rise of the Maronite community in that region, became the modern history of Lebanon to the point that many non-Maronite youths, Shi'a and others lost the sense of their own history and of the heritage of their own communities. After being transformed, under the direction of its clergy into a "historic bloc" (Charara, 1977; Jaber, 1980; Salibi, 1965), the Maronite community succeeded in imposing its supremacy on the state apparatus. The effect was the equating of Lebanese nationalism with Maronite ideology, thus denying the very plurality of Lebanon, eradicating the historical and cultural contexts of other communities, and preventing them from studying their history or from studying the common national history (Halawi, 1992).

Regional. Moreover, Arab historians have often viewed Shi'a thought as an out of time doctrine. This approach has also accorded little attention to regional differences. For "Jaafari Shiism" which is found in Lebanon, this meant the assimilation of its history, at least until recently, into the history of the Shi'a movement at large (Jafri & Husain, 1979).

In fact, with only brief intervals, the Shi'a have endured varying degrees of isolation, discrimination or persecution. Politically, the Shi'a are perceived as dissenters, unwilling to endorse the system of succession (khilafa) and the established order; therefore, Shiism is an incitement to rebellion, designed to tear apart the solidarity of the Muslim population. At the extreme, Shiism came to be seen, not as a separate school of Islamic thought, but as a heretical movement that undermines the

principles of Islam (Ajami, 1986).

Consequently, the engagement of the Shi'a in public affairs has thus been, and continues to be, constrained by these charges. The political participation of the Shi'a was limited to failed insurgencies under the early Muslim caliphates and to brief periods of tolerance under local sultans in the tenth-eleventh century otherwise political estrangement was the norm for the Shi'a during much of Muslim history. The Shi'a consequently retreated from public life and affairs of states and were in turn marginalized in the affairs of the great Muslim empires, with the significant exception of Iran starting in the sixteenth century (Batatu, 1981). Therefore, the position of the Shi'a in the states and societies in which they live is the historical legacy of their rejection of the legitimacy of government, the reciprocal rejection by Sunni authority of the Shi'a, and their consequent sense of dispossession and alienation.

In Iraq, as an example, and under the rule of Faisal (1921-1933), the world of the "mujtahids" (religious jurists) was being increasingly destabilized; the vast control they possessed over religious and educational matters was undermined by a state with a totally dissimilar cultural and political disposition (Bell, 1927). Faysal had no particular hostility toward the Shi'a. However, the political class around him was hostile to the Shi'a. Some of his entourage brought to the new polity a rigid, really Germanic, view of nationalism that was almost racialist in its assumption about who was an "Arab" and who was not (Halawi, 1992). The new political class was determined to break the religious authority in the Shi'a holy cities, composed as it was of Persian and Arab (Kedourie, 1970). Sati al Husri (1880-1968), the most prominent Pan-Arabist ideologue of his time, imposed and defined the traits of a conventional educational system; he saw the Shi'a society of Iraq and its religious class as barriers and impediments to a uniform

Arab culture. Sati al Husri, who had been a fervent Ottomanist, and from his post as director general of the Ministry of Education, imposed a system of education which rewrote much of Islamic history, giving importance to its Arab foundation, ignoring and altering the contributions of the high medieval culture of Persian Islam. In the "pure" Arab historiography of Sati al Husri and his political class, the Shi'a and their religious authority were men beyond the limits of the "Arab nation" (Kedourie, 1970; Ajami, 1986).

Similarly, history books in Saudi schools ignore the history of the Shi'a. Until 1993, schoolbooks openly denounced Shi'a beliefs as (bid'a) innovators. The Shi'a were referred to as (rafida) rejecters, a very derogatory term, and often referred to also as (muchrikeen) polytheists or unbelievers, against whom it is a duty to lead (Jihad) holy war. Besides, students are warned against mixing with the Shi'a unless to advise them, as mixing with them could have a dangerous influence. A Tawhid book of 1992, also mentioned that the Saudi religious class devotes great effort to denouncing the practice of Shi'a thus raising awareness among Muslims of the importance of suppressing or destroying their doctrine (Prokop, 2003).

The curriculum was changed, reportedly after protests, and the term (rafida) rejecter is no longer used in official textbooks. Nevertheless, Shi'a beliefs continue to be denounced in books distributed at Saudi-financed mosques both within the country and abroad. As a matter of fact, Shi'a are not allowed to teach religion in Saudi schools (Prokop, 2003).

Therefore, the "Arab awakening" had in effect rewritten history while ignoring and excluding the Shi'a community. Still, this "Arab awakening" was unknown to the impoverished and quiescent population of Jabal Amel (Ajami, 1986).

Religious Factors

More importantly, however, the Shi'a in defending their doctrinal independence in the face of persecutions, (during the reign of the Ummayad and the Abbasside or others), practiced "taqqiya", a doctrine that authorizes the faithful, in case of great danger, to hide his religious conviction (Jafri & Husain, 1979). "Taqqiya" or dissimulation was the pragmatic and exceptional response of an embattled minority to a larger Sunni world and to a harsh balance of power (Ajami, 1986; Fadl Allah, 1985).

In fact, the reign of the second Abbassid Caliph Al Mansur was predominantly oppressive against the Shi'a. In order to survive, the Shi'a adopted dissimulation, or withdrawal to their traditional institutions and values, such as their religious and doctrinal identity. Prevented from open self expression and banned from active public participation, the Shi'a often resorted to open revolt which risked their extermination (Kohlbergh, 1975). Those two practices touch upon an apparent mystery in Shi'a thought whereby two opposing dispositions are equally accepted and praised. Within the context of this thought, where martyrdom and salvation play a central role, dissimulation is the application, pushed to the limit, of the principle of passive resistance to oppression. Consequently, the need to resort to dissimulation for the protection and the propagation of the Shi'a dogma sometimes led to the problem of dissimulation in history, namely to the covering up of certain historical traditions or to their rewriting in symbolism that is not discernable. In the hope of self-preservation therefore, "Shi'a history turned inward" (Ajami, 1986). In the name of self-preservation, however, important segments of that history may have been erased. Within the same context, "taqiyya" and its ramifications, contributed to the defensiveness of the Lebanese Shi'a community towards its own history, a history that came to be written

and taught, for the most part, from the perspective of an “Other”. While the former may have caused the gradual disintegration of important segments of this history, the latter simply delegitimized it (Halawi, 1992).

Economic Factors

The primary objective of this section is to explore and understand the features of the Lebanese Shiite socio-economic backwardness which is a main reason for their educational underdevelopment. In fact, the Shi’a community was mainly agrarian; the decline of the agricultural sector accompanied with the dominance of the commercial sector contributed to the impoverishment of the community. Besides, the Shi’a high population growth further amplified their misery. An exploration of those factors provides an understanding of the factors that hindered Shiite education.

In fact, the Lebanese Shi’a were originally concentrated in Jabal Amil and the Beqa’a. Each of these two major groups of Shiite followed a distinct track of development. Jabal Amil was nearly always able to support a stable form of rain fed agriculture. Its society was settled and become dominated by a handful of large land-lords, who exercised strong feudal power over their farmers. The Northern Beqa’a was the driest part of Lebanon; settled agriculture was rarely feasible and could support only a semi nomadic society. The Shiite from there were clans living under an honor code (Ajami, 1986).

Agriculture was traditionally the main source of livelihood in Jabal Amil and the Biqua’a. Until the late 1950s, it employed nearly 90 percent of the population. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry lived on small holdings and practiced dry-farming. A sample study conducted in 1972 by the Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO) in cooperation with the Litani Authority, a Lebanese governmental institution, estimated the total cultivated area in Southern Lebanon then at 48,000 hectares. In 1973, another study for the Biqua'a, put the total cultivated area in the Biqua'a plain at 87,000 hectares. On the whole, and according to the same studies, the Biqua'a s and the South's contribution to the gross agricultural product in Lebanon was 30 percent in 1973 and 26 percent in 1974 respectively (The Arab League, 1980; The Lebanese Communist Party, 1973, Salih, 1973). Land tenure on the other hand continued to be extremely unequal, in many ways reflecting its Ottoman heritage. The agrarian laws and the administrative measures promulgated in 1858, 1880, and in 1913, apparently, aimed at the creation of small peasant holdings (Al-Safa, 1981). However, in effect, they facilitated the wholesale acquisition of land by tribal chiefs. The peasants, eager to escape conscriptions, taxes, often sold their prescriptive rights and left the land, or transferred the titles to their leaders and stayed on as tenants or sharecroppers in return for protection from conscriptions or taxes (Al-Safa, 1981).

Furthermore, the coming of the French in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the subsequent creation of the Grand Liban and of the Lebanese Republic in 1920 and 1926 respectively further exacerbated the existing inequities in the Shi'a areas (Dahir, 1975). New laws of 1921, intended to divide the villages into private holdings, benefited only the established Shi'a families who had the financial means. The inactivity of successive Lebanese governments on the issue, however, was characteristic. And although, Shi'a agriculture was to experience major transformations in independent Lebanon, and medium holdings would emerge, by 1970, 8.12 percent of the landowners in the South and 14.41 of those in the Biqa'a still controlled 68.2 percent and 73.6 percent of the agricultural land there (The Lebanese Communist

Party, 1973).

As previously stated, as late as the 1950's as much as 90 per cent of the Shiite labor force in the South and the Biqa'a was engaged in the agricultural sector (Halawi, 1992), working as sharecroppers, semi salaried employees of the Regie de Tabacs and workers in the citrus fruit orchards. By the 1970s, almost three-quarters of the South's agricultural workforce were employed in the Regie and a corresponding amount represented the South's contribution to Lebanon's entire tobacco production (Halawi, 1992).

The impoverishment of the Shiite tobacco-growing peasantry was shown by their low wages, averaging LL 1,208.14, only LL 8.14 more than the LL 1.200 poverty edge marked by the IRFED (Institut de Recherches de Formation en vue de Development Harmonise) in 1961 (Halawi, 1992), compared with the urban service sector workers who earned almost nine times as much (Ajami, 1986). The mass of tobacco cultivators earned forty-two times less than the top 71 "major growers" (Halawi, 1992). Besides, the Regie had monopoly over the entire tobacco industry, whereby the cultivation, processing and marketing of the tobacco was exclusively regulated by the Regie. Furthermore, the Shi'a (Zuama) chiefs were also empowered to grant licenses for tobacco cultivation at caprice, and to price the tobacco crop as they saw fit. Thus, the small peasants were economically dependent not only on the policies of the Regie, but also on the favors granted by their (Zuama) chiefs. Over and above this, the political influence exerted by powerful tobacco importers undermined the local production of tobacco, by decreasing its share in the market by 32 percent over a five year period (Halawi, 1992). As such, the general condition of the Shiite peasantry was basically destitute, a state which was only aggravated by the winter drought of 1973,

which further drained their economic resources and indebted them to loan-sharks (Halawi, 1992).

The most important factors in the impoverishment of Lebanon's rural world, however, have been the laissez-faire attitude of the successive Lebanese governments and the hegemony of commercial interests over much of the agricultural sector. Government neglect and lenient supervision allowed the increasing deterioration of the rural society and the exploitation of the peasantry at every stage of the production cycle. The importance of these circumstances lies in their ability to evoke class consciousness among the Shi'a community (Huntington, 1971).

Actually, Lebanon passed through a new era of economic transformation in the down of the sixties. Beirut developed into the financial and commercial heart of the region and became a large trade business center linking the West with the oil areas of the Middle East (Farsoun and Carroll; 1976). In fact, taking advantage of its strategic location, Beirut benefited first from the closure of Haifa to Arab trade during the aftermath of the Palestinian War of 1948, second from a pool of capital from the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, and finally from refugee deposits from politically troubled Arab countries, as well as from remittances from emigrants to their families. Lebanon in those years experienced an exceptional, although uneven and marginal, economic boom well illustrated in the development of its banking sector (Dubar & Nasr, 1976; Halawi, 1992).

The commercial sector played the most important role in the Lebanese Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The rise in GNP from $ 520 million in 1953 to $ 725 million in 1963, as well as the increase in per capita income from $ 235 in 1950 to $ 449 in 1963, both testify to this economic boom (Hudson, 1968). All in all, the share of the

tertiary sector grew from 62 percent in 1960, to nearly 72 percent in 1970 (Dubar & Nasr, 1976). This overdependence on services, in addition to posing as an extremely vulnerable source of income, generated an urban-rural gap by concentrating all economic activities in Beirut, to the detriment of the countryside (Tabbara, 1979). Thus, the capital and the nearby Maronite areas in the Lebanese Mountain, enjoyed a high degree of economic prosperity, whilst the rural regions, the Shiites South and the Biqua'a especially, got weaker under the state's neglect of the industrial and agricultural sectors (Halawi, 1992). This hegemony of the tertiary sector exposed by the weakness of the industrial sector accompanied by an accelerating decline of the agricultural sector explained the following figures. Between 1948 and 1974, the share of the industrial sector in the GDP grew by a modest 2.2 percent, the agricultural sector dropped from 20 percent to less than 9 percent. The segment of the active population working in agriculture diminished markedly from 48.9 percent in 1959, to 17 percent in 1974 (Baalbaki, 1985). The outcome of this phenomenon was the impoverishment of the peasantry which constituted 50 percent of the Lebanese workforce, but who only received 15 percent of the national income in 1956 (Joseph, 1975). By 1970, the remaining 19 percent of the population who were still engaged in agricultural employment received only 9.5 percent of GNP (Khashan, 1992). These figures stand in sharp contrast to the service sector, whose commercial, financial and rentier classes in 1956 comprised 14 percent of the workforce, and who built up 46 per cent of the GNP (Joseph, 1975). In 1970, the commercial sector alone represented 30 per cent of the national income, although it included only 13 percent of the economically active population (Khashan, 1992).

In effect, Lebanon's economic growth served only to benefit the well-to-do and

wealthy, particularly members of the service economy. The pyramidal social class structure which typified Lebanese society, assured that the 50% destitute of the population, received 18 percent of the GNP, compared with the top 4 percent who collected 32 percent (Barakat, 1977). Over and above this, the unequal distribution of income was characterized by sectarian identification, in view of the fact that the country's economic elite employed in commerce, finance, real estate and so forth, was chiefly Christian, whereas those employed in the neglected agricultural and industrial sectors were predominantly Muslim, Shiite in particular (Joseph, 1975).

Hence, the transformation of Lebanon from an agrarian republic into an extended city state (Hourani, 1966), the absence of a conscious governmental policy to alleviate or to respond to the pressures of these structural changes in the national economy, and the overflow of the regional and international dynamics had far reaching consequences for the mostly agrarian Shi'a community.

However, the pressures generated on Shi'a society by the continuous decline of the agricultural sector were aggravated by the regional concentration of the needed infrastructure for the other sectors of the Lebanese economy in non-Shi'a areas. This concentration, was the result of the indifference of the "merchant republics" of Bishara al Khoury (September 21, 1943- September 18, 1952) and of Kamil Chamoun (September 22, 1952- Septembre 23, 1958) displayed towards the predominantly Shi'a peripheral regions of the country with the full complicity of its traditional leadership (Halawi, 1992). Furthermore, the "one Lebanon rather than two" vision President Fouad Shihab (September 23, 1958 - Septembre 23, 1964) tried to fulfill by attempting to improve the conditions of those underdeveloped regions without eliminating the system of uncontrolled capitalism and of political sectarianism mostly ended in frustration

(Salibi, 1966). Despite, the enormous expansion in public-work projects, Shihabism accomplishment was minimal, primarily because it failed to ingrain in the Lebanese ethos a sense of the common good (Hudson, 1985). With Shihab out of office, age-old ways returned.

Indeed, the South for its part was one of the poorest regions in the country. Its marginality was shown by the state's adoption of the term "South" instead of Jabal Amel. It had the fewest paved roads per person or per acre, inferior sewage facilities and a nonexistent domestic telephone service (Norton, 1987). A full 32 percent of households in the South and 34 percent in the Biqua'a were without a kitchen in 1974, compared with 6.3 percent and 8 percent for Beirut and Mount Lebanon respectively. Moreover, the South had the most shortage supply of running water, with 40,5 percent of all households lacking this basic need, whilst only 6 percent of Beirut's and 10 percent Mount Lebanon's homes had to manage without it. For electricity as well, as much as 17, 4 percent of all Southern households had to function without electrical power (Halawi, 1992).

Thus while the South and the Biqua'a together contributed 30 percent of the gross agricultural product in 1973 and 26 percent in 1974, the South received only 0.7 percent of the state budget in the latter year (Halawi, 1992). That 20 percent of the Lebanese population was comprised of Southerners only exaggerated the injustice (Norton, 1987). As for Baalbek, it did not receive even LL 1 million out of the LL 984 million spent by the government over a four-year span (Halawi, 1992). The government's appropriation of 360 million cubic meters of water from the South for Beirut's consumption, notwithstanding the South's acute water shortages in light of the government's failure to effectuate the Litani water project, further attests to regional

exploitation (Halawi, 1992).

According to Joseph Chamie's 1971 survey of the socio-economic differentials of religious communities in Lebanon, 35 percent of all Shiites were classified as manual laborers, 15 percent as engaged in crafts and operatives, i.e mechanics, plumbers, drivers, metal workers etc.; 11 percent as farmers, 4 percent as peddlers and the remaining third distributed over the clerical managerial, business and professional sectors. However, the Shiites displayed the lowest number of individuals employed in these latter categories, with only 2 percent in the professional and technical fields. Not only did the majority of Shiites specialize in particular occupations, but they represented the statistically predominant community in certain unskilled occupational domains. For example, in Fuad Khuri's study (1975) of the suburbs of Chiyah and Ghobeyreh, at a time when the former , was overwhelmingly inhabited by Maronites, over 90 percent of all bakers, peddlers and concierges were Shiites, as were 84 percent of all grooms, 80 percent of butchers ad 68 percent of shoemakers.

In addition, types of employment and of economic activity supplement this picture of regional-communal differentiation. By all indicators, the Shi'a community and the hinterlands where it resides were the least developed. Of 94,320 industrial jobs available in Lebanon in 1970, only 7215 or 7.7 percent were located in the South and the Biqa'a, and while the other regions were enjoying the benefits of the economic boom, a declining agriculture still constituted 54.7 percent and 53.0 percent of the economic activity in those two regions respectively (Le Ministere de Plan, 1970). The only 5 percent of all Lebanese industries that were located in the South is another indicator of the region's marginality (Khashan, 1992). In 1964, only 6.5 percent and 6.9 percent of all investments were made in the South and the Biqua'a, respectively (Le

Ministere de Plan, 1970). As such, the South had only 4.5 percent of all profits and the Biqua'a 3.2 percent (Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises, 1970).

