Using "State Philanthropy" to Educate the Next Generation and Build Democracy

Tavis D. Jules

This article posits a conceptual framework for understanding how what I call "state philanthropy" in education is used to build democracy. Using the example of Tunisia, the article looks at how states manage grantees, choose partners, frame problems, and evaluate philanthropic endeavors in education. In drawing from the International Relations literature on the conceptual scaffolding of soft diplomacy, the article examines the rise of state philanthropy in education where donor countries spend billions of dollars trying to (re)shape national educational systems under the guise of security. The article explores the difference between educational philanthropy (in the form of zakat, sadaqah, and waqf) and state philanthropy by explaining how the former is waning in support while the latter thrives under perceived new threats. By doing this, the article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on philanthropy by exploring how new actors (both state and non-state

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alike) are using soft diplomacy to reshape Islamic philanthropy in education. The article concludes by suggesting that we are now entering a complicated time in educational philanthropy that is no longer based on individual giving but one directed and dictated by the geometries of statist interventionism.

Keywords: Tunisia, state philanthropy, edu-funders, educational diplomacy, philanthro-stateism, educational philanthropy

INTRODUCTION

When we think of philanthropy, we often conceive of it in terms of a donation of monies from private individuals to charities, foundations, and the like. However, what if we were to consider the monies, support, and advocacy that governments give to other countries not as "foreign aid," "relief," or "humanitarian assistance" in this traditional sense, but as state-led philanthropical donations and activities that serve to develop connections and dependencies as much as to assist others? In this way, philanthropy is political and strategic. Depending on state-society relations, philanthropy is essentially a contested concept that incorporates diverse activities, values, and a "circuit tent of terms,"[1] and is about the mission, shared values, and organization (Payton & Moody, 2008, p. 30). Philanthropy, which has deep historical roots, is a "normative term describing normative human activity," and it is "essentially moral nature of voluntary action for the public good" (Payton & Moody, 2008, p. 36). With the movement from "government to governance" or "governance with and without government" (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006), the concept of philanthropy is evolving from simple charitable aid to complicated diplomatic maneuvers as governance is achieved via informal authority. Combined with the dawning of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which blends the physical with the cyberphysical, philanthropy as we know it is amorphous as new actors, particularly nation states, enter this arena that has traditionally been dominated by entrepreneurs and business and corporate philanthropists. Singer (2018) reminds us that when it comes to philanthropy, "competing donors may be individual rulers, rival courtiers or politicians, government ministries or agencies, political parties, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" (p. 3). Yet some argue that philanthropy is based on "teleopathy" or "intersystem goals," given that entities are often fixated on one aspect, such as fundraising, at the expense of other goals (Payton & Moody, 2008). Thus, the politics of

philanthropy is now intertwined between state and non-state actors. What was once viewed as a voluntary activity linked to being a good person can now be seen as a coerced endeavor to shape Western views of Islam. In quoting the chairman of the Islamic charitable organization Hartnell (2018) notes that "giving is fragmented, with giving by individuals going largely to family, friends, and communities" (p. 3). Yet the World Giving Index, which includes 13 Arabic countries, notes that most Arabs are more than willing to give. Using Tunisia after the 2011 uprising, or Jasmine Revolution, as an example, this article explores the opening of the sociopolitical space that external actors sought to fill with "educational diplomacy" (Jules, 2016) aid, often through traditional Islamic philanthropy. While this article acknowledges that Islamic philanthropy had existed in an embryonic state before the 2011 uprising, it also suggests that the revolution provided an exceptional "window of opportunity" (Kingdon, 1984) for "social learning" (Hall, 1993) and agenda-setting to occur within educational reforms. In the 2017 World Giving Index, Tunisia's score increased to 92 (up 28 points from the previous year). However, much of that giving remains localized and rooted in Islamic traditions of—zakat (alms or charitable giving), waqf (philanthropic endowment), and sadaqah (benevolence and voluntarily giving to the needy)—which places a high value on anonymity. Nevertheless, of all three, it is waqf that has been at the center of establishing and supporting educational institutions. But there has been a "philanthropic turn," sparked by the giving away of fortunes by the likes of Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffett, which is now affecting Muslim societies. In the first decade after the new millennium, there was an explosive growth of secular Arab foundations focused on development (Hartnell, 2018).