Accordingly, low incomes were the likely outcome of these low-status occupational roles. On the regional level, per capita income was five times as high in Beirut as it was in the South, with the former closing an average of 803$, compared with 151$ in the South, in 1970. By 1974, the South and the Biqa'a's individual earnings below L.L3000 per year amounted to 35 percent and 44 percent of the population, respectively. Figures for Beirut and Mount Lebanon were significantly lower, with only 10 percent of Beirut's households earning less than L.L3000 and 21.5 percent of Mount Lebanon's (Chamie, 1977).

Demographic factors

In addition to the above mentioned economic factors, the significant demographic shift, manifested by the Shi'a high population growth, has been a primary factor in the strength of Shi'a lagging behind the progress and development of other communities. Despite that no official census has been conducted in Lebanon since 1932 (reflecting the sensitivity of the issue), it is widespread opinion that the Shi'a community today constitutes the largest single confessional group in the country (Halawi, 1992).

The following table represents the demographic confessional development in Lebanon from 1932 until 1988.

Table 19

Demographic Confessional Development (1932-1988)

	1932	1943	1956	1975	1983	1988
Druze						
N	53,047	71,711	88,131	178,500	200,000	218,000
%	6.8	6.9	6.2	7.0	5.5	5.3
Greek Orthodox						
N	76,522	106,658	148,927	178,500	250,000	271,250
%	9.8	10.2	10.5	7.0	6.9	6.7
Maronites						
N	226,378	318,201	423,708	586,500	900,000	990,000
%	28.8	30.2	30	23	25.1	24.4
Shi'a						
N	154,208	200,698	250,655	688,500	1,100,000	1,276,974
%	19.6	19.2	17.7	27	30.7	32.3
Sunni						
N	175,925	222,594	286,238	663,500	750,000	855,000
%	22.4	21.3	20.2	26	23.4	21

From Halawi, 1992.

According to that table, the Shiite community constituted 19.4% of the total population in 1932; in 1988, the Shiite community constituted by then 32.3% of the total population.

As revealed in a study conducted by Joseph Chamie in 1971, the average number of living children per Shiite mother was 5.15, and even higher 7.29 for the 40-44 age bracket, in contradiction to the Maronites with a national average of 3.67 and the non-Catholic Christians with 3.33 chidren per mother (Chamie, 1980). The South had the highest number of births in all of Lebanon from 1957 through 1970, and Baalbek

had the highest birth rate in all the Biqa'a (Le Ministere de Plan, 1970). Even as late as 1987, a similar pattern was exhibited, with the Shiites still in the lead with an average of 4.6 children in Beirut and 5.3 in the rural areas (Hanf, 1993).

Paralleling this demographic evolution, a major Shi'a residential shift occurred into the suburbs of Beirut at the center of Lebanese political and economic life. Hitherto concentrated in two rural highlands, the Shi'a community has recently formed a second "Shi'a Lebanon" in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, and in its bidonvilles, in what has been generally called the belt of misery (Ajami, 1986; Halawi, 1992). Here the Shi'a from the South and the Biqa'a started interacting on a wide scale, "weaving the interests of what were three geographically distinct Shi'a communities into a single national constituency" (Halawi, 1992). The concentration of the Shiite thereafter in the Southern Suburb helped in building group solidarity that was reinforced by common grievances.

Impact of Hindrances Factors on the Development of Shiite Education

Indeed, the Shi'a regard themselves as living under injustice. Their social identification as the poor and uneducated reinforces the cultural-religious dimension of Shiite identity. They point to a pattern of neglect and poverty resulting from discriminatory practices of governments from Ottoman times through the modern era. The Shi'a formed the peasantry and poor rural sector of their societies. For decades they remained outside the advance of urbanization and modernization. The benefits of modernization, as manifested in education, health services, communications, job opportunities, and higher standards of living, reached the Shiite areas very late. Overall, the exploration of the economic and demographic factors emphasized the hardship the

Shi'a had to live. Consequently, the type and scope of education which developed within the Shiite community of Lebanon is a function of various interacting determinants such as religious heritage, political history, social and economic conditions. In fact, the development of Shiite education seems to have been most closely associated with those factors.

As a matter of fact, the motivation, orientation and content of Shiite education have been predominantly conditioned by the religious factor. It is important to recall that emergence of the Shiite sect as a separate group from Sunni orthodoxy has brought along deep religious tensions and political differences which have a strong and often unfortunate impact on the Shiite throughout their history. Thus the political history of the Shiite may, to a large extent, be interpreted in terms of their relationship with the Sunnis. Considering that Islamic dynasties that have ruled this area were mostly Sunnis, it is to be expected that they would face resistance from Shiite communities and that the latter, in turn, would sometimes undergo mal treatment and suppression. Consequently, at times of high political tension and violent outburst, Shiite educational activities would recede. When the Sunni dynasties of the Ayyubids and the Bahri Mamlouk, reigned over Syria between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, Shiite political and social conditions worsened as a result of intensive religious persecution. Shiite had to resort to dissimulation (Taqqiya) in order to preserve their religious beliefs. In such an atmosphere, it was only expected that Shiite learning weakened.

Besides, early Shiite education can be viewed as a formalized attempt to transmit and sustain Shiite dogma and to prepare religious learned men and interpreters. As any other group which possessed distinctive features, religious or otherwise, the Shiite have used education to preserve their religious doctrine and thus maintain their

communal and religious identity. Although they are permitted by their law to investigate novel issues because of their wide opportunity of Ijtihad, the Shiite abided by the other extreme. In trying to survive in an area surrounded by a hostile majority, it was unlikely that they would show as much receptivity toward any novel contributions in adapting new educational demands into their traditional Islamic culture. For that reason, Shiite took a defensive attitude towards secular education which they perceived to be threatening to their traditional cultural and religious way of life (Atiyyah, 1972). Chief among these reasons for this defensive attitude were the Shiite as an alienated minority group in an ocean of Sunnis, stuck tightly to their religious and cultural traditions and were unresponsive to outside influences. Besides, the Shiite areas of Jabal Amil and Baalbek-Hirmil were geographically remote from the center of missionary educational activity and thus had not come in close contact with the possible benefits that such education could bring forth.

As to the kind of literature and books that were taught and circulated among the community, they are described as strictly devotional and mainly concentrated on the exaltation of God and holiness of the twelve Imams. In these teachings, much stress was laid upon the disappearance of the Mahdi and the belief that the Ulama were the rightful leaders of the members of the Shiite community until the re-appearance of the Mahdi (the twelve Imam who went into occultation) who is to bring justice to the deprived Shiite. Though the religious doctrine is optimistic, it has been associated with a rather pessimistic outlook as the Shiite encountered continual suppression and ill treatments by other dominant groups. The Ulama put much emphasis on the teachings that this unjust world in which the Shiite lived was transitory and that it was unworthy to cultivate such a perishable world as this would be well taken care of when the Mahdi returns.

Moreover, the religious and political leaders in the Shiite community were in opposition to basic changes in social and educational tradition. According to the view outlined above, Shiite feudal and religious leaders seem to have reinforced each other's positions and collaborated to maintain a stagnant feudal social structure in the name of sustaining Shiite communal identity.

Moreover, the general deterioration of economic conditions in Jabal Amil during the latter part of the nineteenth century might have contributed to restricting the possibilities of establishing new educational endeavors. The financial difficulties faced by the Maqasid Society in Nabatityeh are a revealing illustration. Even the majority of Shiite individuals who were interested in continuing their education in Jabal Amel were not able to meet the rising cost of living and so preferred to seek a job at an early age rather than waste their time and money to learn something which brought in little material compensation, let alone the material limitations imposed on those Shiites who might have been interested to pursue their educational activities in external localities.

Regardless of whether or not Shiite religious and feudal leaders carry the full blame, there is no doubt that the Shiite passivity gradually brought forth negative consequences on their general educational conditions, not only in regard to what they might have gained from novel influences, but also towards what they had traditionally maintained. For at the eve of the twentieth century, Shiite students became more aware of the various changes that were taking place in Syrian society and became conscious that the kind of knowledge transmitted to them in their schools, unlike that which was introduced in Christian and state schools, was obsolete (Atiyyah, 1972). They perceived a great gap between what they were taught and the secular, practical and scientific education that was in demand. Thus, the once flourishing Shiite traditional schools of

the nineteenth century had to close down gradually as students lost interest in them, and the last of these schools closed its doors in 1906. Since new secular schools, except for a few, were not promoted, learning in the community lagged behind and ignorance prevailed.

Factors that Promoted Shiite Education

In an inquisitive way, the factors that intensified the underprivileged status of the Shiite community united them by hardship and thus created fertile ground and high receptivity to its mobilization which indirectly led to the development witnessed today.

In fact, the development of Shiite education is a product of many factors, including social, political and religious factors. These factors responsible for the community's social political and religious mobilization allowed the Shiite community to ask for more educational opportunities.

Social Factors

Within that context, Deutsch (1961) examined the impact of social mobilization phenomena on communal consciousness; he stated that, certain changes in residence and lifestyle such as rural to urban migration, occupation (for instance shifts away from agrarian employment) and exposure to aspects of modern life (e.g., consumer goods, and technology) will induce personal changes on the psychological and behavioral levels, changes in expectations, habits and needs. Moreover, Deutsch (1961) affirmed that, the expansion of literacy, education and mass media exposure, further flourishes the range of individual demands and heightens expectations for their fulfillment.

Indeed, the Shiite community experienced a change in social expectations (for instance rise in their demand for education) due to migration, urbanization, change in occupation and exposure to new social contexts. Besides, advancements in education, literacy and mass media exposure elevated expectations within the Shiite community at an exceptional rate. However, since the state failed to satisfy these expectations at the same rate at which they are rising, the Shi'a embraced a communal character, relying on ethnic solidarities to fill this psychological and material void (Rotchild, 1981).

The following section will review the factors that led to the Shiite community social mobilization which is considered as a major determinant in promoting Shiite education. As stated above the social factors were migration, urbanization, change in occupation and advancement in education.

Migration. In fact, migratory movements from the rural area of Lebanon towards other regions in the country and abroad had begun in the XIXth Century. Indeed the first modern wave of southern emigration started shortly after 1883 as a result of the policy of the tobacco monopoly, discussed previously, which caused a major deterioration in the economic condition of Jabal Amil (Halawi, 1992). The quick rise in unemployment, robbery and general security, coupled with the effects of a compulsory military service imposed on Muslim Ottomans in World War I especially by forcing the Shi'a male from rural areas to fight in battle field, caused this prolonged movement of mass emigration in Jabal Amil that continued well into the XXth Century, gradually becoming a collective exodus involving all of its towns and villages (Hitti, 1967).

Adding to the factors mentioned above, the 1916 Sykes-Picot treaties between

France and Britain, an agreement for boundary delimitation in the Arab region, marked out Jabal Amil which was part of the Syrian locality, and northern Palestine (Nasr, 1985). In fact, the French attempt to join together the economy of the newly-created Grand Liban (1926), and basically the Beirut-Mount Lebanon region, with that of inner Syria, led to the advance of Mount Lebanon region and the weakening of Jabil Amel. Though the Southern economy continued to be closely linked with Palestine, Southern agricultural products were forcibly diverted by the French to Syria through Beirut, thus reducing trade in the two Southern ports of Tyre and Sidon to insignificant activity. The major overland trade route was also redirected from the traditional Sidon-Marji'yun-Damascus highway to passing through Mount Lebanon and avoiding Jabal Amel. Deprived from its traditional economic lifelines, the Southern economy got weaker (Halawi, 1992).

The Palestinian war, however, formed the more severe blow; in fact the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the subsequent signing of the Rhodes armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel (March 1, 1949), in effect maintaining the state of belligerency between the two countries caused a second wave of southern emigration. Furthermore, Jabal Amel had to cope with thousands of its people who were expelled from Palestine or who had lost their lands as a result of the war, together with approximately 100,000 Palestinian refugees (Sharif, 1978). Many of the arriving Palestinians were able agricultural workers who played a significant role in developing the coastal citrus plantations between Sidon and Tyre, but also formed a cheap pool which competed with and even overtook its Lebanese counterpart. The ensuing economic crisis further weakened the Southern economy and forced the Southerners to seek their livelihood elsewhere, mainly in Beirut, whose Shi'a population had increased

from 3,274 in 1921, to 11,379, in 1932, and to 17,062 in 1956, and abroad, notably in West Africa and the Arab Gulf states (Nasr, 1978).

Despite these blows, Shi'a society had not yet experienced the severe social disruptions it has been plagued with since the 1960s, causing the disintegration of what was once the major part of rural Lebanon. In fact, the crisis of the agricultural sector caused by the hegemony of the tertiary trade and service sector, has forced thousands of sharecroppers in the Beka'a region and the South to migrate to the urban centers and market towns, the bidonvilles of Beirut, or abroad (Halawi, 1992). To this was superposed from 1965 onwards a state of perpetual insecurity on the Lebanese-Israeli quagmire. The presence there of the Palestinian resistance, legalized, regulated and many times re-regulated in a series of agreements concluded between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fida'iyyin operations launched against Israel from that region, and Israeli reprisals and many incursions eventually forced the southerners to flee in search of bread and life itself (Fiches du Monde Arabe, 1983; 1979; 1978; 1976; 1975).

Urbanization. Moreover, the exodus towards Beirut by 1974, resulted in the fact that half of the entire Lebanese Shi'a population was found concentrated in the greater Beirut area. Though the capital had its earlier and relatively small share of Shi'a residents, there is no comparison between this old nucleus which was largely concentrated within municipal Beirut, (Nasr, 1979) and the living conditions of the new arrivals whose incessant influx will have fundamental consequences on the progressive formation of a Shi'a suburb surrounding the city. The following exhibits reveal the concentration and extent of this influx: The Shiites represented the most rapidly

urbanizing community between the late 1950's and the 1970's, to the extent that by 1975, 65 percent of the inhabitants of the South and 50 percent of the Biqua'a's rural population were compelled to migrate (Farsoun & Caroll, 1976). As such two thirds of the Shiites community had become urbanized (Nasr, 1985), with 45 percent congregated in Beirut and its suburbs (Chamie, 1981).

The following table shows the percentage of Shi'a inhabitants in the various agglomeration of Greater Beirut by 1973. Indeed, the population of the Southern Suburbs constituted 32.8% of the total population of Greater Beirut out of which 45.5% were Shiite. Similarly from the 30.9% who lived in the Eastern Suburbs, 33.8% are Shiite. Accordingly, the largest agglomerations in Greater Beirut had a high percentage of Shiite population.

Table 20

The Shi'a in Greater Beirut (1973)

Sector of Agglomeration	*N*	% of Agglomeration	% in sector
Beirut City	100,000	31.5	20.3
Southern Suburbs	104,000	32.8	45.6
Northern Suburbs	98,000	30.9	33.8
Eastern Suburbs	15,000	4.8	18.7
Total	317,000	100	------

From Salim Nasr, *La transition des Chiites vers Beirut: Centre d'Etudes et de la Recherches sur le Moyent-Orient Contemporain*, 1985, p. 9.

Table 21

Distribution of Shi'a in Rural-Urban Areas

	Percentage (%)
Urban Centers	
Beirut	18.1
Suburbs	32.2
Other Cities	12.4
Total	62.7
Rural Areas	
Mount Lebanon	0.2
North Lebanon	0
South Lebanon	21.8
The Bika'a	15.1
Total	37.1

From Shemeil, 1976. p. 63.

The above table shows that 62.7% of the total Shiite population lived in urban centers out of which 32.2% lived in the Suburbs, thus leaving 37.1% of the Shiite population in rural areas out of which 21.8% lived in South Lebanon; this gives evidence to the rural-urban migration and urbanization underwent by the Shiite community.

The table below shows the origins and the number of the Lebanese Bidonvilles inhabitants; in fact 1760 of the Suburbs bidonvilles inhabitants came from the South.

Table 22

Lebanese Inhabitants of the Bidonville (1973); Origins of the Population

	Bidonvilles	
	within Municipal Beirut	in the Suburbs of Beirut
Beirut	1476	201
Mount Lebanon	362	73
South Lebanon	159	1760
Biqua'a	183	150
Total	5209	2393

From Bourgey & Phares, 1973.

Franz Moulder, a Jesuit priest who was working in the Karantina, the largest and oldest bidonville in Lebanon, insisted that by 1974 the Lebanese there alone numbered more than 8000 inhabitants, due to the large influx of Southern refugees after 1967 (Bourgey & Phares, 1973).

Furthermore, by 1978 another 141000 Shiites migrants had fled their homes in the South to seek refuge in Beirut, in the wake of Operation Litani (Cobban, 1986). However, despite numerous population shifts engendered by the civil war and the Israeli invasion of 1982, 56 percent of those who originated from the South had permanently settled in West Beirut and its Suburbs by 1987, leaving only 41 percent of all Southerners residing in the South (Hanf, 1993). In effect, the Shiites now numerically predominate the population of Beirut (Hanf, 1993).

The upshot of this vast scale of urbanization was the enhanced destitution of the Shiite migrants. The incapacity of the city to adequately accommodate the migrants' basic need for shelter left them no resort but to cram into the urban periphery, in ghettos

such al-Naba'a, Tal–al-Zaatar, Burj-al-Barajneh, Sabra and Chatila camps which also harbored Palestinian refugees. By 1973, 58 percent of all shanty towns in Beirut proper, were inhabited by rural migrants from the South and 73.5 percent of urban slums in Beirut's Suburbs were home to Southern emigrants (Halawi, 1992).

Change in occupation. Besides, the new urbanites crammed into unsanitary neighborhoods where the population density reached 55,392 inhabitants/Km2 for Beirut (Halawi, 1992). The more fortunate among them became the workers in Beirut's factories, while the majority joined the ranks of the "unclassified urban poor," (Nasr & Nasr, 1976). The chronic weakness and dependent nature of Lebanese industry clearly exposed the country's inability to deal with this human drama: from 1960 to 1970, the industrial sector absorbed 23,000 new workers, in other words only 19, 5 percent of the 118,000 working persons, most of whom were Shi'a, who were forced off the land during the same period. The Shi'a formed 80 to 90 percent of the workers in the predominantly Christian suburbs (Khuri, 1981; Salame, 1986).