Yet little if any research has been done on specific educational charity and how this differs from zakat, sadaqa, and waqf. The challenge with Islamic giving is that there are no clear distinctions as to which religious tradition should be used for education-related endeavors. While waqf can have an element of educational opportunities attached to its gift, zakat and sadaqah are mostly viewed as "palliative and developmental giving" (Ball & Junemann, 2012). In essence, Islamic "philanthropy has almost become the new status symbol. To have your foundation or a wing of a building named after you can be an outward and respectable mark of success" (Handy, 2006, p. 9). Recent research has found that "other categories of charitable giving that receive substantial donations include full-time Islamic schools and civil rights organizations" where "the appeal

of Islamic schools [is] to educate Muslim youth and the appeal of civil rights organizations to respond to attacks on Muslims in the public square constitute powerful motivations for giving" (Bagby, 2018, p. 58). While several scholars have sought to interrogate the core principles of philanthropic giving—from a political perspective (Singer, 2018), the shifting trajectories of redressing poverty (Widmann Abraham, 2018), disparities in reasons for giving (Khader & Siddiqui, 2018), the securitization of giving (Benthall, 2018), the care for orphans (Benthall, 2019), the capacity of civil society associations with a religious orientation to contribute to the development of the social infrastructure (Clark, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2003), philanthropic governance (Olmedo, 2014), philanthropolicymaking (Rogers, 2011), and philanthrocapitalism (Bishop and Green, 2010)—little has been written about what I call "state philanthropy" with regard to education. By state philanthropy, I mean social transaction of prosperity or material objectives for the public good driven by state-level foundations and entities that serve other countries on behalf of the benevolent state. Despite the growing literature on educational philanthropic action, "an enormous gap in the research field of education policy" exists due to most research taking place at the national level and thus constituting the "policy-as-government paradigm" (Ball, 2012, p. xii) view of the world.

In what follows, this article explores the contours of what I call the conjoined twins of state philanthropy and educational philanthropy, which are driven by educational diplomacy and soft power to maintain influence. In other words, it examines why non-Muslim societies give to Muslim societies and what driving factors motivate such benevolence. In the first of the four sections that follow, I, historize educational philanthropy by detailing what constitutes philanthropy, the rise of educational and venture philanthropy, and how philanthropy has been operationalized in Muslim societies. The second provides a brief overview of educational philanthropy in Muslim societies. The third section talks about the rise of educational diplomacy as a conduit to facilitate educational philanthropy. In the fourth section, the concept of what I call state philanthropy or philanthro-stateism, the exerting of power and influence during system failure with the aid of soft power in recipient countries, is discussed. After this, I use Tunisia as a case study to illustrate this concept. In the discussion section I argue that educational state philanthropy is different from donor aid in that it is given to influence inter-state relations.

HISTORIZING EDUCATIONAL PHILANTHROPY

Customarily, philanthropy is broadly conceived as the use of private resources to better the public good. As Jung and Harrow (2017) note,

> On the one hand, a prominence of hagiographical accounts highlight philanthropy's saintly side (Mahood 2009); on the other hand, hyper-critical perspectives mirror early twentieth-century notions of "Robber Baron" philanthropy, where philanthropy is cast as "malignant" (Parmar 2012, p. 1) or where philanthropists are seen as operating a "shadow state" (Lipman 2014, p. 29).