Advance in education. Nevertheless, educational progress was achieved; in fact, president Shihab's modernizing reforms directly targeted the Shiite peripheral regions; his most noted success was in the educational realm. For both the Biqa'a and the South, the number of students increased from 62000 in 1959 to 225000 in 1973 (Hanf, 1993). However, these educational achievements were not matched by employment opportunities, since Shihab's plan failed to develop the industrial sector in the rural areas. However, Shihab's successor Charles Helou, did not effectively follow the former's footsteps and as such rural development schemes were only partially achieved.

As a result, these half fulfilled developments culminated in raising the expectations of the Shiites, who naturally opted for internal or external migration as a mean of satisfying their newly articulated demands.

Moreover, in the city, individuals came to compete with one another not on a personal basis as they had previously done in their rural home towns, but as groups striving for the same valued collective goods (Halawi, 1992). Ben-Dor (1988) proposed that when these goods are unequally distributed along communal lines, the incorporation of aspirations of all group members generates ethnic conflict.

Consequently, as stated above, migration accompanied with urbanization and exposure to education and to new ways of life raised the hopes of the Shi'a for more improvement in their social conditions (educational and economical). Their high aspirations by then opposed to the restricted existing socio-economic conditions stimulated a social mobilizing process which was manifested in the enhancement of their life circumstances. The development of education through opening schools was the main tool to be used to achieve their aspirations for progress and growth.

Political Factors

As stated above, the development of Shiite education is a product of political factors as well. The politicizing factors were responsible in mobilizing the Shiite community, in flourishing the array of individual demands in various spheres and in building up scenarios for their fulfillment.

Indeed, it is not the Shiites social and economic misery by itself which are directly responsible for the community's political mobilization, but their inferior status compared with other groups which have provoked their politicization. In other words,

had the Shiites lived in a socially homogeneous society, their supreme poverty would not have led to their dissatisfaction. It is because their dispossession is of a relative nature that is in comparison with other communities, that their dissatisfaction is politicized (Saad, 1996).

Huntington and Nelson (1976) provide a useful analogy of two Italian regional communities which were both deprived, but which reacted differently to this deprivation. The Italians of southern Italy perceived their situation as “miserable” but not as “unjust” and as such they were not radicalized. The Italians of central Italy, on the other hand, defined their living conditions both as miserable and unjust. Accordingly, they translated their sense of resentment into collective political action (Huntington, 1973). In effect, misery is not a determining factor of politicization in some absolute sense, but the perception of injustice, which is aggravated by flagrant social cleavages.

By the same token the Shiites were driven to political action by their perception of social injustice cultivated through their exposure to the more privileged population upon their urbanization, which highlighted their socio-economic repression vis-à-vis the higher social status of other groups. As such, they experienced a gap between the commodities and circumstances of life which people wish for and those they want to achieve (Huntington, 1973). As previously mentioned the Shiite community aspired for the same social and economic rewards as education, occupational mobility, employment opportunities, and social services as their compatriots.

Thus, political mobilization is the communication of deprivation, which in turn, is cultivated by the modernization process. In the first, modernization intensified the gap between the historically fortunate “dominant” and the newly mobilizing

“subordinates” (Saad, 1996). Secondly, certain aspects of social mobilization such as education and media exposure, serve to unmask the illegitimate nature of these long-established inequalities and to heighten expectations for their suppression (Rothschild, 1981). In like manner, modernization in Lebanon throughout the 1960s, only promoted the development of the core Beirut-Mount Lebanon region and the interests of the dominant Christian community. The main losers were the Shi’a, whose living conditions only worsen, further widening the gap between them and their Christians counterparts. At the same time, the Shiite community social mobilization through migration to urban areas and media exposure exposed its dispossession relative to other groups, whose display of wealth uncovered the gross discrimination inherent in Lebanese society (Olmert, 1987). As such, the Shi’a showed the highest level of social demands among all of Lebanon’s religious communities. The modernization process reinforced these socio-economic disparities, as well as highlighting the moral bankruptcy implicit in their maintenance (Huntington & Nelson, 1976). All things considered, those factors where major determinants in the politicizing process, thus in the awareness of the Shiite community of its underprivileged status which stimulate the move about toward political action. Empowered politically, the Shiite community was able by now to ask for more educational reforms through pressure on governmental bodies to provide education by establishing additional public schools in Shiite areas. Besides, the Shiite community relied on its own private initiative and started the building process of its own schools promoting by that Shiite education. As such, modernization as manifested by improved education helped the Shiite in their search for equal opportunities and in their struggle to eradicate the long established class structure system inherent in the Lebanese society.

Up until now, the inquiry has only focused on the deprivation of the poor, uneducated and unskilled masses. In the following section, the relative deprivation of then educated, wealthy and professional elite (all separate categories) will be deliberated, so as to assess the contribution of this class to the community's politicization. It is first necessary however, to outline the political implications of the community's general achievements.

Although it has been maintained throughout this study that the Shi'a are the most disadvantaged community, collective educational, occupational, economic and political gains were obtained and achieved through social mobilization. At that time, a new class emerged within the Shiite community. An educated intelligentsia, a commercial bourgeoisie and a professional class come into view and tried to forge a path within the Lebanese socio-political system. Faced with limited opportunities opened to them for upward mobility, this new deprived class was a main contributor to the community's politicization. This section will therefore consider the improvement of the entire community, despite its persisting deprivation in comparison to other groups. It will also analyze the impact of the economic and political deprivation of the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie and the professional class, on the community's political mobilization.

According to Rothschild (1981), socio-economic improvement is a requirement to the development of any political movements. Rothschild (1981) further added that the increase of mobility opportunities for lower ethnic groups only expands their expectations for additional advancement. In conclusion, group achievements are assumed to lead to ethnic and communal group politicization.

Thus, although the dispossessed are radicalized by their awareness of

deprivation, some aspects of social mobilization is initially required to achieve this process; therefore, socio-economic and educational improvement is needed, something the leaders in the community started capitalizing on and mobilized the group. As Huntington (1973) states, the poor are usually too preoccupied with their struggle to survive to participate in politics, which is why a degree of improvement in their living conditions is necessary for their politicization. In like manner, the radicalized Shi'a masses, who as previously mentioned, witnessed a decline in their living standards upon urbanization in the 1950s and early 1960s, were concurrently afforded opportunities for educational advancement as public schools were more available in urban settings.

In fact as stated previously, while only 6.6 percent of all Shi'a had completed their secondary school education in 1971 (Norton, 1987), 27 percent had done so in 1988 (Hanf, 1993). Furthermore, based on Chamie (1977) although 50 percent of the community had never attended school in 1971, by 1987 this figure had fallen to 22 percent (Hanf, 1993) and was as low as 14 percent in the Shi'a slums of Burj-el Brajneh (Hezbollah's Consulting Center for Studies and Documentation, 1995). This educational advancement was a dynamic, a self-motivating and energetic factor that stimulates the Shi'a to go ahead and promote Shiite education.

The rise of new bourgeoisie. More to the point, coupled with the expansion of the service sector and the attendant decline in agriculture, the Shi'a community could no longer be characterized as one massive class. Thus, by the 1970's the community was divided into a migrant bourgeoisie, a bureaucratic middle class, an industrial proletariat, a group of guest workers in the oil-rich Gulf States and an exploited peasantry in addition to the above- cited intelligentsia (Halawi, 1992; Saad, 1996). By the late 1980s,

a grand total of 40 percent of all Shi'a were employed in relatively high status occupations 5 percent were large landowners or industrialists; 8 percent described themselves as self–employed and 27 percent were either civil servants or white-collar workers, denoting the extensive urbanization undergone by the Shi'a community (Hanf, 1993).

Another aspect of the community's socio-economic improvements was the widespread practice of migration to West Africa, the United States and other parts of the globe, in fact, the Shi'a are claimed to be the largest Lebanese community in both continents (Halawi, 1992). Moreover, this group of former expatriates was able to carve out a niche for itself in certain sectors of the Lebanese economy such as real estate, commerce with Africa, the entertainment industry and citrus crop cultivation. However, it was bit until 1970s the Shi'a bourgeoisie made inroads into the banking, industrial and big business sectors, ushering in the era of the Shiite "new man" (Nasr, 1985).

The political implications of emigration served to undermine the power of traditional leaders, who were superseded by the returning nouveaux riches (Nasr, 1985). Those Shiite, with their booming accomplishments coming with higher economic standards disrupted the quiescent order. These newly resettled migrants, assumed control of the infrastructural development of the South and the Biqua'a, in light of the government's incompetent performance (Halawi, 1992). Consequently and as previously stated the Shi'a embraced a communal character, relying on ethnic solidarities, separate from geographical location and independent from feudal leaders; they got liberated from that dependency yet regrouped under new identity to fill this psychological and material void (Rotchild, 1981). In fact, this newly rich bourgeoisie was able to financially support and with determination the development of schools in

Shi'a regions thus promoting Shiite education.

Role of the intelligentsia. On another front, within the ranks of the intelligentsia, it was the students of the liberal arts who were most susceptible to political activism. This group is characterized by Hudson (1976) as the lower stratum of the politically relevant category, whose employment as salesmen, clerks, and other psychologically unrewarding and low-paid occupations, had rendered them amenable to radical ideologies (Hudson, 1976). The development in educational achievements was the crystallization of an active and radicalized intelligentsia on the one hand and a socio-politically mobilized community on the other. Actually, in the late 1960s, the Shi'a intellectual elite swelled the ranks of leftist and Arab nationalist parties (Shanahan, 2005). By the late 1970s this support was rechanneled to the Amal movement, a great portion of which veered toward Hezbollah in the mid 1980's (Shanahan, 2005). Furthermore, the low status of Shi'a professionals, aggravated by their political underrepresentation, enabled parties like AMAL and Hezbollah to elicit the support of this class by serving as venues for socio-political mobility. In Harik's (1994) study, 44 percent of all Shi'a respondents of high SES (socio-economic status) who selected a preferred party, favored Hezbollah and 35 percent of this class opted for AMAL. Hezbollah also drew 53 percent of middle class support, while AMAL attracted 22 percent of middle class respondents (Harik, 1994). The appeal of these movements lies in their ability to satiate the social status of this socio-politically alienated class, by entrusting its members with a special mission to articulate party ideology and accordingly, placing them at the upper echelons of the party's hierarchy (Saad, 1996). Thus, this group may be classified as lower middle class, a socio-economic status which

is highly correlated with political participation. Accordingly this group is considered as a critical dynamic in spreading Shiite dogma through the development of Shiite education.

In fact, the Shi'a community was galvanized to action by its social, economic and political achievements. Had the Shi'a masses remained in a state of complete poverty, they would have been too occupied with their daily suffering to worry about the absolute repair of the socio-political system. Furthermore, without the initiation of the economically, educationally and professionally advanced classes, their mobilization is confined to urban riots. It is the educated, wealthy and professional members of society, whose sense of political efficacy enables them to perceive their participation as instrumental in pursuing the community's political, social and educational objectives (Saad, 1996). Even when there is little incentive for upwardly mobile individuals to act, they may find it emotionally rewarding to identify themselves with their deprived communal group and to struggle for its cause.

Accordingly, it is not the Shi'a actual and social economic hardship per se which is directly responsible for the community's mobilization, but their secondary status compared with other groups which have stimulated their politicization. In other words, had the Shiites lived in a socially homogeneous society, their absolute poverty would not have conduced to their engagement in political action. It is because their deprivation is of a relative nature that is in comparison with other communities, that their discontent is politicized and is considered instrumental in achieving the community's educational objectives through developing Shiite education.

Religious Factors

It is within those conditions of growing activism against injustice that the religious leadership formed the space to galvanize and mobilize the community under a sense of loyalty to a new form of heavily religious Shiite identity. Therefore, this section addresses the factors that attracted the Shi'a to the appeal of religious movements in the early sixties. In fact, the Shiite demands for social and political equality have been ignored by Lebanon's political system since the inception of the Lebanese Republic in 1926. As a result, the religious leadership took a major role in mobilizing the community toward looking for more social justice.

Actually, in the late fifties, many features were deemed responsible for the Shi'a religious resurgence in Lebanon. The Shi'a chronic deprivation induced dissatisfaction with their feudal traditional political leadership, which in turn created a leadership vacuum. In fact this political frustration led only to their increased involvement in secular political parties, not to the formation of religious or sectarian organizations at that period of time (Shanahan, 2005). During the sixties, the Lebanese Shi'a had been involved mainly with progressive, socialist parties prior to their first sectarian political movement. These secular parties were ineffective in helping the Shi'a realize their aspiration for equality and justice hence unable to achieve a change in the Shi'a status quo. Nevertheless, they were instrumental in illuminating to the Shi'a the extent of their deprivation relative to other Lebanese sects (Shanahan; 2005).

Moreover, by the mid-1960s, large groups of Shi'a moved out of their rural communities, where they were exploited by their elite, into urban areas with the potential for mass political participation. Yet, neither the political parties nor the Shi'a's traditional political leadership were able to manage and respond to the sect's rapid

urbanization or to provide the sect with confessional equity. The inability of the parties and the leadership to provide the Shi'a with social justice led to the sect's dissatisfaction. This discontent with their political machinery increased the sect's receptiveness to the appeals of religious movements. Yet, disillusionment with modernity and Western-style ideologies, and the fracturing of society as a result of urbanization and bureaucratization, without corresponding tangible benefits to the mass of the people, all of these helped stimulate the rise in Shiite adherence to religion both as personal creed and as political ideology in search for a new religious identity to base their struggle on (Dekmejian, 1987).

The emergence of the charismatic leadership of Imam Mousa el-Sadr in the Shiite community is identified in Dekmenjian (1985) Islam in Revolution, where he states: "Generally, the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic… The charismatic founders include such powerful personalities as…Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr (hizb al-Dawah of Iraq); and Imam Musa al-Sadr (Amal of Lebanon). Dekmejian (1987) analytical framework states the presence of a leader with charismatic potential is key to mobilization and that without it, the process of development cannot be initiated regardless of the intensity of crisis.

The opportune presence of such a catalytic religious leader was essential to the organization of the contemporary Shi'a religious-political movement. Viewing with concern the influence of leftist parties among young Shi'a and the ineptitude of the traditional Zu'ama, he decided to enter the political fray. The ease by which Imam Mousa el-Sadr was able to mobilize the Lebanese Shi'a may be explained by Oberschall's (1973) research. One of Oberschall's (1973, p.129) hypotheses states: "The more segmented a collectivity is from the rest of the society and the more viable

and extensive the communal ties within it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the collectivity into an opposition movement”.

Indeed, already in the 1960s, a confluence of factors boosted the momentum for Shiite political awareness and self-assertion. The drain on Shiite resources by secular ideologies and the decline in the clerical institution triggered a backlash among religious Muslims and prompted the re-entry of a new generation of Shi’a clerics into public life. The Shi’a found an alternative inspiration in the writings, guidance, and charismatic presence of Shiite figures like Sayyid Muhamad Baqir as-Sadr and Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim in Najaf, Iraq, and Sayyid Musa as-Sadr and Sayyid Mohamad Husayn Fadlallah in Lebanon. This new insight reconnected them to their history and gave them a sense of belonging to a community which builds up their identity.

In his book (Our Philosophy, 1959), Sayyid Muhamad Baqir as-Sadr rebutted both communism and capitalism as foreign ideologies that degrade the human being and held up Islam as a political philosophy based on the benevolent will of God and an Islamic humanist ideal. He followed with (Our Economy, 1961), the elaboration of an Islamic economic system. Although these treaties were not addressed to an exclusively Shiite readership, they and their author became magnets for the Shi’a and a springboard for the rise of Shiite consciousness. For many, a religious revival was essential to Shiite social and political commitment, although it is difficult to say whether there was a causal relationship between the two; by all evidence, religious faith , social and political activism were part of a newfound Shi’a pride.

Thus, prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, it was in the Shiite socio-economic, political deprivation, highlighted by Sadr’s religious revival movement that propelled them to political action so they can achieve their aspirations in the social

economical, educational and political realm. However, once the war took its toll, it was the civil war that ultimately unleashed the community's mobilization potential. Nevertheless, by the late 1970’s three developments, unrelated to the civil war, served to snowball Shiite mobilization and, by implication, elevate the political and religious parties standing in the community. The first of these developments was Operation Litani, Israel's first full-scale invasion of Lebanon in 1978. A few months later, Al-Sadr simply vanished on his way to Libya. Both these cardinal events were capped by the Islamic revolution in Iran a year later (Norton, 1984; Saad, 1996).

While the factors cited above served to accelerate communal politicization and thereby played an indirect role in the emergence of the radical religious parties, the pre-eminent factor responsible for the movements’ birth was the Israeli invasion of 1982. Thus, although the process of radicalization had already taken root more than a decade before Israel's invasion of 1982, yet, the scope of this radicalism was expanded and its intensity reinforced by the invasion. However, the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran literally captivated the Shi'a community in Lebanon and deeply affected it ideologically. For the first time since the Prophet's time and Imam 'Ali, Shi'a were capable of establishing an Islamic state, and this success fostered the mobilization of the Shi'a community in Lebanon.

Manifestations: Schools Currently Serving the Shi’a Community

Background of Political and Religious Parties

The Shiite community has attempted to eradicate its "second class" standing by founding its own schools and capitalizing on the cultural and social accomplishments contrived by other confessional communities in Lebanon.

As a matter of fact, during the war, Lebanese sects and especially sectarian movements like Hezbollah, and Amal, came to decide on collective action, determining relations between people and setting guidelines on their economic and political conducts; the movements' involvement in their adherents' way of life and efforts at institutionalization became functional and apparent when the states authority and institutions were weak.

In fact, the degree to which Amal and Hezbollah exercised their ideologies and adjusted to their followers' dissatisfaction played a fundamental role in their mobilization efforts. Accordingly, mobilizing efforts were determined by the access to and management of resources, as well as the process of ideology and style of organization. Amal having access to most local government resources and legitimizing its use of public wealth during the war reorganized itself in post war times and started the establishment of its educational institutions. Hezbollah, having access to local and regional wealth and funding, also reformed its strategy in post-war times. The only way to maintain and extend their support after the civil war became through the "institutionalization" of their followers; one of these manifestations is the educational institutions.