The precise meaning of what constitutes philanthropy is abstract, given its multiplicity, and "philanthropy is about ideas and values as well as about action, about doing things" (Payton & Moody, 2008, p. 4). Payton and Moody (2008) assert that philanthropy involves voluntary giving, voluntary service, and voluntary association for the public good. This points to the murkiness of the philanthropic giving since it is layered—ranging from "buildings, legal documents, and charitable gifts, to visions, thinking, and practices"—with "material and immaterial influences" that stem from its "fragmented, accumulative, multi-directional nature" (Jung & Harrow, 2017, p. 29). In this way, philanthropy can be seen as communal trades of wealth or material objects. While there are new forms of philanthropy—donor-advised funds, entrepreneurial philanthropy, donor-designated funds, venture philanthropy, strategic philanthropy, international philanthropy, and e-philanthropy—state institutions are still responsible for the distribution of public goods and their financing (Anheier, 2005). The state's role in financing public goods dates to the premodern state, where its responsibility was viewed as primarily based on security and meeting the other needs of society. Nevertheless, state funding boundaries with private donations are blurred as philanthropic beneficence is always in flux. However, the state would focus on diverse social priorities at different times as "charity deserts" arise (Anheier, 2005; Cunningham, 2013; Jung & Harrow, 2017). As Payton and Moody (2008) highlight, there are three types of philanthropic responses where: "(i) philanthropy is the only, or the only effective, response; (ii) philanthropy is one response that complements other responses; and (iii) philanthropy is the preferred or the most appropriate response" (p. 87).

In turning to educational philanthropy or "edu-philanthropy," we determine that it can be seen as one way of giving back by wealthy individuals who want to lead the charge in engendering school reforms through the

influence of policy and practice. Educational giving has a long history, and it has played a hegemonic role during the twentieth century. Traditional edu-philanthropy or "scientific philanthropy" is one where "the industrialist gave back some of the surplus wealth that he had accumulated" to support public institutions that were in line with their "ideological perspectives and material interests" (Saltman, 2010, p. 2). Edu-philanthropy has emerged in light of the vacuum that exists and "gets filled by incendiary voices and marginal figures with ideological agendas and nothing to lose" (Hess & Henig, 2015, p. 8). In essence, "edu-funders" or "educational brokers" (Jules & Stockdale Jefferson, 2016) use education philanthropy to create tectonic shifts in policy priorities, promote particular types of reforms, and stimulate educational improvements. Oftentimes, education philanthropists, who aim to transform education, do so by expanding educational opportunities by building new schools, delivering low-cost private education, enhancing teacher quality and increasing accountability, and improving educational practices through comprehensive reforms. In this way, several American foundations and new edu-funders—the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Open Society Foundation, the Walton Family Foundation, the Buffett Foundation, the Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative, and the Bezos Family Foundation—have all internationalized and become global in their giving to educational causes to improve student performance. With the rise of COVID-19 pandemic, many U.S. philanthropies extended their giving pledges in education.[2] Such a response can be defined as "muscular educational philanthropy," where giving proves to be a valuable catalyst through the provision of "a vehicle for identifying and supporting promising individuals and ideas that may be an uncomfortable fit for education bureaucracies and routines" (Hess & Henig, 2015, p. 1).

The ultimate objective of educational philanthropic endeavors is about shaping public decisions and backing certain types of reforms. For example, in the United States, the arrival of a new generation of edu-funders and philanthropists—with names like Gates, Soros, Walton, Dell, Broad, Fischer, and Arnold—educational philanthropy has become a testing bed for investment in exhilarating educational programs and practices that may show diminishing returns once they are scaled up (Hess, 2012). Thus, foundations have facilitated many policy shifts in education as they react to educational governance's changing nature. In essence, educational philanthropy, which aims at corporatizing education, is based upon a model that treats education as a for-profit business (Saltman, 2010). Today educational philanthropy is part of the global education industry (GIE) where

education is getting increasing attention "from private, often for-profit organizations and investors across a range of levels and activities, including an interest in investment, ownership, servicing and management of education at different levels, which have traditionally been within the purview of the state" (Verger et al., 2016, pp. 3–4). GIE actors are, therefore, able to exhort a tremendous amount of influence on a transnational scale with global reach. Consequently, education has come to be handled like a corporation that is expected to be more efficient, and a host of business and market metaphors—choice, efficiency, competition, entrepreneurs, and performance-based assessment—became part of the discourse as students became viewed as consumers and clients while teachers became service providers.