In both Nasr's (1978) and Harik's (1994) studies, the majority of Shiite respondents believed that the political system was unable to meet their various demands, on the grounds of efficiency; besides, those Shiites were less optimistic in assuming that the government would redress their grievances. Considering the continued disregard of the educational needs of most of the country's outlying regions by the government, the religious and political parties, Amal and Hezbollah, remain the predominant political reference and the leaders in establishing educational institutions

in Shiite regions.

Therefore, this section will start by examining the Foundation of the Amal movement under the leadership of Musa al-Sadr and under his follower in the leadership of the movement Nabih Berry. Eventually, the favorable presence of the religious leader, Musa al- Sadr, was essential to the organization of the Shi'a religious-political movements. In fact, one of al-Sadr's instrumental objectives in achieving social justice was the opening of educational institutions (Al-Sadr Foundations) and initiating a plan for wiping out illiteracy. After the disappearance of Musa al Sadr in 1978, a second set of institutions was established as a result of Nabih Berri's foundation of Jami'yat Amal l'il Mahroumeen (Amal Association for the Deprived); the educational institutions took the name of Amal Educational Institutions.

The beginning of Hezbollah under the leadership of both Fadlallah and the movement of young clerics led today by Hassan Nasrallah is also examined. Two different leaderships stand out from Hezbollah and lead to the establishment of two separate educational institutions, Al-Mabarrat Schools and Hezbollah Educational Institutions.

Foundation of AMAL. Musa al-Sadr was born in Qom, Iran, in 1928, the son of an important religious leader, Ayatullah Sadr al-Din al-Sadr. He pursued an education in "fiqh" (Islamic jurisprudence). Initially he studied in Qom, and one year after his father's death in 1953, he moved to Najaf, Iraq, where he studied "fiqh" under the "marja'a al kabir" (the greatest reference of religious matters), Muhsin al-Hakim (Norton, 1987).

Musa al-Sadr moved to Tyre in the early 1960's to assume leadership of the

Shiite community of South Lebanon, with the active support of his teacher and mentor, Muhsin al-Hakim (Ajami, 1986).

The cleric organized and led Harakat al-Mahrumin ("the movement of the deprived") to protest the poverty and deprivation that the Shi'a in Southern Lebanon endured. The movement was primarily a call for justice and a repudiation of oppression, but its implications went beyond economic redress. The movement became an expression of Shi'a self-worth and assertiveness in a country where the political system of proportional representation failed to acknowledge their increasing numbers, and where the Shi'a feudal landlords upheld their own private interests rather than those of the community.

Again, as education spread among the Shi'a and immigrants returned with greater wealth, the system was closed to social and political advancement forced by barriers for social mobility regardless of their socio-economic achievements. Harakat al-Mahrumin tapped into a large and deep reservoir of frustration and inferiority felt by the Lebanese Shi'a.

Through the mechanism of "Harakat al Mahroumeen", Moussa al-Sadr prevailed in displacing many well established Shi'a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly exposing their exploitation of the sect in pursuit of political gains. Besides, through the ideology of the movement, its objectives, and goals, the Imam formulated and presented the national government with a set of compelling demands. From the national government, he argued that the state, ought to invest much more in the Shi'a areas, to their economic infrastructure, employment opportunities and educational and health services. In his speech, he declared that "the Shi'a have come of age; they need no trustees; they have emancipated themselves despite all the means adopted to keep

them from learning and enlightenment". He went on to say that "there are those who want to rule and oppress without giving anything in return; those who ruled the community for years without building a school" (Sicking & Khairallah; 1974).

Not long after 'Harakat al-Mahroumeen" was in full swing, the doors that previously were closed in the face of the Shi'a started to open, and the Shi'a fate changed for the better. This movement stood for the economic and social advancement of the Shi'a. "Harakat al Mahroumeen's" was able to penetrate and extract resources of the Shi'a professionals and businessmen for a Shi'a region building effort. Thus, for the first time, the sect's collective wealth increase in size and power was channeled through the movement towards collective ends.

In fact, during the 1972 parliamentary election, 18 of the 19 Shi'a Parliament Deputies nominated by Imam Mousa al-Sadr were elected by the Imam's followers. This new parliamentary coalition established the South Lebanon Reconstruction Council, and allocated LL. 130 million (about $40 million) to improve conditions in Shi'a regions by building schools and hospitals and developing industries. When funds began to flow in from the national government, the rest of the Arab world joined in support. Schools, shops, clinics, hospitals and industries proliferated in Shi'a regions (Halawi, 1992; Saad, 1996).

Harakat al-Mahrumin was a movement of social protest which eventually got caught up in the storm of the civil war. It created a platform for the Shi'a distinct from other opposition movements and produced a hitherto unfamiliar Shiite empowerment that raised political and social aspirations. Furthermore Shiite clerics returned to the foreground in the political and social leadership of the community, giving them a prominence and clout in their communities they had lacked for several decades.

However, Al-Sadr movement was essentially a national reform movement rather than an Islamic revolutionary one. Rather than call for the system's overthrow and the implementation of Islamic social and political objectives, the movement strove to secure a larger political and economic role for the community within the confines of the secular Lebanese state (Norton, 1984; Saad, 2003). Indeed, the Islamic dimension of Sadr's movement cannot therefore be overlooked, only underplayed. As a movement that did not pursue Islamic domestic goals or concern itself with the fate of the wider Islamic Umma, it clearly did not have an Islamic ideology, but as a movement that had a distinctly Shiite Islamic identity and idiom, neither could it be described as a secular movement, at least not during Sadr's day. Perhaps Sadr's movement could best be classified as a national- Islamic reform movement (Saad, 2003).

Al-Sadr, at a most critical moment in the political history of his community, vanished during a trip to Libya in August 1978. Hussayn al-Hussayny, lawyer and ex-speaker of the House of Parliament took over Amal during 1978-1980. He believed, like Imam al-Sadr, that Amal should remain a flexible socio-political tool of the Shiite establishment; namely, an organization through which the Shiites will continue their fight for reformation of their social, educational, health and political status through the government, its institutions and funds (Norton, 1987).

In 1980, Al-Hussainy was replaced in new party elections by Nabih Berri, a much younger lawyer from a modest family in the Jabal Amil of Tibnin. Indeed, the rise of Nabih Berri to the presidency of Amal represented the emergence of a new generation of mobilized middle-class Shiites who were traditionally not involved in politics (Norton, 1987). Berry, like many of his financial supporters, was born in West Africa, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where many Shiites earned their fortunes. He was

educated in Beirut and Paris. He lived in the United States in the early 1960's and for a brief period in the 1970's. Nabih Berri fought during the civil war in the name of the deprived Shiites until he became minister in 1984. Amal's influence at that time was acknowledged at the national level by the creation of the Ministry of the South; yet for all intents and purposes, the Ministry seems to have officially stamped the South as Amal's fief headed by Nabih Berri. The 1992 elections brought Berri and his list a wide victory, thus leading him to become Speaker of the House of Parliament where he continued in office until our present day.

A number of large projects which normally would have come under the aegis of various governmental ministries were handled by the new ministry. They included large public works and the building of educational institutions which with no doubt were a windfall for Berri's communal and national stature.

Several facts stand out from the above review. Amal's prestige in the South was heightened in 1984 when it was able to influence the large public projects, social assistance and educational institutions at no direct cost to the party. This was especially important since competition with Hezbollah was growing and the latter's service, social and educational activities in the Beka'a, the Dahiah, and the South were on their way during the same period.

Foundation of Hezbollah. Hezbollah emerged in the Shiite community in the early 1980's as a reaction to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon and to the triumph of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Hezbollah was led by Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who by 1983 became the leading political and religious figure among the Shi'a (Shanahan, 2005).

Sheikh Muhamad Hussein Fadlallah was a graduate of the Shiite College in Iraq, where he had apparently supported the Iraqi Da'awa party (Shanahan, 2005). The latter organization had an Islamic Shiite trend, fighting for the rights of the Shiites and against their social and political oppression. Its leaders and main organizers were predominately graduates of Najaf (Halawi, 1992). The Ba'ath party, which took a serious view of the Shiites rebellious tendency, carried out extensive operations of repression against the sources of religious education of the Da'awa organizers such as the college in Najaf. Their students were subjected to detention, torture, deportation and even execution (Halawi, 1992). These punitive measures constituted a major setback to the Shiite organizational efforts and generated a wave of protests in the Shiite world, principally Lebanon (Ajami, 1986).

As a result of the deportation policy launched by the Iraqi Baa'th regime against the foreign Ulama, several dozen Lebanese clerics, who had spent their formative years in Najaf, virtually all of them pupils of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Musa al-Sadr's cousin) arrived in Lebanon in the early 1970's (Shapira, 1988). Najaf graduates, along with other Lebanese, formed the Lebanese Islamic Da'awa Party, modeled on the Iraqi party of the same name (Shanahan, 2005). This organization took full advantage of Lebanon's pluralism, operating openly, while maintaining contact and forging a mutual aid network with the mother organization that functioned secretly in Iraq. The target population of the Lebanese Da'awa was the generation of young Shiites who were previously organized in the "Lebanese Association of Muslim Students", founded by Shiite graduates of the Arab University of Beirut. The Lebanese Da'awa and its cadres in the students' association found their spiritual leader in the person of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (Shanahan, 2005).

Fadlallah arrived in Lebanon in 1966 from Najaf, where he had been born in 1935 to a well known Lebanese family of learned Shiites. Seven years earlier his father had taken the family to Najaf from Aynata, not far from Bint Jubeil in South Lebanon. Shaykh Fadlallah settled in the Naba'a quarter of East Beirut, an area heavily populated by Shiites from the South and the Beka'a. There, as the representative of his master and teacher Abu al-Quassim al Kho'i, (the supreme religious authority of the Shiite world), he strove to establish himself as a ranking "mujtahid" (teacher and interpreter of Islamic law) with an acknowledged standing of his own. In this period, which saw the impressive success of the Imam Musa al-Sadr, Fadlallah opted for a quiet mode of activity, far removed from the political realm. For quite some time though, Fadlallah remained in al-Sadr shadows (Shapira, 1988).

Lebanese graduates of Najafi "madrasa" set up a branch of the Da'awa party in their own country sometime in the early 1970s, where it acted as a framework for the more activist members of the Shi'a clergy. What is notable about the members of the Da'awa is that many of them were also members of the AMALmovement, although this is not surprising given Musa al-Sadr's prominence in AMAL's establishment and the lack of any alternative means of distinct Shi'a political expression at the time (Shanahan, 2005).

While the socio-economic, political and religious factors cited in the conduct of this study served to accelerate communal politicization and thereby played an indirect role in the emergence of Hezbollah, the pre-eminent factor responsible for the movement's birth was the Israeli invasion in 1982. It is explicitly articulated by Nasrullah, the current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, "had the enemy not taken this step (the 1982 invasion) I do not know whether something called Hezbollah would have

been born; I doubt it" (Alagha, 2007). However, the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran deeply affected the Lebanese Shiite community ideologically (Alagha, 2007; Norton, 2007; Saad, 2003). It follows then, that the Shiite Islamicization, partly a product of the Revolution's in Iran, was a necessary condition for the advent of Hezbollah.

More importantly, in a bid to export its Islamic revolution, Iran had initially sought to propagate Khumayni's pan-Islamic ideology by infiltrating existing Shiite organizations such as AMAL. When these efforts bore little fruit, Iran seized the opportunity provided by the Israeli invasion to organize the sundry resistance groups into a single organizational framework under the banner of Hezbollah (Kramer, 1990).

In fact, the schism within AMAL caused by Nabih Berri's participation in the 1982 National Salvation Committee affected those with an allegiance to the Da'awa; many left what they perceived to be an increasingly secular movement for the activism that Hezbollah offered. One of the most prominent clerical members of the Da'awa movement, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin, a Najafi graduate who became AMAL's representative in post-revolutionary Iran, returned to Lebanon in response to Berri's actions and assisted in the transfer of many Da'awa members into the nascent Hezbollah (Shapira, 1988). The small group of young clerics, led by Abbas Mussawi and Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, acknowledged the Imam Khomeini as their religious and political leader (emotionally if not formally). Within a matter of months, this small group had become a mass movement. The founders were joined by radical Shiites who broke off from Amal and other movements and who brought with them members from organizations such as Amal al-Islami, the association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, the Lebanese Da'awa and the Association of Muslim Students. These new Shiites forged a coalition which

gathered under the front organization of Hezbollah (Shapira, 1988).

The current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, is a more contemporary case of the pragmatic clerical leader. Nasrallah differs in many ways from the Ulama already discussed (al-Sadr and Fadlallah). He was not of a scholarly family, and indeed, he was the first member of his family to become a cleric. Nasrallah studied for two years in Najaf, but completed his juristic studies in Baalbek. In his youth, therefore he was not exposed directly to the teachings of Muhamad Baqer al-Sadr, so he cannot be considered one of the Najafi activist clerics in the same manner as Fadlallah and Musa al-Sadr. His interest in political activism is evident from the fact that he was a member of Amal at age fourteen and head of his town's party branch by the time he was eighteen, which demonstrates his capacity for leadership from a young age. He was expelled from AMAL in 1982 because he urged armed resistance in response to the Israeli invasion of that year (Alagha, 2007). Despite his early training in Najaf, Iraq, he is closely aligned with Iran, a situation stemming from his juristic allegiance to the Tehran-based (marja'i) religious authority.

In fact, Hezbollah clergy adhered to a religious ideology composed of Islamic principles as voiced by Ayatollah Khomeini. Consistent with the principle of Islam, the ideology is deeply concerned with social welfare (Fadlallah, 1985). Sayyid Fadlallah himself founded charitable institutions, schools, clinics and orphanages in West Beirut. His start was in the Naba'a quarter which was "evacuated" by the Lebanese Front in 1975. He established a welfare association to provide aid, social assistance and education to the Shiites in need arriving in Beirut from the South and the Beka'a.

Within the same context, Hezbollah claimed that the movement is not a regimented party, in the conventional sense, for the idea of an exclusive party is foreign

to Islam. Hezbollah rather is a “mission” and a “way of life” (Kramer, 1987). The movement’s involvement in its followers’ way of life became functional and obvious when the state’s authority and institutions were weak. During the war, demand for social welfare and distributive justice for the oppressed was so intense; it motivated the militant clergy and fused their action. This was seen in the activities of the Association of the Ulama of Jabal Amel and Biqa’a; their educational and philanthropic institutions and programs were part of a growing network of social assistance (Harik, 1994). Shiite clerics running educational institutions, cultural centers, orphanages and welfare organizations joined this struggle and formed the backbone of Hezbollah’s activities in those regions.

However, Hezbollah’s ideological development can be divided into three phases. From 1978, with the arrival of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi in the Beka’a valley, until 1984-85, when the institutionalization of Hezbollah took place, the “Party of God” is to be grasped essentially as a religious movement (Alagha, 2007; Norton 2007).

The second phase runs from the middle of the 1980’s until the beginning of the 1990’s. Although one witnesses at that time a mixture of religious and political ideologies, it is nevertheless clear that politics enjoyed the upper hand. The religious discourse was mainly a tool to justify the political stances of the movement (Norton, 2007). In 1991 Sayyid al-Musawi, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah at that time, defended the notion of openness to other communities and encouraged the movement to engage its fellow Lebanese in order to integrate itself into the Lebanese political system and public sphere. One can observe a gradual Lebanonization of Hezbollah over the years. From the 1990s and especially after the Ta’if Agreement in1989, the “Party of God” has planned a strategy of infiltration into Lebanese institutions.

In the third phase, the era of the political program, from 1992 to the present, Hezbollah has been integrating more and more into the Lebanese public sphere. The Party now strives for more concrete social and political objectives. Using the parliamentary podium, the party now presses for the reform of the Lebanese system and concerns itself with finding solutions to the many social and economic problems besetting the country. Thus, in parallel with the party's transformation from an anti-system revolutionary party into an organization that has accommodated itself to the reformed post-war political system, Hezbollah's goals have witnessed a shift from transformative to reformist (Alagha, 2007; Norton, 2007; Saad, 2003).

At the end of the discussion on the Foundation of Hezbollah it is worth mentioning the ideological differences between Fadlallah and the new movement of Hezbollah which was manifested mainly in their allegiance to different juristic authority.

As a matter of fact, at the height of Khomeini's power, there were those who ascribed to him extra-territorial authority over Muslims (Hezbollah for example). Ayatollah Khamenei, later to become Khomeini successor, revealed the extent to which Iranians believed in their right to act as leaders for all Shi'a. Fadlallah himself does not subscribe to the view that the supreme leader possesses extra-territorial authority, particularly when that leader is currently Ayatollah Khamenei: "while Iranians might well follow Khamenei's political and spiritual lead, Shiites outside of Iran… were not bound to emulate Khamenei (Mallat, 1988).

It appears Fadlallah's attitude is partly due to his firm belief in the uniqueness of the Lebanese state and the fact that consequently it is not possible to transpose scholarly opinions (fatwa) wholesale from Tehran to Lebanon. Another reason for Fadlallah's independence from Iran no doubt reflects his refusal to recognize Khamenei's claim

to juristic authority (Kramer, 1987).

On the other hand, Nasrallah juristic allegiance is to the Tehran-based (marji') religious authority. Hezbollah's relation with Iran is both ideological and religious; especially, his link with Imam Ali Khamenei, president of the Islamic Republic between 1981 and 1989, and then elected supreme leader of the country, is based on the "velayat el-faqih" and its important financial support. "Velayat el-faqih", literally the guardianship of the jurisprudent, describes the leading role of clergymen in political life. The acceptance of this principle by Hezbollah makes it, theoretically, a subject of the supreme leader of Iran. Iran has also been the main financial supporter of Hezbollah since its creation. In 1995, nevertheless, Ali Khamenei himself appointed Nasrallah as his religious representative in Lebanon. He advised a delegation from Hezbollah that they should refer to Nasrallah and consider his opinion to be Khamenei's opinion in all circumstances. This decision allows Nasrallah's party to directly receive the "khums", a form of financial support coming from religious taxation (about 20 per cent of income added to the traditional imposition of "zakat") without having to channel it through Iranian foundations. This situation has partly contributed to Hezbollah's autonomy.

No matter how effective a cleric such as Nasrallah may be as a leader, he indeed lacks scholarly credentials. Whilst he is an impressive orator and well regarded for his role in resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, he lacks a wider audience as a juristic authority outside Hezbollah. This limits the audience for his message largely to pro-Hezbollah Shi'a.