Educational philanthropy has evolved and given rise to venture philanthropists, social entrepreneurs, and neoliberal policy advocates that extol the virtues of "philanthrocapitalism" (The Economist, February 2006)—where philanthropy resembles a capitalist economy and patrons become customers. For venture philanthropists, schools are "social investments" that should begin with a business plan, involve quantitative measurement of efficacy, be replicable to be "brought to scale," and ideally "leverage" public spending in ways compatible with the strategic donor. Grants are referred to as "investments," donors are called "investors," impact is renamed "social return," evaluation becomes "performance measurement," grant-reviewing turns into "due diligence," the grant list is renamed an "investment portfolio," and charter networks are referred to as "franchises" (Saltman, 2010, p. 2).

The rise of venture philanthropy, particularly in higher education, which is different from traditional philanthropy, is based on the privatizing and transforming of schooling based upon a corporate culture (Saltman, 2010). The entry of venture philanthropists in edu-philanthropy seek to hollow out education through the corporatization of education by accentuating a model centered on "business involvement in schooling" and "school commercialism" (Saltman, 2010). In short, venture philanthropy in education expands the neoliberal discourse and rational public education by using venture capital and technology to pursue educational reforms and policies based on deregulation and privatization. The focus on influencing policy has led to educational philanthropic efforts being geared toward imposing free-market principles across educational reforms and ushering in an increasing focus on policy advocacy, structural reform, and public-private partnerships. Venture philanthropists justify their involvement in the "edu-business" by providing educational services and arguing that

schools have failed, governments are inefficient and markets are efficient, and governments threaten personal liberties. In this way, venture philanthropy is part of the new philanthropic endeavors aimed at strategically leavening private monies to influence educational reforms.

EDUCATIONAL PHILANTHROPY IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Philanthropy has been influential in shaping the outcome of educational issues. Muslim philanthropy in education is not new, and today it has become part of the "new frontiers of philanthropy" (Salamon, 2014). While Payton and Moody (2008) argue that "philanthropy is essential to a free, open, democratic, civil society" (p. 6), many Islamic foundations have been exclaiming the virtues of giving and "doing good," with some claiming that they "aim to have become one of the leading global humanitarian INGOs, and the leading humanitarian INGO working in the Muslim world" (Islamic Relief, 2017, n.p.). In short, Islamic philanthropy is not linked to democratic action but based upon the principle of doing good for one's community. There are three levels of giving—individual giving, structured giving, and forming a foundation (Hartnell, 2018). In a study on giving, researchers found that Muslims often like to give to Islamic schools (Hartnell, 2018). This form of giving is often viewed as flexible and tailored so that givers can have an intimate relationship with the benefactors. By default, zakat, sadaqa (giving to madrassa), and waqf (building or gifting a new school building) are not delineated in education. However, there are roundabout ways for the donations to be used as an educational charity.

Traditionally, educational charities were indirectly served by zakat, a form of compulsory charity. Over time, the concept of zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, has evolved from a principal in the Quran to the foundation of Muslim philanthropical efforts. Historically, educational philanthropy has been dominated by zakat, and in some Muslim societies, it is collected by the governments. Singer (2018) notes that "zakat is technically neither benevolent nor voluntary; although it is sometimes interpreted or misunderstood as a form of philanthropy, its motivations are a belief in and obedience to God" (p. 4). While zakat is legal and obligatory, sadaqa is voluntary, meritorious giving that goes beyond what was required. In fact, zakat exists in a gray area in that while it is understood that Muslims should make a donation of 2.5% of their accumulated wealth to the poor and that donations cannot go toward payment of mosque expenses, other charitable organizations can benefit from these gifts. In some societies,

under the corporate philanthropy banner, companies are legally obligated to pay zakat that goes to charity or a nongovernmental organization or on areas that are deemed essential, such as health or education. However, questions remain as to where zakat has the most impact: should zakat be used to help the poor, or should it go toward government and societal related institutions, such as health or education? In fact, many modern Islamic philanthropy organizations are framed by zakat, and some even go a step further to note that they aim to train a new generation of philanthropic leaders.

Waqf is a form of perpetual charity that views education as an investment. Waqf is traditionally considered as the donation of property, and it is only as recently as the 1700s that a cash waqf was deemed acceptable in mainstream Islam. Sadeq (2002) argues that waqf giving has played an essential role in education, and it has influenced the development of several renowned educational institutions of learning, such as Harvard and Oxford Universities. Historically, waqf was given in Gulf countries to build schools to teach the Quran. However, in North Africa, governments administer waqf as part of a perceived social contract between the state and the subject. In most instances, waqf is handled at the state level, and it often requires an intermediary who is responsible for the redistribution of the waqf to prevent nepotism. There are two types of waqf: in the first the family gives to other family members, and the second, which is relevant to education, is the al-Khairi (for the public good) waqf, or what we might call a form of education philanthropy. Al-Khairi is further subdivided into "public waqf," which comes under the state's direct supervision and can be given as a public benefit to build bridges, masjids, or cemeteries. The second is a "quasi-public waqf," which is a benefit given to a particular group of individuals, such as schools of students of religious knowledge. It can also be used for the construction of madrasas or even public schools, but it must still go through an intermediary. However, most waqfs are used for mosques, hospices, and religious schools to generate income based on the investment. In this way, it can be argued that educational philanthropic waqf is an investment in future earnings in the form of human capital. More recently, there has been a surge in waqf as modern foundations utilize management principles and methods to determine their philanthropic endeavors. On the one hand, within the philanthropic turn, there has been a rise of Eastern-style giving that is slowly replacing Islamic waqf. This is evident in that today Eastern-style giving goes beyond an endowment to religious, educational, or charitable causes, and this type of giving aims to tackle border

societal ills or fund philanthropic organizations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, foundations tend to invest in commercial business ventures and use the income generated to cover administrative and programmatic costs. On the other hand, new forms of waqf or "strategic philanthropy" (Ball & Junemann, 2012) are emerging within the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as crowdfunding for waqf (Hartnell, 2018). A recent study by Kuttab et al. (2017) found that a majority of Arab foundations have aligned their work with the UN's Sustainable Development Goal 4 (ensure inclusive and equitable quality education for all), Goal 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls), and Goal 8 (promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all). The authors also found that the goals related to the environment or energy were viewed as being outside of these foundations' purposes. In the past, the United States funded its allies in the Middle East, but today Gulf countries awash with oil monies are edu-funders to Middle Eastern and North African countries. However, while old philanthropy in education was about developing programs and practices, new educational philanthropy is based on assertive giving that leverages the networks of edu-funders. In short, Arab philanthropy is becoming focused on delivering concrete services (e.g., jobs, education, and health care; Kuttab et al., 2017). In the post-Islamic State era, educational philanthropy has emerged as a response to fundamentalism and the broadening influence of global philanthropic networks and activities. In this way, "funders have become more intentional in their strategy, more attentive to politics, more focused on metrics of success, and more aggressive about changing policy" (Hess & Henig, 2015, p. 1). Thus, edu-philanthropy is about the corporatizing of education across multiple levels using a policy-centric approach. While edu-philanthropy is dwarfed by state investment in education, deep-pocketed donors still try to leverage their investments in education through advocacy and research so that reforms can become models that can be scaled up. Philanthropic educationalists rationalize philanthropy as fostering productive good that betters societies. Internationally, edu-philanthropy is shaped by "donor logic" (Steiner-Khamsi, 2008) in that educational projects the philanthropic educationalists fund are based not on local needs but the funder's rationality of "best practices." As noted above, education philanthropy has been embedded within Muslim societies for generations; however, what is different today is that as entrepreneurs generate more wealth from their natural resources in the Middle East and North Africa, they are more likely to give charitable donations

to improve state education. While educational giving in Muslim states has been increasing, it has been dwarfed by the total amount of private giving from the top four counties—the United States, the UK, Switzerland, and Australia—to influence public policy on education. The ideological agenda of the edu-philanthropists is one that aims to influence every aspect of educational reform, policy, and practice from finance to management to instruction to the core curriculum.