This divergence in the recognition of the institution of (marji') juristic authority, made Fadlallah and Hezbollah have different paths. This will explain the establishment of two different associations from which emerged their particular educational

institutions. Although both Fadlallah and Hezbollah's educational institutions aimed at providing good education for Shiite children, each institution is committed to its own agenda at the political and religious level.

Educational Institutions

Al- Sadr educational institutions. Some of al-Sadr's more specific and instrumental objectives in achieving social and political equity through institutional organizations were in launching constructive initiatives in the South revolving around empowerment, construction and development so as to improve the economic conditions. It also included opening schools with theoretical and practical branches and initiating a plan for wiping out illiteracy besides other institutions.

1. Background

This section traces the developmental project Musa al-Sadr established. What follows is an account of his most acknowledged accomplishments on the cultural and educational level. It shows the direct connection with the line of work of what became currently known as Imam Sadr Foundation.

According to the 2008 Imam Sadr Foundation guide booklet, the beginnings were in the city of Tyre and its suburbs, through support and help for the indigenous population, literacy campaigns, building institutions, activating the role of women and empowering them by courses in sewing, embroidery, domestic education and holding emergency and training sessions, putting thereby the greater emphasis on Vocational training.

In the early 1960's al-Sadr started his fight against street begging, and he forbade individual charity to those beggars and encouraged collective charitable work to

help them.

In 1963, al-Sadr established the *Beit al-Fatat* (Home for Girls) a dress making school for females with headquarters in Tyre, which later became extended to more than 90 villages in the South. An institution to teach nursing was also established. It had a one year program until 1969 when the school's program was developed into 'Practical Nursing Skills' a higher level of education taking almost two years. The Nursing school is still operational today and has a good number of graduates.

In order to teach Islamic principles, al-Sadr established an association called the "Society for Islamic Teaching" in 1966. It sent Shiite clerics to private and public schools in the towns and villages of the South in order to teach religion and religious principles to the younger generation.

Furthermore, in 1968, al-Sadr became the sponsor of Jami'yyat al- Bir wa al-Ihsan, an old society in Tyre established to carry out limited charitable work. Al-Sadr wanted to transform this small organization into a major institution, and by 1969 the society came to include around one thousand volunteers. The main activity of this society was to provide scholarship for children in need.

The increasing number of volunteers and the increasing recognition of al-Sadr's movement, especially by the Shiite emigrants, the main source of funds for this project encouraged al-Sadr to expand his association's services. In 1969 Jami'iyat al-Bir wa al-Ihsaan established one of the first vocational schools in the South, called Muassassat Jabal 'Amil, (Jabal Amil Institution). The institution targeted youngsters who were orphaned or came from very poor backgrounds and needed to learn a vocation. It enrolled about five hundred students each year again with minimal enrollment fees and again orphans entered for free. At one point, al-Sadr introduced Persian carpet making,

a new enterprise in Lebanon. This industry became very successful and productive especially in the early 1970's, and it engaged a large number of female workers (the Foundation documents, 2008).

In 1978, he established Madinat al-Zahraa al-Thaqafiya wa al-Mihaniyya wa al-Tamrid, (The Zahraa Cultural, Vocational and Nursing School) at Khalde near Beirut. This institution included schools for nursing and dressmaking.

His sister Rabab, who has administered his institutions since his disappearance in August 1978, continued the same strategies.

However, the Imam Sadr Foundation was severely affected by the 1982 Israeli invasion. The activities at Zahra' city in Beirut were halted due to rampage and destruction. The management sought contact with the students through newspaper ads, and asked them to meet in buildings near the Jabal Amel Vocational School in the Bourj al-Shamali region near Tyr, where prefabricated houses had been hurriedly erected and equipped so they could be used as lecture rooms and a dormitory for the orphaned girls. A few months later, the site was surrounded by the occupation forces for three consecutive days and the girls were ordered to evacuate the camp, which was blown up a few days later with all its furniture, equipment and records. The management of the orphanage rented apartments in Tyr to accommodate the girls and contacted the city schools to provide for their education.

By the beginning of 1985, the Israeli occupiers were about to withdraw from vast areas of the South, to entrench themselves behind what would later be called the 'occupied border zone'. At the same time, the benevolent guardianship and aiding activities embodied in the name of "Imam Sadr Foundation" prepared to set the corner stone of its cultural compound on the beach of Tyre.

In the annual report of 1985 presented by Ms. Rabab Sadr Charafeddine to the General Assembly of the Foundation, she stated: "After the Foundation was burned and destroyed and the major catastrophe took place, we were obliged to disrupt studies and move the students to different buildings inside the city of Tyr. After the Israeli withdrawal, we started schooling again. With all my God given strength, I was trying to obtain a piece of land on which to build, for the third time, a new edifice that would shelter the children and the orphans, and resurrect cultural life and development in the minds of the new generations".

With the effort of some generous aids, the foundation was able to sign a contract (a lease for a period of time reaching 99 years, under which the tenant, in return for a modest rent payment, undertakes to perform major works on the land) allocating thirty thousand square meters in the city of Tyr and on the southern coastal shore for the Imam Sadr Foundation to construct a huge cultural compound consisting of the following buildings: high school for girls, general meeting hall, technical orientation center, center for handicraft skills, office headquarters, nursing school, orphanage, kindergarten, educational institute and technical school for girls (Al-Sadr Foundation Brochure, 2008).

According to an official at the Foundation interviewed in November 2008, it is worth citing this extract in its entirety to show that in 2008, nine out of ten projects as mentioned in that report have been accomplished. Moreover, many other projects which were not anticipated in the 1985 plan have also been achieved.

In the 1990s, after the civil war, at the same time, the South was going through one of the most dangerous phases of the war with Israel, a period marked by resistance that lasted until the complete liberation in 2000. After the liberation The Foundation

underwent a major leap in its geographical expansion and in the numbers of beneficiaries. New services were created, such as the Intensive Vocational Training Program, the Special Education section and the Center for Research and Studies (Foundation Brochure, 2008).

The Foundation also focused its attention on the reinforcement of the abilities of volunteers and employees and accelerated the organizational development efforts, since the exchange of expertise became easier after the end of occupation. Affiliations with several local and international organizations and umbrellas enlarged the Foundation's network, resulting in the launching of several co-projects with local and international NGOs, as well as with some governmental institutions, thus greatly expanding its reach (Interview with an official at the Foundation, November 2008).

Several special programs started in the first few years after the Liberation of the South, often in cooperation with international NGOs. The 'Project for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former Detainees in South Lebanon started together with UNDP, in 2005-2006 (Al-Sadr Foundation Guide, 2008).

Moreover, reflecting the Foundation's commitment to sustainable development beyond the practical implementation of the programs is the creation of the "Arabic Glossary of Development Terms" together with World Bank and ESCWA, published in 2004. The glossary addresses a major deficiency in the Arabic language and aims to facilitate the efforts of NGOs and other civic organizations in targeting poor people; that being an extensive document containing nearly 1.200 terms and concepts related to developmental issues, with their synonyms in English (Al-Sadr Foundation Guide, 2008).

The Imam Al-Sadr Center for Research and Studies, a center affiliated to the

Foundation, organized conferences within its annual event “Common Terms”, which gathered clerks, lecturers, researchers and dignitaries as a continuous developmental tool to promote the institution educational and social goals.

The selected examples mentioned so far represented part of the work of the Foundation. The core contribution remained in its regular fields of education, capacity building and training, social and rural development programs.

2. Goals

According to an interview with an official at the Foundation in November 2008, the Imam Sadr Foundation seeks to contribute in improving life conditions for specific groups in South Lebanon, i.e., orphan girls, women, local communities in rural and poor suburban areas especially what relates to health, education and economic self-sufficiency. The Foundation also seeks to develop in the targeted groups their abilities in learning and in getting the equal economic and social opportunities by merging them into the economically capable strata. It again tries to respond to the basic needs of the marginalized, the victims of struggles and persons with special educational needs up to self reliance and integration in their environment and society. Moreover, the Foundation has, since the beginning, been known by the continuous development of its abilities initially based on working with women believing that women are the most capable and the most skilled in picking up deep-rooted problems of society, therefore in achieving the required change. Thus, the real development won’t be possible but through redefining the roles of women and men towards more equity in work relation, mentalities, legislations and life style in general.

At the Imam Sadr Foundation itself, the organization has built an active, committed, and multi-disciplinary team where women play a leading role in both

administration and programs. The Foundation is, in specific, actively involved in a network of regional and international linkages related to women and gender issues in development. It has also participated in numerous initiatives aiming to challenge discrimination against women. This is in harmony with the Foundation's promoting of gender equality and equity as well as women's full participation in public life.

Therefore, the purpose of the schooling for girls is to develop the personalities of the targeted girls, in all its dimensions, i.e. physical, emotional, mental, spiritual, social and intellectual and prepare them to continue their future role. It seeks to elevate the pressures of the hard social conditions, usually confusing for girls, and to help them in accessing their right to education and social upward movement in a tolerant Islamic atmosphere.

3. Funding

The Foundation has a network of friends and supporters within the Lebanese communities of Africa, North America and the Gulf which constitutes its main source of funding. Al-Sadr's supporters continued to finance his projects even after his disappearance. In fact, his sudden disappearance in 1978 intensified his followers 'support' (Interview with an official at the Foundation, November 2008).

Funding for al-Sadr Institutions was sufficient until several other programs began competing for the Shi'a wealth, especially those of the Lebanese emigrants. The competitors included the Shiite Mufti (former head of the Higher Islamic Shiite Council) Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Shams al-Din, Nabih Berri, Fadlallah and Hezbollah institutions, all of whom have established their own societies, organizations and educational institutions after the disappearance of the Imam.

However, the Fund for Orphan Sponsorship is a continuous program with

philanthropists wishing to sponsor orphan girls. Tens of well-to-do individuals form a fixed support by financially aiding the Foundation. Some of them commit to completing a specific project or part of a project, like donating a piece of land for the construction of a building for technical training, while some others place their Zakat in the custody of the Foundation, for it is upheld by many competent religious authorities to receive legal alms (Al-Sadr Foundation Brochure, 2007).

In addition, the income-generating program helps to sustain the non-profitable programs and projects of the Foundation. By using the income generated by these venues to co-fund other programs, the Foundation secures a source of revenue, while at the same time creating employment-opportunities in the region. A Milk Factory founded in 2000, a Restaurant and a Café established in Tyre in 2003 and 2007 are income generating projects.

Moreover, according to an interview with an official at the Foundation in November 2008, the Foundation coordinates with governmental institutions and administrations according to specialties. It receives help from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of health and the National Employment Office to support its different educational and sponsoring activities. The Imam Sadr Foundation also implements many projects with the support and participation of international organizations through awarded grants. The channels of communication and information exchange are always open with several organizations, mainly UNDP, IFAD, World Bank, ESCWA, UNICEF, WHO, Amnesty International, ILO and many other organizations (Al-Sadr Foundation Guide, 2008).

The Foundation strongly believes in partnership principles and thus seeks to implement all its activities in close cooperation with its peer Non-Governmental

Organizations, Civil Society Organizations as well as local communities.

Besides, the volunteers make up an important portion of the workforce of the Foundation. This portion differs according to sections and divisions. It reaches 100% in the Board of Directors and in activities oriented towards gathering resources, and diminishes in the teaching and the nursing bodies. It is to be noted that nurses and teachers dedicate part of their time as volunteers in activities that do not fall in the sphere of their expertise. The foundation also hosts regularly volunteers of all nationalities, ages and qualifications (Foundation Documents, 2008).

According to an estimate done by the foundation in 2005 (Al-Sadr Foundation Guide), income sources were varied and received proportionally from:

Table 23

Al- Sadr Foundation Income Sources

Source	Percentage
Individual Contributions	39.4%
Other Sources	3.3%
Orphans Contributions	6.3%
International Organizations & Donors	7%
Ramadan Iftars	8.5%
Governmental Contracts	10.5%
School Fees	12%
Income Generating Projects	13%

4. <u>Al-Sadr Schools</u>

The following section will give a brief description of a variety of Al Sadr

Foundation schools. As mentioned above, the majority of those schools have big emphasis on vocational training; nevertheless, academic education is as well available. Cultural institutions were also built around the Foundation schools to support their mission and goals.

As a matter of fact, the Academic Education is run by the Rihab al-Zahra' School. The Elementary School established in 1981 and the Kindergarten in 1988 target the students of Rihab al Zahra' orphanage and other female students of the populace in the local community. The Special Education Section established, in 1977, a specialized program towards providing specific rehabilitation activities to children with special educational needs, i.e. difficulties in learning, disorder in growth, or low to medium behavioral disorder.

In addition, the Vocational training program, supervised by the Afaq Institute for Development, in its two sections comprises the Nursing School (1969), providing its graduates with technical certificates in nursing science. It targets orphan girls, as well as others from the South, the Beka'a and the rest of the Lebanese regions. The intensive vocational training (1988) targets girls and women that are unable to pursue academic studies. The program offers many technical specialties in one scholar calendar. It is flexible in its response to the needs of the work market as well as to the expectations and capabilities of the beneficiaries. It goes beyond the pure technical side of training, and it mentions giving diverse lectures of religious, social and cultural nature. The Social Work Branch (est. 2003) is a unique program that trains women to become active social workers within their communities (Foundation Brochure, 2007).

Table 24

Al- Sadr Vocational and Academic Institutions

Al-Sadr Institutions	Date of Establishment
Rihab al Zahraa School	
Elementary	1981
Kindergarten	1988
Special Education Section	1977
Afaq Institute for Development	
Nursing School	1969
Intensive Vocational Training	1998
Social Work Branch	2003

On the educational upcoming projects**,** the Imam Sadr Foundation is currently planning for several new projects that are in different stages of development. In January 2008, the Foundation planned on starting a Mental Health Nursing project within the Nursing School. A first group of 20 students was trained to identify childhood onset mental disorders (Al-Sadr Foundation Guide, 2008).

AMAL educational institutions.

1. Background

Harakat Amal lil-Mahroumeen (the Amal Movement of the Deprived) was established in 1981 by Nabih Berri separately from al-Sadr's institutional establishments and socio-political organizations. The Movement of the Deprived drew on the Shiite funds, locally and internationally, to establish their own educational institutions, later known as Mouassassat Amal al-Tarbawiyya (Amal Educational

Institutions). These institutions were totally independent of al-Sadr Institutions, financially and administratively.

2. Goals

In an interview conducted in June 2008 with the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Amal Educational Institutions, Dr. Ali Khreiss exposed the goals of the institutions.

Amal Educational Institutions, he said, aim at building up a sound personality in the learners' character. To achieve the institution's main educational objective, the focus is on developing the abilities of the learner in a balanced way by providing him with necessary skills that enable him to be an efficient and productive citizen.

Since Amal Educational Institutions, Dr. Khreiss continued, were founded to nourish their people's thirst for knowledge and education after the terrible consequences of war in Lebanon, their main purpose has been to embrace all the fields of education in order to grasp knowledge of different dimensions in different fields.

According to the 2004 Institutions' Guide, Amal Educational Institutions work on adherence to moral values; strengthening national belongingness and belief in the sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, understanding Lebanon's History and main issues within the frame of its Arab identity and most importantly acquiring logical and scientific thinking for scientific research (Mouassassat Amal al Tarbiwiyya Brochure, 2004).

3. Funding

Much of the financial support of Amal was solicited during the war, especially between 1985 and 1991 (Harik, 1994; Osseiran, 1997). This was a period when the influence of Amal as a militia was at its height and it was able to collect funds from

numerous sources. Besides receiving substantial contributions from wealthy immigrants, Amal militiamen exploited the Ouazi Port, taking tax on all imports (Harik, 1994). This form of action was widespread during the war. However, Amal's officials denied that party receipts from these sources directly financed their educational institutions.

Moreover, Berri's social service resources boomed when AMAL supporters took over Majlis-al-Janub (Council of the South) which was separated from the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1980 and given independent status to handle social welfare and reconstruction in the South in the aftermath of the 1978 Israeli invasion. Dr. Hussayn Kana'an who had close links to AMAL led the Council of the South from 1980 to1984. At the time, the Council had extraordinary administrative powers and financial independence, allowing quick action to be taken. However, after Kana'an was moved to head the Central Bank in 1985, a new Ministry of the South was created (Harik, 1994). The Council oversaw the repair of public schools and the construction of new schools; The Council took the charge of the replacement of hundreds of Christian teachers who had left the region (Harik, 1994).

As Berri reached formal positions within the state, by the summer of 1984 he was installed in the government as minister of justice and minister for the South (a position of great symbolic significance), and later on October 20, 1992, became Speaker of Parliament, he received more donations from Shiites emigrants. The large-scale financial campaigns were not prevalent before the war in the Shiite community. This time the money was collected by the Shiite communities in the name of the deprived Shiites ostensibly for the poor. By that time, according to Dr. Khreiss, the director of AMAL educational institutions, AMAL started collecting huge sums of money to build

educational institutions.

Furthermore, on the financial issue, the director explained that Amal's institutions are profit making and self-sufficient, established at a time when qualified government schools were scarce. Hence, they are preferred over government schools and are comparatively less expensive than private and missionary schools. The profits made by the schools are managed by the AMAL's Educational Society.

According to Dr. Khreiss, the income generated by each institution was meant to support a new institution elsewhere. At the same time, the income generated had to cover the full expenses for running the institution. He explained that Bilal Fahs Institution, as an example, became self-sufficient soon after its foundation and contributed to the establishment of other institutions.

In addition, the Institution coordinates with governmental institutions and administrations according to specialties. It receives help from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs to support its different educational and sponsoring activities. Dr. Khreiss explained that the Toul school has a large number of orphan students or students who come from a needy background. These students are either supported by the school or by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

4. AMAL Schools

Most of the schools have both academic and Vocational section. Several schools also include a boarding dormitory division. The Institution provides scholarships and aids for orphans and orphans of Martyrs, for siblings of wounded and handicapped and for siblings of poor and critical cases. AMAL Educational Institutions are spread in the three regions where the Shi'a mostly live, the South, the Beka'a and the Southern Suburb of Beirut.