EDUCATIONAL DIPLOMACY

This section will connect Islamic philanthropy and nation-states' benevolence in public education to a movement from government to governance and the emergence of network governance. As governing becomes shared between states, markets, and philanthropy, this group of political actors is "the catalyst and driving force for a paradigmatic political change" (Olmedo, 2014, p. 576). Recently there has been more expression to give to educational causes outside of madrasahs. In today's climate of Islamophobia, terrorism, and securitization, Islamic giving in education has taken on a new meaning, since Muslims now conceive of Islamic schools as the core bedrock of responses to perceived Western imperialism. In this way, "strategically, philanthropy has provided a 'Trojan horse' for modernizing moves that opened the 'policy door' to new actors and new ideas and sensibilities" (Ball & Junemann, 2012, p. 32). This provides educational philanthropy with a new purpose—using soft power and educational diplomacy (discussed below) as a conduit to influence political perception.

The relationship between soft power and educational diplomacy has existed since the birth of the modern university. Soft power (Nye, 2004) in education is the "nexus of influence in world affairs that relate to culture, science, technology, and other subtle forces" (Altbach & Peterson, 2008, p. 37). In higher education, soft power has materialized through education and academic exchanges as a form of "public diplomacy" that extends national diplomacy through education (Bayat, 2014; Peterson, 2014). At its core, educational diplomacy is a "multi-level, multi-actor negotiation processes" that engages in cultivating "trust and negotiation of mutual benefit in the context of global [education] goals," and as "the chosen method of interaction between stakeholders engaged in public [education] and politics for the purpose of representation, cooperation, resolving disputes, improving [education] systems, and securing the right to [education] for vulnerable populations" (Hone, 2014, p. 1). Hone (2014) suggests that

educational diplomacy entails three broad aspects: "(i) the normative aspect of education diplomacy; (ii) education diplomacy as an activity spanning various issue areas, policy fields and types of diplomatic engagement; and (iii) education diplomacy as a multi-level activity" (p. 1). As a multilevel activity, education diplomacy is a bilateral, multilateral, and transnational activity that directly connects citizens to their country (Hone, 2014). Thus, educational diplomacy has become relevant to the global education agenda by drawing attention to ways policies are shaped by soft diplomacy.

Educational diplomacy, which drives cross-border educational philanthropic activities, has emerged as a form of global engagement, particularly in higher education. Thus, educational diplomacy seeks to capture the interconnectedness and activities that define the new ways of working in a world that increasingly operates across sovereign borders. In an era of educational soft power, the core attributes of educational diplomacy are advocacy and collaboration "that covers the actions of a wide-array of actors and activities intended to promote favourable relations among nations" (Peterson, 2014, p. 2), or what has been called "public diplomacy." With the rise of educational soft power, we also see the growth and intensification of national interest through education as a way to influence actors, agents, and interests (below I call this state philanthropy or philanthro-stateism). However, today, educational diplomacy is not only about cultural exchanges; it is also about the spread and dissemination of norms, standards, benchmarks, and practices from one actor to another. In other words, as economic interactions intensify, the diffusion of norms and practices is concerned with the attractiveness of markets and the ability to set up new alliances while courting old ones (Hartmann, 2008). It is no longer individuals who are involved in global engagements in the form of student mobility; institutions, too, are developing, testing, marketing, and branding their own types of "foreign relations" policies as they seek to build educational relationships (Peterson & Helms, 2013). Moreover, as higher education institutions seek to internationalize, they are themselves becoming public diplomats; their public diplomacy is expanding to include government officials and offices. Long-term engagement is now the norm in global higher education expansion. At the heart of educational diplomacy is soft power in the form of the "ability of a given political entity—a state or non-state actor—to induce other actors and entities in the international system to desire similar goals and outcomes to the initiating actor" (Hadfield, 2015, p. 3). Thus, education diplomacy is based on the sheer attractiveness of perceived influence upon an extensive array of ideas, preferences, and behaviors between actors,

institutions, and governments. When used in education diplomacy, soft power's attractiveness lies in its ability to create an environment that produces a shift in mindset rather than a violent change via intimidation (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borragan, 2009; Hadfield, 2015).