Table 25

AMAL Schools According to Region and Date of Establishment

AMAL Educational Institutions	Date of Establishment	Academic	Vocational	Boarding
Beka'a				
Moussa al-Sadr Hermel	1993	x		x
Mohamad Yaacoub Baalbek	1997	x	x	
Sohmor Educ. Complex	2004	x	x	
Beirut				
Hassan Kassir	2001	x	x	
South				
Bilal Fahs Toul	1990	x	x	
Mostafa Shemrne Bissariah	1991	x		x
Mohamad Saad Abbasyeh	1992	x	x	x
Liberation Complex Sultaniyeh	2001	x	x	x
Khiam Marjeyun	2004	x	x	

Towards the end of the discussion on Amal's institutions several fundamental conclusions stand out. As a matter of fact, the segmented leadership practice of Amal was reflected in two independent institutional administrations. The first institution founded by the Amal movement founder, al Sadr, became totally independent financially and administratively of Amal's institutions. The second set of institutions was established as a result of Nabih Berri's foundation of Jami'yat Amal l'il Mahroumeen (Amal Movement Society for the Deprived) after Musa Al-Sadr's disappearance in 1978. However, although all institutions were established under the strong political influence of Amal's name, they not only became fragmented administratively but also financially. Their financial funders also became segmented

depending on which of the two institutional leaderships they are associated with.

Al-Mabarrat educational institutions.

1. <u>Background</u>

In 1978 the Religious authority Sayyed Muhamad Hussein Fadlullah addressed the social oppressions in Lebanon. He established Al-Mabarrat Association in 1978, a non-profit Islamic organization concerned with charity and public service that undertook to care for the victimized orphans of the successive wars; the Imam Khouie Orphanage came to be the first institution of the Association. Realizing that those most in need of this help are the deprived children and the orphans, the Mabarrat Association multiplied its efforts, hoping not only to give shelter for the largest number of orphans, but to provide them with the best services as well. Consequently, and with the generous donations of benevolent philanthropists, the Association's institutions grew in number to encompass different Lebanese regions. The care it provides has also developed. What began as a purely social care has turned into a comprehensive one that includes education, cultural upbringing and medical care so that it could achieve its goal of providing the orphans with physical, psychological and social welfare, and develop all their potentials and capabilities that they will in turn make use of to enrich and enhance their society. Thus, providing care for orphans was the first task that the Mabarrat Association assumed, but it then went on to include, in addition to those deprived of their parents, those who are deprived of seeing, hearing or proper speech. It gives henceforth those who were deprived of education an opportunity to learn and develop their potentials, boosting their confidence in themselves and in their community and enabling them to become active members in the society.

Moreover, as a result of the damage inflicted by the Lebanese war at the educational level in the country, and that even left the fate of thousands of children uncertain, the Association has established a number of schools across the Lebanese territories in a bid to ensure high-quality of learning using modernized educational techniques and procedures in Arabic, English and French for all academic, professional and vocational subjects (Association's documents, 2008).

2. <u>Goals</u>

As outlined in the 2007 Brochure issued by the Association, a first goal of the Association is to build orphanages that provide the orphans with adequate home environment and proper guided schooling. The Association also aims at building schools for academic teaching as well as vocational institutes that adopt modern curricula, and employ scientific techniques. Besides, ensuring constant access to the most recent scientific development in academic programs and curricula, the Association establishes training centers for teachers, and a scientific research center, so as to achieve continuous professional development. Moreover, promoting awareness of the Islamic culture in the community remains one of the major goals of the Al-Mabarrat Association; this is attained by holding seminars, founding public libraries and Islamic research centers and issuing educational, cultural and social publications.

In an interview with the Daily Star (February 17, 2007) Dr. Fadlallah the General Director of the institution, made it clear that the organization doesn't have any political aims; the goal is to care for people and to meet their need for education and to help the disabled people who suffer from deafness, blindness or language and common action problems. Al-Mabarrat initiated vocational learning a few years after introducing its academic programs. The motive behind the move was to prepare orphans, who were

unable to proceed with their academic coursework, for employment in the real world. In addition to being concerned about the welfare of its children, Al-Mabarrat has also directed its humanitarian efforts toward helping the physically disabled youngsters (Daily Star, February 17, 2007).

3. Funding

Al-Mabarrat institutions are social institutions whose aim is to fill a gap in the social, educational and health needs but at the same time are not free of charge. Therefore, according to the principal of Al-Kawthar school, students enrolled in the Mabarrat educational Institutions pay a minimal school fee though, well below the average of private schools.

Although wealthy Shiites, including emigrants and rich Shiites in the Gulf, are often important donors, most of the Al-Mabarrat's institutions depend heavily on local fund-raising and donations or generate income themselves. As Deeb (2006) notes, rich variety of institutions includes gas stations, a publishing house, a photocopy store, a factory for religiously permissible or (halal) foods (such as meat that has been slaughtered according to Islamic rules), and a computer store. Individual donations include alms (zakat), (khums) (a fifth of one yearly income after meeting living expenses), half of which is paid to one's (marja'a) (religious authority) or wakil (religious delegate and entrust) and the other half to a descendant of the prophet or (sayyid), and ad hoc donations by the faithful (sadaqat). Respected associations are often authorized by several religious authorities (marjai'is) to collect donations on their behalf. It is not unusual for as much as two million dollars to be collected on a single night during Ramadan (Deeb, 2006).

According to the Principal of Al Kawthar School, the Association hopes to

meet the running cost with these fees; in addition, the Fund for Orphan Sponsorship is a continuous program with philanthropists wishing to sponsor orphans.

Moreover, the Public Sector supports the Association which coordinates with governmental institutions and administrations according to specialties. It receives financial support from the Ministry of Education which subsidies the tuition of students who receive education free of charge; besides, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health sustain its social actions.

Al-Mabarrat Association implements as well many projects with the support and participation of international organizations through awarded grants. It also seeks to implement all its activities in close cooperation with its peer Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations as well as local communities (Al- Mabarrat Association Guide, 2006).

Moreover the Association cooperates with many foreign embassies in Lebanon to support its social, educational and health projects. In fact the Embassy of Japan announced on the February 23, 2007 that it will donate $89,639 to Al-Mabarrat Association in order to purchase equipment and perform renovation at the Imam al-Baqer Secondary School in the town of Hermel in the Beka’a Valley. The school will be equipped with new student desks and the playground will be renovated and furnished with outdoor games (Daily Star, 2007).

Likewise, the former British Ambassador James Watt had generously given to the Hadi institute for Visual, Auditory and Speech Impairment (Daily Star, 2007). Frances Guy, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom toured the pedagogic institutes at Al-Mabarrat in June 2007 and reassured the continuity of cooperation between the Embassy of the United Kingdom and Al-Mabarrat Association so that the students

would have access to any new development (Daily Star, 2007).

Noteworthy to mention that the summer 2006 war with Israel caused extensive damage to numerous schools run by Al-Mabarrat Association. The organization, which today has an extensive network of schools (22 schools) in the South, Beka'a and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, has managed to re-house many displaced orphans and students in temporary facilities, either at public schools offered to them by the Education Ministry or other facilities they own.

"The road to recovery is not an easy one" said Dr. Mohamad Baker Fadlallah, the General Director of the Association, in an interview with the Daily Star (February 17, 2007). Offers to rebuild these schools flooded in from Arab and Gulf countries. According to a booklet issued by the organization (November, 2006), AL-Mabarrat losses, which include destroyed school buildings and equipment, total $ 11.3 million.

Fadlalah said that Quatar, which promised to rebuild the towns of Bint Jbeil and Khiam after the Israeli war, has also pledged to rebuild Al-Mabarrat's schools in these towns at the cost of $6 million. Quatar has also given students in these schools books and school expenses. The United Arab Emirates said it would also rebuild schools demolished during the war (Daily Star, 2007).

Besides, the Kuwaiti Fund for Economic Development on an agreement with the Association on October 21, 2008 took the charge of rebuilding the Imam Ali Orphanage in Maaroub South Lebanon destroyed by the Israeli raids in July 2006; the 1 million U.S. dollars project will be financed through a grant offered by the Kuwaiti State (Daily Star, 2008).

In an interview with the Daily Star (February 17, 2007), Dr. Mohamad Baker Fadlallah declared that generous patrons, among them expatriates and Arab nationals in

the Gulf, have helped build many of Al- Mabarrat's institutions. He confirmed that the organization will accept donations from any source provided the donor does not impose any terms and conditions on them.

4. *Al- Mabarrat Schools*

The following section will give a brief description of different types of Al-Mabarrat schools. The Association in fact opened schools with Academic and Vocational track (Technical Institutes, Teacher Training Center and a Nursing School); besides, the Association addressed the wants of students with special needs; it opened schools for the visually and audibly impaired, a school for speech disorder and a center for early learning disorders' diagnosis). Al Mabarrat schools are spread mainly in the South, Biqua'a and Beirut.

Al-Imam Hasan Secondary School was built in 1989, amid a set of high buildings in the Rwaiss area in the heart of Beirut's Southern Suburb. It started to accept students at the beginning of the academic year 1990-1991. Since then, the school has provided education for students at all pre-university levels (kindergarten, basic and secondary).

Al-Mabarrat Charity Association founded Al-Ishrak school following the liberation of the South in 2000. The school opened for the students as of the 2002-2003 academic years. It only opened for primary grades in its first year, then, when the construction of the buildings was completed, it expanded to receive 700 pupils starting from the Kindergarten and up to Grade 7.

At the Imam Al-Hadi Foundation, Al-Mabarrat Association cares for disabled young people who suffer from hearing, visual and speech impairment. The foundation's buildings were specially designed to suit the movement of disabled users. The complex

contains three specialist schools: An-Noor School for the Blind, Ar-Rajaa School for the Deaf, and Al-Bayan School for Language and Communication Difficulties (The Association Documents, 2007).

Al-Mabarrat initiated vocational learning a few years after introducing its academic programs. The motive behind the move was to prepare orphans, who were unable to proceed with their academic coursework, for employment in the real world. Ali-AL-Akbar Technical Institution in Dawha-Beirut was established in 1994 and offers 19 programs of study which lead to a technical occupational degree. Furthermore, Ali-Al-Akbar vocational school has boarding and non-boarding section.

List of Al-Mabarrat Schools

Academic Learning

- Beirut

a) Al- Mojtaba Secondary School, Hay-al-Sollom, (1991)

b) Al-Imam al-Hasan Secondary School, Rwaiss, (1992)

c) Al-Kawthar Secondary School, Bir-Hassan, (1996)

d) Al-Abrar School, Al- Dawha, (1997)

- Jabal Amel

a) Imam Ali Secondary School, Maaroub- Shehour, (1991)

b) Imam Al Sadiq School, Joyya, (1995)

c) Al-Rahmah Secondary School, Nabatiyeh, (2001)

d) Al-Ishrak School, Bint-Jebeil, (2002)

e) Issa Ibn Mariam School Al Youssfi Educational Complex Al-Khiam (2002)

- Al-Bekaa

a) Imam Al- Baker Secondary School, Al-Hirmil , (1988)

b) Imam Al- Jawad Secondary School, Ali-an-Nahri-Riak, (1990)

c) Imam Al-Hussein School, Sohmor, (1999)

d) Al-Bachaer School, Baalbek, (1999)

e) Imam-Al-Kazem School, Ali an-Nahri-Riak, (2000)

Vocational Schools

a) Ali-al-Akbar Technical Institution in Dawha-Beirut (1994)

b) Al- Sayyideh Sukaina Vocational Institute for Girls in Bir Hassan/Beirut (1996)

c) Al- Sadiq Educational House (Teacher Training Center) in Bir Hassan/Beirut (1995)

d) Al- Mabarrat Nursing school in Haret-Hreik (1996)

Schools for the Disabled

a) Al-Nour school for the visually impaired

b) Al-Rajaa school for the audibly impaired

c) Al-Bayan school for speech and communication disorder

d) Al-Siraj Center (2003) for early learning disorders' diagnosis

Table 26

Al-Mabarrat Schools According to Region and date of Establishment

Mabarat schools	Beirut	South	Bekaa
1988	Airport		Hermel
1990	Rwais		Riak
1991	Hay sollom	Maroub	
1992	Rwais & Dawha		
1995	Birhasan	Jowaya	
1996	Birhasan & Haret hreik		
1997	Dawha		
1999	Sohmor		Baalbek
2000			Riak
2001		Nabatiyeh	
2002		Khiam & Bint Jbeil	

Hezbollah educational institutions.

1. *The Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching*

- Background

"The Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching" started its contribution in 1993 after the inauguration of three educational edifices that were the first set of its schools. These schools were named Al-Mahdi Schools after the Imam "Al- Mahdi", the Shiites 12th Imam. After fifteen years of building the first schools, the number of Al-Mahdi Schools has increased to fourteen spread all over Lebanon in Beirut, South, and Beka'a. In addition, a school was founded in the holy city of Qom whose students are the sons of the Lebanese community who study in the religious schools there.

Based on an interview with an official in the head office of the institution in July 2008, the number of students rose considerably which made the Institution unable to provide opportunities for new learners who would like to join its schools. This urged the Institution to widen the old buildings, add new floors, and rebuild new schools when the investment and resources are ensured. Besides, as a result of the growth and expansion of the faculty in the head office of the institution, an ex-school building at Ouzai was renovated. It was reestablished to offer facilities for the main departments and boards that play a critical role in improving the educational work. Hence, the head office moved to this newly renovated place in spring 2007.

- Goals

The Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching is an educational association whose announced aim is to build a conscious and educated generation. This is intended to be accomplished through establishing schools and institutes, and developing teachers.

The institution, through its schools, works on consolidating the Islamic religious values and ethics in the Lebanese Shiite community. The schools were named Al-Mahdi Schools after the Imam "Al- Mahdi", the Shiites 12th Imam who continues to be the guide for the young generations of these schools; the youth will embody the teachings of the Imam in his approaches and thoughts. Therefore, the name of the school represents its philosophy, that Al-Mahdi Schools constitute part of the resurgence and the spread of Islamic values and faith as well as education until Judgment Day (The Institution Mission, 2007).

Moreover, the institution develops the human relationships among all its members by giving special attention to knowledge and learning in all the theoretical and practical fields (The Institution Document, 2007).

According to an administrator in the head office of the institution in an interview in July 2008, the school does not aim to serve only those whose parents are supporters or otherwise affiliated with Hezbollah. On the contrary, the school aims to serve all sections of the Shiite community equally. Its ultimate goal is to have a faithful Islamic community that will resist Israel and all other oppressors.

It becomes clear that Hezbollah educational institutions have a clear set of goals, providing educational services in combination with the teaching of Islam and of the need for Islamic resistance. The goals are clear within its institutions and its cadres. The staff and administrators are practicing Muslims who are well educated and trained. Institutional extension of their holy message is their obvious goal and instrumental mediating agencies, their educational institutions are their means.

- Funding

Hezbollah's financial support is a matter of controversy. Hezbollah maintains that the main source of its income comes from donations by Muslims and that much of the funding for the social and educational infrastructure is raised domestically. However, critics argue that it is, or has been, massively supported from the Islamic Republic of Iran, from which their educational institutions also receive significant subsidies (Norton, 2007). Moreover several of Hezbollah-sponsored societies are actually branches of Iranian organizations or were initially created by Iran (Alagha, 2007; Deeb, 2006). Hence the large Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC) was created in 1987 with Iranian financial support but today depends heavily on volunteer labor. The Martyr’s Association (Al-Shahid Social Association) was created in 1982 by Khomeini and operates as a sister group to an Iranian organization of the same name; it guarantees to provide living and education expenses for the families of fighters who die in battle, as

does the Association for the Wounded. Other organizations were created by Hezbollah, more notably the Jihad al-Bina'a, Construction Association, which is responsible for numerous economic and infrastructure development projects. The Association designs and constructs the schools using party affiliated architects, engineers and laborers.

On the other hand, since its beginning, the Institution has worked to ensure the expenses related to the construction and expansion of its buildings through donations, financial aids, and endowments from Shari'a, a right licensed to the Institution by great religious authority men to build the schools. In addition, the Fund for Orphan Sponsorship is a continuous program with people wishing to sponsor orphans. Many individuals form a fixed support by financially aiding the Institution. While some others place their Zakat in the custody of the Institution, for it is upheld by many competent religious authorities to receive legal alms. Noteworthy to mention that, Hezbollah has relied extensively on funding from the Shiite Lebanese Diaspora in West Africa, the United States and South America (Norton, 2007).

The educational expenses are financed by tuition fees that are paid by students' parents. However, due to the difficult and low standard of living concerning the public who benefits from these schools, the Institution adopted a policy in assigning the tuition fees in a way that takes this standard of living into consideration according to an administration in the institution interviewed in July 2008. Moreover, there is the financial commitment of the Institution towards specific social communities, a commitment which is expressed in offering scholarships and discounts while at the same time compromising between the students' needs and the available fund. Ultimately this has been a burden to be added to the construction and building expenses, for these tuition fees fail to cover the real teaching cost (Interview with an administrator

at the head office of the institution in Ouzai, July, 2008).

Besides, an Education Unit is in charge of providing financial aid and scholarships to students of Hezbollah that are in need. It is led by a central office called al Ta'bia al-Tarbawiyya (Educational Enforcement office). The unit spent over 21 billion Lebanese Liras (US$ 14,215,000) between 1996 and 2001 on financial aid and scholarships (Hamzeh, 2004). This amount reflects the serious commitment that Hezbollah has to the students in need of its constituency. The aid program of Hezbollah's Education Unit takes many forms. For example, the amount spent by the unit for the year 2000-2001 totaled almost 5, 5 billion Lebanese Liras ($3,569,408) and benefited around twenty-three thousand students. Other types of aid involve paying for school textbooks and instructional material and paying part of the registration fee of students in public schools or in private schools with reasonable tuition (Hamzeh, 2004).

The bulk of the unit's aid, however, seems to go for scholarships that cover full tuition of students plus living expenses. The numbers of students in need who have benefited from Hezbollah's scholarships are by far greater in Beirut than in the Biqa'a and South Lebanon. This is natural because the cost of education and living in urban dwellings is much higher than in the rural areas of the Biqa'a and South Lebanon. Overall, Hezbollah's Education Unit spent a total of 4,464,755,000 Lebanese Lira ($309, 850,000) on three types of aid in the Beirut area compared with 475,000,000 Lebanese Lira ($ 3,166,666) and 423,337,000LL ($2,822,225) in South Lebanon and Biqa'a respectively (Hamzeh, 2004).

The table below shows the types of education unit aid by amount (in Lebanese Lira) and by region, 2000-2001.

Table 27

Types of Hezbollah Education Unit Aid

	Token	Financial	Scholarship	Total
South				
Amount	67,000,000	109,000,000	290,000,000	475,000,000
N of students	3800	2180	580	6560
Bika'a				
Amount	30,000,000	147,337,000	249,000,000	423,337,000
N of students	611	2532	1207	5489
Beirut				
Amount	16,722,000	40,999,500	4,407,045,000	4,464,775,500
N of students	1120	819	8643	10582

From Educational Mobilization Office, 2000-2001 Annual Report, *Al Ahd, November 24, 2001 ,9.*

Nevertheless, the Institution coordinates with governmental institutions; it receives financial assistance from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs as a subsidy to support its free of charge sections.

However, Hezbollah organizations have developed wide networks on income-generating projects, which they hope will sustain the running costs of their massive and wide scale organizations. These income generating projects include petrol stations, super markets, butcher shops and retail shops (Deeb, 2006).

- AL-Mahdi Schools

Al-Mahdi Schools are spread in three main Shi'a regions, the South, Biqa'a and the Southern Suburb of Beirut.

South Lebanon

a) Al-Mahdi High School Sharqiah Established in 1993

b) Al-Mahdi Schools: Al-Majadel Established in 1993

c) Al-Mahdi Schools: Kfarfila Established in 1994

d) Al-Mahdi Schools: Ain Al-Mizrab Established in 1995

e) Al-Mahdi Schools: Ghaziyeh Established in 1995

f) Al-Mahdi Schools: Tyre Established in 2000

g) Al-Mahdi Schools: Bint Jbeil Established in 2003

Beirut

a) Al-Mahdi Schools: Beer Hasan, Beirut joined in 1997

b) Al-Mahdi High School Shahed, Airport Highway joined in 2004

The institution completed the unfinished part of the school building in 2006 despite the war and the difficulties it faced during construction. Upon completion, the capacity of the school matches up to 2500 students distributed over 90 classes.

Al-Bika'a

a) Al-Mahdi Schools: Bazzaliyah, Established in 1994

b) Al-Mahdi Schools: Shmustar, Established in 1995

c) Al-Mahdi Schools: Al-Nabi Sheet joined in 2001

d) Al-Mahdi High School Baalbek, joined in 2004

Al-Mahdi High School: Project – Al Hadath (2009); the project is new and tremendous in the southern suburb of Beirut in Al Hadath area (7000m2). The complete construction of the project is expected to be over by summer 2009; in fact the school is currently receiving student's application for the fall 2009.

Table 28

Al-Mahdi Schools According to Region and Date of Establishment

	Beirut	South	Bekaa
1993		Sharqiyah & Majadel	
1994		Kfarfila	Bazaliyah
1995		Ainelmizrab & Gaziyeh	Shmustar
1997	Berhasan		
2000		Tyre	
2001			Nabisheet
2003		Bint Jbeil	
2004	Airport		Baalbek
2009	Hadath		

2. *Islamic Charitable Emdad Committee (ICEC)*

- Background

One of Hezbollah's established institutions is the Islamic Charitable Emdad Committee (ICEC). The association was established in Lebanon in 1987; according to an administrator who has been with the organization since its beginning in 1986, a group of young people decided to confront the poverty in the Southern Suburb of Beirut (al-Dahiya). So they began to collect money from businesses and distribute it to the poor. Soon afterwards, representatives from an organization in Iran came to the Southern Suburb of Beirut to establish a sister association. The two groups agreed to work together and founded the Lebanese ICEC (Deeb, 2006). It became a public welfare association for its social and welfare activities mainly in remote, rural and neglected areas in the South, which were constantly shelled by Israeli troops, and in

regions where the presence of government services is scarce if non existing. The association's slogan was from the beginning "Support the destitute and the needy". Its activities covered in a few years many Lebanese regions by establishing schools and care centers for handicapped children. The Association currently runs 8 schools in the regions where the Shi'a predominate. It aims at providing the poor section of the Shi'a community with education (the Association Brochure, 2008).

- Goals

As outlined in the 2008 Association's Guide, to achieve its goal, the Association main objective is to raise the educational level of deprived children through arming them with education and knowledge and providing them with the chance to find a job and learn a profession; besides focusing on their Islamic education, so they can be raised as devoted Shiite Muslims. The Association sponsors the orphans in need on the educational level; it provides education as well for students with special needs by providing them with specialized teaching methods to enable them to cope in their society. The educational committee will do follow ups for the students from school to graduation and help in providing them with job opportunities especially for vocational and technical graduates. An Education Assistance Team makes a complete basic need assessment for the registered families at the ICEC. It provides school grants, stationary and books. It also offers educational guidance programs and academic support whereby a member of the education team will voluntarily or for a low wage give private lessons for the children who need school assistance. To reach its objectives, the Association strengthens its cooperation with societies and individuals, both locally and internationally.

- Funding

As previously stated much of Hezbollah's funding for the social and educational infrastructure is raised domestically. In 2000, the ICEC budget came mainly from donations, religious taxes, Ramadan fund raisers, almost three thousand full sponsorships for orphans, and the ubiquitous collection boxes that are scattered all over Lebanon (Deeb, 2006).

However, Hezbollah also receives significant subsidies from Iran. In fact, they vary widely, depending on the political climate there. Hence the large Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC) was created in 1987 with Iranian financial support but today depends heavily on volunteer labor. Deeb (2006) notes that of 440 Emdad employees only about 90 were paid, and many paid employees donate a significant amount of unpaid labor.

Tuition fees at al-Emdad schools are very minimal and free of charge for the orphans of martyrs. According to the Association's guide (2008), the Islamic Charitable Emdad Committee (ICEC) relies on the following sources for its funds:

- **Donations (sadakat):** For this purpose, special donation boxes have been distributed all over Lebanon carrying the motto of ICEC available at shops, houses, offices and commercial centers. The number of these boxes has reached 67,000 and they provide the biggest part of the funds.
- The Imam's Khomeini Assistance Committee in Tehran sponsored educational activities and provide scholarships for brilliant and needy students.
- **The orphan sponsorship** is spent on the orphan's needs and education.
- **Contributions** are offered by institutions and generous individuals, and are spent on schools.

- Islamic Charitable Emdad Committee Schools

The Islamic Charitable Emdad Committee has extended its social activities to cover education. It started in 1992 the establishment of schools for the students in need and orphans of martyrs. Currently ICEC runs 8 schools, vocational and academic, besides one institution for students with learning disabilities.

This committee has established several educational settings which are:

a) Martyr Mohammad Bjeiji seconday school (Mashgara, West Beqa'a) 1992.
b) Moaysara Secondary school (Kisirwan) 1993
c) Imam Khomeini Secondary School (Hadath, Beirut) 1996. Academic and Vocational
d) Imdad Vocational Center (Southern Suburb) 2001.
e) Imam Al-Baker Educational Complex (Al-Batroun) 2001.
f) Ahl-al-Beit Complex (Zkak Alblat – Beirut), 2004.
g) Imdad Vocational Training Center for Dropout Students (Hadath, Beirut, 2001).
h) Imam Khomeini permanent camp for sports, in the suburbs of Baalbek.
i) Four rehabilitation and care centers for handicapped children with special needs in Beirut, Nabatieh, Baalbek and Hermel encompassing handicapped children and students having difficult learning cases.
j) Currently, ICEC is in the process of building two more schools in Hermel and Nabatieh.

Table 29

Emdad Schools According to Region and Date of Establishment

School	Region	Start
Mohamad Bjeiji	Beqa'a	1992
Moaysara	kisirwan	1993
Imam Khomeini	Hadath	1996
Imdad Vocational	Southern Suburb	2001
Imam Al Baker	Al-Batroun	2001
Ahl-al-Beit	Beirut	2004
Ragheb Harb	Hermel	project
Abbas Mussawi	Nabatiyeh	project

3. <u>Jamiyyat al Ta'alim al Dini al Islami</u> (The Association of Islamic Religious Teaching): Al-Mustafa Schools

- Background

The Association was established in 1974 by a group of clerics who become aware of the necessity of religious Islamic teaching in schools where the Shi'a prevail. The Association started by providing schools with teachers of religion having the purpose of spreading Islamic Shiite doctrine among the new Shi'a generation. In 1984, the association established its first private school (Al-Mustafa) in the Southern Suburb of Beirut. Branches of the school were established later in the South and the Biqa'a.

- Goals & Funding

The Association of Islamic Religious Teaching is in fact affiliated to Hezbollah. The educational goals and the mode of funding of Al- Mustafa schools are similar to Al-Mahdi and Emdad Schools which are as well affiliated to Hezbollah.

- Al-Mustafa Schools

Table 30

Al- Mustafa Schools by Region and Date of Establishment

School	Region	Start
Al-Mustafa	Hareit Hreik Beirut	1984
Al-Mustafa	Tyre -South	1986
Al-Batoul	Bir Hassan Beitut	1987
Al-Mustafa	Al-Ghadir Beirut	1993
Al-Mustafa	Nabatiyeh South	1993
Al-Mustafa	Kasr Nabba Biqa'a	1995

In sum, and according to an administrator in the head office of the Institution, interviewed in July 2008, all Hezbollah educational institutions do not claim to serve only those whose parents are supporters or otherwise affiliated with the party. On the contrary, the aim is to serve all sections of the Shiite society equally by providing educational services of good quality in combination with the teaching of Islam and the need for Islamic Resistance that will resist Israel and all other oppressors.

The goals are clear within its institutions and its cadres. The staff and administrators are practicing Muslims who are well educated and trained. At the beginning, the term "Hezbollah institutions", suggested a rigid and closed atmosphere within the institutions, bold religious or party symbols, and a less open staff. More recently, openness, flexibility, tolerance and modernization (i.e., equipment used, training of staff, education of personnel, structures built, etc.) have become more

aligned to instrumental objectives. Hezbollah's choice of their teaching staff has become more selective; selection of person of a higher educational and social background however, is not always an easy job, for those persons who usually prefer to remain independent of a party's stamp especially if they are economically independent or well off. This is not to mention that they cannot succeed to attract those people as friends or sympathizers. Thus, in spite of Hezbollah's tendency towards more openness and flexibility, its success in recruiting a high percentage of caliber and non-party affiliated staff is still low.

Administrative mode of work of the Shiite educational institutions. This section will make a brief review of the administrative mode of work which is somehow common to the different educational institutions under study.

A group of boards and departments supervise the educational and administrative activities of the institutions. They are as follows:

- Central Board of Directors which is the highest authority in the institution whose role is to set the Institutions standards and make decisions in all aspects. This board has a general manager as headperson and department directors as members.
- Principals Board which includes all the schools' principals headed by the general manager of the institutions. Sometimes, members from the Central Board of Directors attend its meetings if needed.
- Educational Supervision Department which is responsible for planning and supervising the teaching process at all schools.
- Cultural and Religious Educational Department which plans for the educational and religious programs. It also supervises all the cultural, religious and

environmental activities.

- Human Resources Department which is responsible of all the employee affairs. It provides promotion, professional development and evaluation for the faculty members. It also demonstrates care of the employees administrative issues.
- Writing and Publication Department having the duty to write and publish school books in addition to preparing additional resource materials needed for teaching.
- Supervision and Inspection Department which exercises superintendence and inspection over the administrative and educational work.
- Finance Department which pursues the financial issues of the institutions and their schools and provides maintenance and accommodation.
- Public Relations and Media Department which works on building strong relations with the institutions, associations, and active social figures. Moreover, it helps advertising the institutions goals.

In another sphere, at al-Sadr educational institutions, while they require religious education and commitment, religious symbols and rituals are not very pronounced. The one austere symbol is al-Sadr's picture in all main offices. The dress code, accent, style of conduct and the whole working atmosphere reflect a more Southern life style but with slightly more emphasis on Islam and its practices in everyday life rather than an Iranian-affiliated one.

In the Amal educational institutions, the Amal symbol posted inside is adorned by the portrait of Amal Society founder Nabih Berri and often by that of al-Sadr as well as the original founder of the Amal movement. Veiling is compulsory for teachers but not for students. Most of the teachers are not personally veiled outside their work, but only put the veil to maintain the religious identity of the institution. Discipline among

its members is loose; they do not necessarily carry religious or traditional family values of the political party first (al-Sadr).

However, Hezbollah educational institutions have an organized and tightly knit and disciplined membership. This is evident in its member's institutional practices. The children and the staff in Al-Mahdi schools are both disciplined. Veiling among the staff and the older girls is compulsory. Hezbollah symbols or emblems are prevalent in the school besides some religious mottos that emphasize Islamic values in general and the Islamic Resistance fighter in particular.

In an interview conducted by Osseiran (1997), with the Director of al-Mahdi school one of Hezbollah's schools in a district called Ghaziyah, the latter expressed the party's hope to integrate Hezbollah and Fadlallah's institutions administratively since they both have similar educational programs and incentives. These include social, health and educational services along teaching Islamic faith, religion and discipline. Those attempts were not achieved, as declared by the educational director of the Association; differences do exist which make each institution unique in its contribution.

In conclusion, more important than the specifics of any one association is the evidence that a palpable sense of community and religious commitment (iltizam) now exists that emphasizes that a mark of faith is to offer a helping hand to others and participate in the community. Ayatollah Fadlallah is known for capturing this ethos when he says that he does not want followers but rather partners. It is impossible in fact to appreciate the durability and loyalty that modern Shiite groups generate unless one understands that their strength derives from the strong social fabric that they have woven over the years.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The existing literature on the ascendance of political religious movements primarily focuses on socio-economic, political, and cultural variables (Halawi, 1992; Hamzeh, 2004; Lewis, 1988; Norton, 1987; Rotchild, 1981). Socio-economic explanations point to the economically deprived, who turn to religious symbols due to their frustrations (Ahmad, 1991; Rotchild, 1981; White, 2002).

White (2002) asserts that the rural migrants embrace a militant religiosity as a defense of their threatened identity when they settled in the city. Brown (2000) posits that socioeconomic modernization in the Middle East has raised the expectations of urbanizing classes. Yet the expectations of the new literate urbanites could not be met by secular political movements. Hence, these disgruntled men became activists in the rising religious-political protest. Bruce (2001) admits that religious activism might replace a trend of secularization in the modernizing context when it is used by an ethnic group to defend its identity as a minority. These arguments are valuable steps in explicating the contexts under which modernization might lead to the rise of religious movements.

Besides, the literature on politicized ethnicity and ethnic mobilization determines the conditions under which ethnic mobilization occurs in pursuit of social, economic and political gains. According to Ben-Dor (1988), for ethnic mobilization to occur and to achieve its aim of restructuring existing conditions, certain prerequisites both of a behavioral and organizational nature have to be fulfilled. This phenomenon

occurs when ethnic groups bring their social, economic interest, grievances, claims, anxieties and aspirations into the political arena. Likewise, Rotschild (1981) asserts that for ethnic mobilization to occur there must exist first a leadership, be it traditional or religious or aristocratic, desiring and capable of provoking the transformation of the mass bearers of the cultural markers into a self-conscious group; in addition, Halawi (1992) suggests that, ethnic groups can be seen as involved in manipulating their ethnic identity in order to advance their strategic goals. However the use of ethnicity for the purposes of mobilization requires transformations at the individual and group levels. Deutch's (1961) model suggests that these transformations are in large part a response to the requirements of modernization. According to that model, social processes that fall under the rubric of "modernization" promote heightened levels of ethnic self-identification. Besides, urbanization deepens ethnic solidarity by exposing the ethnically uneven distribution of resources in most pluralistic societies, and by providing social arenas where competition for valued collective goods such as employment, education, services, etc., is more intense than in rural areas (Young, 1983). Urbanization also enhances the creation of ethnic enclaves, family associations and social clubs which help resettle new migrants, and thus promotes ethnic allegiance (Olzak, 1986). Furthermore, the spread of education creates new strata susceptible to politicization. Modern media, infrastructural development, and other expanded networks of communication intensify "awareness of social competition within national and regional arenas" (Young, 1983). Modernization therefore, contributes to the rapid destruction of political isolation (Weiner and Hoselitz, 1961).

As such, this section tries to find out what role the expansion of Shi'a schools had in the community political mobilization? I argue that the existence of a historical

socio-cultural divide in the Lebanese society and the politicization of that divide as a result of social change through modernization and urbanization turned Shi'a schools to institutional sites for religious-political mobilization. Besides, I discuss that the creation of a new educational stream by the religious parties transformed Shi'a identity into an ethnic-religious identity that accelerated the political mobilization of the community. I also unpack the discourses formed around Shi'a schools in order to explain how these educational institutions became vehicles for political mobilization.

Cultural Divide, Migration and Political Mobilization

In fact, a socio-cultural cleavage was created in the country between the rural migrants and the city inhabitants by the modernization process; an ethnic divide was formed with the immigration of large numbers of Shi'a from the periphery to the center of the country; increasing modernization, namely increasing rural-urban migration and increasing literacy rates, challenged a historical socio-cultural divide and brought two sides of the divide to closer social contact. As a consequence, the rural migrants and the city inhabitants felt that their cultural identity is under threat. In such a context religious-political groups used religion as a meta-narrative that addresses the cultural marginalization of the peripheral groups, namely in our case the Shi'a in Lebanon. Institutional sites, religious schools of the religious political actors, created spaces suitable for the communication of the ethno-religious discourses to the larger society, hence contributing to religious political mobilization.

In the case of the Lebanese Shi'a migrants, the destabilizing effect of their flight from rural village to urban slum created new psychological and material needs, which the ineffective Lebanese state was incapable of addressing. Thanks to the

institutionalization of sectarianism in the Lebanese socio-political order, these needs were aptly met by communal affiliations (Khalaf, 1987). The heightened communal consciousness of the Shi'a was itself a product of the urbanization process. The Southern Suburbs became a meeting point for the Shi'a communities from the Biqa'a and the South, where together they underwent the same social and cultural dislocation and, in due course, developed a sense of communal solidarity (Cobban, 1986; Halawi, 1992). The radicalizing potential of this sense of communal cohesion lay in the Shiite growing awareness of their deprived status vis-a-vis other communal groups. As stated by Young (1983), urbanization deepens ethnic solidarity by exposing the ethnically uneven distribution of resources in most pluralistic societies, and by providing social arenas where competition for valued collective goods such as employment and education.