FROM EDUCATIONAL PHILANTHROPY TO STATE PHILANTHROPY: PHILANTHRO-STATEISM

In turning now to what I call state philanthropy or philanthro-stateism, it essential to bear in mind that there has been a strategic rise in the heightened collaboration between nongovernmental and governmental entities all over the world (Najam, 2000). While traditional philanthropy is often associated with money, in this article philanthro-stateism is about exerting power and influence during system failure through the use of soft power in recipient countries. State philanthropy is but one component of philanthropy, which has emerged as a way to influence educational ensembles. Such ensembles, which are driven by the demise of the hierarchic Keynesian welfare state and rise of the Schumpeterian competition state (Jessop, 2002), based on coordinated heterarchies and flexible networks, are creating new forms of economic, political, and institutional relations that are giving rise to new identities and new roles for individuals and states. Thus, philanthro-stateism endeavors move away from top-down forms of imperative coordination and are based on processes of "governing at a distance" (Rose & Miller, 1992), which is based upon the "the creation of alliances between political and other actors from different fields" (Olmedo, 2014, p. 578). Thus, state philanthropic activities, which rely on metagovernance, or "the governance of governance" (Jessop, 2003), are part of the rise of philanthropic governance. Thus, metagovernance, the organization, and coordination governance are premised upon the governance of national education policy spaces by external policy actors.

The history of the state's involvement in philanthropy is one that is intertwined with a hybridity of agreements where, on the one hand, the state has been responsible for overseeing and administering philanthropic gifts and bequests and, on the other hand, for providing financial support and willingness to intercede in philanthropy's effectiveness and efficacy (Jung & Harrow, 2017). Najam (2000) highlights four relational qualities that emerge from the intertwining of the state and philanthropy: cooperation (comparable goals and means); complementarity (parallel goals and dissimilar means); confrontation (dissimilar goals and means); and

co-option (diverse goals and analogous means). Thus, state-led foundations and entities are para-policy organizations and local NGOs, which are part of the third sector and are now colliding in the same policy stream as they are working on similar wicked problems, which are often tricky to solve. Wicked problems are seen as a set of apparently intractable challenges that are part of a "class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision-makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing" (Churchman, 1967, p. 141). Hence, state-led foundations aim at influencing public policy from outside the formal structure of elected government. As such, state-led foundations are now policy entrepreneurs who: "(i) perform public tasks that have been delegated to them by the state; (ii) perform public tasks for which there is a demand that neither the state nor for-profit organizations are willing to fulfill; or (iii) influence the direction of policy in the state, the for-profit sector or other nonprofit organizations" (Hall, 1987, p. 3).

State philanthropy is about the social transfer of statist priorities from one country to another through cross-border and governmental networks of support. State philanthropy in education is driven by educational diplomacy. Philanthro-stateism is different from traditional donor aid, since it is based on social investment and social finance and is driven by the state's changing role in an era of geostrategic maneuvers and the use of soft power to mitigate security concerns around terrorism. Therefore, state-led philanthropy combines charity with soft power to (re)shape the receiving country's policies and priorities and may involve gifts and grants, volunteers, special events, advocacy, and reform. As Payton and Moody (2008) contend, "both the intentions and the actions of philanthropy are important" (p. 28). Since some problems are too large for governments to tackle, governments may ask for help. It is at the intersection of trying to solve wicked problems, and requesting external assistance where we see the rise of state-led philanthropic activities. State-led philanthropic-delivery is guided by social action "behind the scenes" as it seeks to implement "philanthro-policy making" (Rogers, 2011) under the guise of "international philanthropic impulse" (Gregson, 2012). State-led philanthropic activities take policy responsibilities and recommendations beyond their national boundaries, offer innovative techniques and try to meet niches that governments cannot or would not address. Given that countries have their own values, histories, ethnicities, and political traditions, philanthro-stateism is about advocating for policy goals and changes that are in the

best interest of the benefactor. In short, state-led philanthropy is about winning the hearts and minds of people in the recipient country.