In fact, the many waves of Shi'a rural urban migration created a center-periphery cleavage that became one of the most important divisions in social and political life. Besides, the economic policies followed by succeeding governments also produced severe socio- economic inequalities between the center and the periphery. This Shi'a periphery was not only culturally and politically marginalized, but also educationally disadvantaged. Hence, despite their physical closeness to the center, these Suburbs still constituted a periphery, this time the urban periphery.

Nevertheless, the Shi'a families who migrated to the city thought that their children would be better due to economic and educational opportunities. However, the optimism of the first generation of Shi'a suburbs dwellers did not extend to the second and third generations, since their opportunities did not improve. These city-born youngsters were stuck at the level of their parents' low-income and low-prestige jobs.

Moreover, the close contact with the urban elites made the Shi'a suburbs inhabitants more aware of the social and cultural hierarchies that existed between themselves and the urban elites and made them also aware of both their lack of economic opportunities and the discriminatory outlook towards them.

Actually, the migrant Shi'a population is not constructed anymore as a rural population that failed to become urban, but as a population that is attacking the city, its values, its political institutions and, more importantly, the very core of its ideology and its social order. Moreover, those people of rural origin were considered as the 'threatening other' by the other group, but today also as the occupier of the social, cultural and political space (Khalaf, 1987). Hence, the urban elites blamed the suburbs dwellers not only for the mounting infrastructural problems, for overcrowding and for diminishing high urban manners, but also for posing a cultural and political threat to their very existence. The steep increase in the number of the Shi'a suburb residents and the persistence of the problems of integration were an important factor in this changing perception.

As explained above, socio-cultural marginalization of the periphery became more evident and politicized because of the economic frustration of the rural migrants and the increasingly negative cultural representations by the urbanites. The movement of the periphery from villages to cities was also reflected in changing residential backgrounds of Shi'a students. In this context, Shi'a schools attracted poor students from the neighborhoods by providing extensive scholarships and free boarding opportunities. In addition to these direct contributions, certain civil society organizations provide material and logistical support to students and graduates alike. For instance, these material incentives made Shi'a schools very attractive for students

from lower socioeconomic families. In the past, a big segment of the Shi'a population could not send their children to schools. They could not do that due to a lack of material opportunities. In effect, I met many Shi'a individuals in the conduct of the study, who told me: "We couldn't have studied and have a good education if these schools wouldn't exist. We couldn't have a profession if these schools wouldn't exist". Hence these schools became the only space, where the poor and deprived Shi'a masses could get good quality education due to their economic accessibility. Thus, these schools provided a venue for the children of the deprived masses for upward mobility. In fact, Shi'a schools constituted the most important social project in the history of the Shiite community in Lebanon.

Therefore, at the socio-cultural level, Shi'a schools addressed the needs of the marginalized. Moreover, the religious-political parties established their educational institutions and saw them as a tool, through which they could realize their self-declared goal of spiritual development. Hence, by portraying these schools as the source of spiritual awakening, the religious parties politicized the issue of religious education within the Shi'a community.

Ethno Religious Identity and Political Mobilization

In this section, I discuss how Shi'a identity was transformed into an ethnic-religious identity through the creation of a new educational stream by the religious parties, as well as how Shi'a schools became the primary vehicle for political mobilization, by successfully addressing the socio-cultural needs of the Shi'a through creating social networks around those schools.

Yet, it needs to be explained why Shi'a schools succeeded in attracting a

significant number of religious and non-religious Shi’a students in a short period of time. I argue that those schools became a very popular and significant alternative for Shi’a families as they successfully addressed the socio-cultural marginalization of the Shi’a. Indeed Shi’a schools became a vehicle of political mobilization by effectively creating cultural pride around Shi’a identity. Besides, one of the main reasons for their success is their ability to attract low-income parents; unsurprisingly, the Shi’a schools are mainly located in low-opportunity neighborhoods.

As a matter of fact, Shi’a schools addressed the cultural discrimination faced by the Shi’a community and created a positive Shiite identity around piety. They stress on the fact that the Shi’a possess a glorious tradition that comes from their religious history. Indeed, a major role of Shi’a schools is to lead their students in re-embracing the values of this glorious tradition through education.

When asked how education in Shi’a schools was different from education provided in secular non Shi’a schools, an official from Al-Mabarrat emphasized this distinction by saying “Our public wants to learn specifically more about Shi’a religious tradition and we, in charge of Shi’a schools, are proud of our education which emphasizes respect for figures of religious authority”. By emphasizing their Shi’a roots and including specific Shi’a traditions in the school curriculum, Shi’a schools teach their pupils to be proud of their Shiite heritage. This sense of ethnic pride is in sharp contrast with the loss of self identity in secular schools.

Indeed, the schools’ officials are not short of stories of how non-religious parents return to religion due to the education of their children. Shi’a parents, who have forgotten about their ties to traditional Shiism, are returning to their roots thanks to their children who are receiving a proper religious education in Shi’a schools. This change at

home is then depicted as the first step in the Islamization of Shi'a society according to Shi'a doctrine and beliefs. Hence, according to this discourse, pupils in Shi'a schools do not simply adopt appropriate behavioral traits, but they are being prepared to become agents of societal change within their community.

Moreover, the fact that these schools appealed to many Shi'a families according to an official in the Hezbollah schools' network circle, can be explained by the existence of social networks formed around these schools. Hezbollah owes much of its appeal to the fact of the delivery of social and public services in Shiite areas. The religious political party uses its good works as a means of underlining and enhancing its legitimacy as bona fide party (Harik, 2004), while commitment to the principles and values of Islam remains obviously the wellspring of the party. Philanthropic institutions, orphanages, cultural centers and welfare organizations and programs were part of a growing network of social assistance (Harik, 2004) which also consists of providing good health care services and hospitalization to the community at minimal cost. In addition to building schools, Jihad al-Binaa (Reconstruction Campaign) established agricultural cooperative organisations in rural areas and assisted farmers with heavy machinery and technical assistance; besides providing the poor farmers with credit and social security facilities.

When interviewed in July 2008, a Hezbollah official claimed: "In reality the benefits provided by Shi'a schools extend to parents and to many of the residents residing in the low-opportunity neighborhoods. For instance, when it was decided to dig wells and install generators in seven public schools that had no water in the Dahiyah, Hezbollah's Student Mobilization Office arranged for volunteer help. In another instance Hezbollah arranged for parental assistance when the Reconstruction

Campaign started work on schools (Harik, 2004).

Hajj Husain Shami, Director of Hezbollah social services as quoted in (Harik, 1994), explained that mobilizing people to demand their rights would continue as a major part of Islamic Movement's program since many people were unaccustomed to making their voices heard on social issues, although so far, no response from the government had been forthcoming. Shami went on saying that continuing gaps in normal governmental services often seemed to exercise logic of their own with regard to service institutions.

After all, this sheds some light on how the meeting of material needs encourages political and religious loyalty. As a matter of fact, an important engine of Islamic expansion in the Shiite community was the worsening economic plight of the lowest sectors of society who receive material aid and consolation from Islamic organizations. The work is politically motivated but it also shows what faith can do (Harik, 2004). The service the party could still provide would continue to further its religious and political goals.

Yet these social networks do not only extend material benefits, but also communicate the ethno-religious messages constructed around Shi'a education through participating in extra-curricular activities. Through these social networks, many Shi'a who do not send their children to Shi'a schools are exposed to the ethno-religious discourses constructed around the type of education offered in those schools.

In fact, Shi'a individuals who support the existence of Shi'a schools without partaking of their services constitute a larger group than the few thousand parents who enroll their children in the schools' network. As a matter of fact, the network of Shi'a schools receives funding from many wealthy Shi'a supporters.

Ethno Religious Discourses and Political Mobilization

In addition to material incentives, many families turned to Shi'a schools because of cultural motives. In order to grasp how these schools addressed the cultural needs of the marginalized, it is necessary to unpack some of the narratives constructed around Shi'a schools and the ways they are communicated to the society, in order to explain how these educational institutions became vehicles for political mobilization.

First, these schools built a positive pious Muslim identity which the secular parties tried to erase for so many years. This positive pious Muslim identity partly stemmed from the socialization process within the schools and was expressed in different ways. Zainab, a graduate from a Shi'a high school, claimed that there was a different type of atmosphere in her school compared to secular schools. She added that this atmosphere inculcated spiritual principles in students, such as valuing others because they are Allah's creation. Another graduate, Jaafar, claimed that there was a spiritual atmosphere in his school, because "we could talk with others about religious matters, we could pray in the mosque within the school." This spiritual atmosphere created a consciousness of being a member of the community. According to Jaafar, this consciousness is "not something that is taught in the classes, rather it is a situation that emerges during your years of education in the school." This atmosphere in the school campuses also affects the religiosity and ideological orientations of the students.

According to this discourse, Shi'a schools are viewed by Shiite who support those schools as immune from the ill effects of modernization. Thus, unlike their secular counterparts, students in those schools mostly stay away from improper behavior, such as violence, criminal activities or drug use because of their religious education. Another graduate of a Shi'a school sums up this claim and says "currently, you can observe that

students engage in strange movements, such as Satanism, or commit homicides. I think these happen due to a lack of religious knowledge. Let me give you an example. For instance you tell people not to steal. Yet, you make the person internalize this, if this person cannot assimilate this spiritually and conscientiously, then this instruction is to no avail. The reason is because you approach education one dimensionally".

Another discourse depicts Shi'a schools as the only venue for the education of girls from conservative backgrounds. For instance, the majority of parents who interviewed for this study in three of Shi'a schools asserted that these schools were the only option for the education of their daughters due to the propriety standards they provided. The spatial segregation between the sexes in curricular and extra-curricular activities and the lack of mingling between boys and girls play an important role in the maintenance of these propriety standards.

This discourse is sometimes supplemented by a more positive claim on Shi'a identity. According to this claim, students and graduates of Shi'a schools are expected to be agents of positive social change in the Shi'a community. As one graduate puts it, "Once you say that you are a member of a Shi'a school you need to be aware of your behavior, because you subscribe to a mission. Hence you develop an auto-control mechanism". This behavior of students is also expected to have larger social consequences, such as cleansing the Shiite community from corruption.

However, it is important to explicate how these discourses are translated into social and political power. In fact, there were other important social networks (religious ceremonies, cultural clubs…) through which discourses were disseminated to the larger society; graduates of those schools come together around several organizations and form a tightly knit community. These organizations provide several opportunities for

political mobilization. First, they actively promote the idea that Shi'a schools are the primary sources of spiritual values within the Shi'a community, and students are the agents of social change towards a more pious Shi'a community. Secondly, these institutions provide spaces, where the members of religious-political parties and the schools graduates could physically meet and interact. These politicians preserve their ties with the graduates, who became prominent members in social or business circles. Graduates also became political cadres and at the same time commercial cadres. Lastly, according to the public relations and media directors of the educational institutions, graduates of Shi'a schools through their participation in social networks were able to talk about and act on political issues which were their common concerns. For instance, many of the graduates were engaged in political protests, and these social networks emerged as the hotbeds of such protests.

Implications

Describing the discourses around Shi'a schools, that blend ethnic and religious messages, is important as a matter of fact to understand why these schools appealed to many Shi'a families. According to this discourse, the reason for the proliferation of Shi'a schools was the community's embrace of Islamic Shi'a values; Indeed, Shi'a schools' generation should be seen as the engine of societal Islamization and creating a sense of identity and pride around it.

An authoritative figure in the Shi'a schools circle summarizes this argument by saying: "How does Islamization occur? What is the means to achieve Islamization? According to my opinion Islamization occurs through education and instruction. It occurs through generating faith and action among those we educate. As a result our

community will become Muslim again. The believers will become believers again. Those who are deficient Muslims will become complete Muslims. The more you turn people to complete Muslims, the more the country becomes Muslim with its morality, with its image, with its actuality, with its institutions, and with its order. But who will undertake this effort? We claim that under current conditions the most suitable community for this job is the network of our Shi'a schools".

Taken as a whole, the wide range of educational programs promoted by the institutions under study emphasizes the political meaning of the groups they served. Indeed, the wider cause of these groups based on religious conviction greatly influences the vigor with which educational activities were undertaken, and explains stronger efforts to let social services and educational programs stand for fundamental goals.

Another important factor in the evolution of educational activities was elite use of complex emotions revolving around fears of marginalization and banishment. These feelings encouraged a deep consciousness of identity. In the cases examined in this study, the educational institutions meant to serve the Shiite were usually endowed with cherished community attributes designed to reinforce primordial attachments and thus revitalize community solidarity.

In fact, educational activities were presented as religious duty and party obligation. This explains the fact that social action in its linkage to Islam was an important agent of political mobilization as early as Imam al Sadr's arrival in Lebanon in 1959 and remains a critical part of the Shiite awakening still in process.

Afterwards, Shi'a schools have proliferated. Their proliferation was not forced. People were giving the money themselves; they were building the schools themselves. Hence this was a popular demand. But those who could not establish such organizations

and who lacked such effective networks to mobilize their supporters felt uneasy about this social potential of the schools' graduates. Hence, the capacity of these networks to mobilize their constituency not only helped the Islamist Shiite political parties to become politically stronger, but also sharpened the religious-secular cleavage by drawing strong criticism from secular actors. Yet, in spite of the demand from the Shiite community for more religious education, secular elites who are alienated from their Islamic roots, try to demonize Shi'a schools by depicting them as sources of religious extremism and as the back garden of Shiite political Islam**.**

In sum, Shi'a schools were formed by political and religious parties; they grew significantly because of increased sources of funding provided to the school system. More importantly, the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran factually mesmerized the Shi'a community in Lebanon and deeply affected it ideologically. It is unlikely that this network of Shi'a schools would have been launched, had it lacked the inspiration of a revolutionary paradigm. Moreover, without Iran's political, financial and logistical support, the organizational development would have been delayed for this network to score the same achievements.

It follows then, that the Shiite Islamicization is partly a product of the Revolution in Iran. On the other hand, the issue of religious education was politicized by the political parties in charge of those schools. The Shi'a schools' system emerged as institutions that provide social provisions for the poor and empower the culturally marginalized segments of the population by creating an affirmative religious Muslim Shiite conservative identity. Discourses around Shi'a schools were successfully utilized by the religious political parties to mobilize their constituents.

The Shi'a clerics (Ulama) have been instrumental in providing a communal

voice that allowed them to influence Shiite education. Their success was due to a combination of factors. Leaders of the stature of Musa al-Sadr, Fadlallah and Nasrallah have created an environment in which the (Ulama) clerics are able to articulate the social and political demands of their community as well as provide it with practical assistance through charitable institutions. In the case of al-Sadr and Nasrallah in particular, we find the (Ulama) using their juristic qualifications and oratorical skills to motivate large groups of their coreligionists. At the same time, the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members has given Shi'a activists the ability to establish and sustain their educational institutions.

Furthermore, by backing the creation in a weak state of a variety of well-functioning educational institutions, where a certain vision of piety is taught, practiced, and developed, religious political officials have encouraged to create a new mode of competition in the Shiite community over leadership positions. References to piety are now preconditions to access symbolic and political power. As mentioned in the conduct of the study, each Shiite party, in order to propagate its own interpretation of Shiite piety competes in form of institutionalization; believing that such establishments are productive avenues for not only disseminating the group's particular vision of piety and ideal citizenship but also for being able to produce loyal followers.

Indeed, the religious leadership has led to a de facto improvement of the educational conditions of many Shiites regardless of how these Shiites themselves envision the relation between devoutness and educational services. It has also resulted in the emergence of a promising culture of self-reliance and civil society. As compared to the late 1970s, where there was only one regular school for Shiites in Beirut, the

Amiliyya, with almost 2,000 students, there is now a multitude of Shiite-run schools all over Lebanon where more than 20,000 students receive a decent education. The Shi'a community of today is largely unrecognizable compared to that which was appended to the Mountain to form modern-day Lebanon, yet it would be wrong to describe the changes it underwent as either sudden or incremental. They were instead a combination of the two, reflecting the variety of factors by which the community was affected. For most of the first forty years following the imposition of French mandatory rule, the community functioned much as it had done for centuries before. At the same time socio-economic changes were gradually beginning to have an impact on the community, as remittances from successful Shi'a emigrants gave their children access to educational and business opportunities never before available. The attraction of Beirut to agricultural workers from the South seeking higher wages was a manifestation of the same aspirations. The social transformation this caused was more pronounced amongst the Shi'a than other communities

As such, the impact of the religious political parties has not been simply an Islamization of a section of the Shiite population, but more importantly, it has been the Islamization of the citizenship discourse among Shiites in Lebanon in addition to radically politicizing educational institution-building as a crucial component of political legitimacy.

Undeniably, for many Shi'a, religion is indispensable to their identity and to their political struggle. Grasping the potential of educational institutions as a mean to propagate religious Shiite identity, religious political parties underwrote a string of religious schools to penetrate and establish a solid base of support for their movement among the Shi'a masses. This has given clerics a large role in the Shi'a awakening. But

that role is not acceptable to secularists and even to some Islamists who are reluctant to grant authority to the religious hierarchy to shape the Shiite future. Despite these differences, the Shiite identity as stressed out in their schools, is strongest in the current period and serves to bind the Shi'a in a common pursuit.

However, in the contemporary world, where issues of identity everywhere have gained greater salience (Halawi, 1992; Lewis, 1988; White, 2002) the Shi'a may be in the process of re-inventing themselves through a process of conscious self-definition, without which identity does not exist. Does the very concept of Shiism have new meaning in today's Lebanon, where community identity is becoming more assertive?

The debate, of course, is not simply about theological principles but also about communities and power; thus the purely theological issues, as motive for religious schools, are often shrouded by other more concrete and competing interests of the differing communities. In this sense, once again, Shiism perhaps should not be thought of as a religion or a political agenda but as a body of interests with the goal of community welfare and self-preservation.

In the long run, as the Shi'a eventually improve their educational, economic and political conditions, the issue of their Shiite identity may become less pressing and less dominating to their lives. On the other hand, some constants of a common culture and history will remain, debates over who is a Shi'a, who has the right to represent the community, are apt to intensify as the social and political pressures for solidarity ease. Under improved conditions**,** as the Shi'a move out of the status of being a beleaguered community, normal competing focuses of loyalty will emerge (professional, regional, class, ideological) that will weaken the idea of a homogeneous community kept together by hardship.

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