STATE PHILANTHROPY OPERATIONALIZED: THE CASE OF TUNISIA

We see the state's movement from its historical role of providing support to local charities toward supporting material objects abroad. Placing the historical context of Islamic charity within the framework of soft power and educational diplomacy in Tunisia helps to clarify the move toward state-led philanthropy. In today's changing geostrategic climate of Islamophobia, radicalization, terrorism, and the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, benevolence to Muslim societies is being co-opted in the name of securitization and secularization. This is giving rise to state philanthropy or philanthro-stateism, which blends the impetuses of soft diplomacy with states' educational philanthropic actions. The movement from educational philanthropy to philanthro-stateism is driven by a new "economic rationalisation of giving" (Saltman, 2010, p. 70). The fear of radicalization in education is also driving the contours of philanthro-stateism as governments seek to keep radicals out of their borders. As Ball (2012) notes, "The distribution of responsibility for the solution of social problems is changing, and now philanthropy and business are an essential part of the delivery and processes of education" (p. 100). As Sigillo (2016) argues, "Several charities have reframed their relationship with foreign donors, adopting a more market-oriented approach: opening their doors to international opportunities and seeking to gain legitimacy from the West, especially from the United States" (para. 17). With this movement toward market-based techniques, traditional charities are now competing with other educational brokers (both state and non-state actors) in seeking to attract donations for education-related activities.

With the soft power of educational diplomacy established, it becomes clear why aid in general to Tunisia becomes a priority for actors. Social learning is more likely to occur in sites where reform has previously been slow to materialize, either in the form of reform fatigue or in instances where government officials did not have carte blanche. In today's interconnected and competitive economy, whoever controls the donor aid agenda also dominates the benefactors' national and strategic priorities. As it transitions from dictatorship to democracy, Tunisia presents a unique opportunity to understand the links between educational development in post-revolutionary situations and the role that external actors play. While the World Bank has been the most active lender in education, investing

some $69 billion globally in more than 1,500 educational projects, newer coalitions, partnerships, and bilateral agreements (i.e., the European Union and United Nations with China and the United States) have also emerged to support educational projects that emphasize good governance and democratic consolidation in Tunisia. For example, since 2012, the U.S. government has invested a significant amount of foreign aid into Tunisia under its Building Capacity in the Education and Media Sectors project to establish linkages between U.S. and Tunisian higher educational institutions, as well as investments in English-language and media programs. Attention to foreign aid's role in shaping national educational agendas and priorities is important; after the 2011 Arab Spring, global aid fell by 6%, and in 2012 it fell by another 3% (OECD, 2012). UNESCO (2014) notes that aid to basic education was cut by almost 10% between 2010 and 2012. The link between the troika of compounding factors—foreign aid, educational spending, and the prevention of radicalization—is reshaping bilateral relations and soft power in education, or what has been described as educational diplomacy.

In Tunisia, Islamic-based charity organizations have "competition with secular associations to attract international funding. Initially, the majority of religious associations had chosen not to accept foreign funds. Some, though, did obtain financial support from Gulf-based charities (Sigillo, 2016, para 16). Hartnell (2018) claims that "historically, and since the revolution, philanthropy in Tunisia has supported kindergartens, schools, scholarships, community health centres and distribution of food" (p. 7). However, they have seen an evolution in the nature of Tunisian charities since the 2011 uprising. As Sigillo (2016) proposes, a triad of events—a change in logistics, the gentrification of Islamic movements, the competition from funds with the secular association—has evolved Tunisian charities. The Law of Associations Decree No. 88 of 2011 does not permit the establishment and registration of educational philanthropy foundations from "religion and/or social solidarity" (Hartnell, 2018) charities and other governments. Decree 88 provides for three organizational forms: associations, networks of associations, and foreign organizations. The 2014 Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, Article 35, states, "The freedom to establish political parties, unions, and associations is guaranteed." However, it further stipulates that "[i]n their internal charters and activities, political parties, unions, and associations must respect the provisions of the Constitution, the law, financial transparency and the rejection of violence."

Hartnell (2018) notes that "in Tunisia, where there are no local foundations, almost all philanthropic money currently comes from foreign sources—a fact that could be used to delegitimize civil society efforts at social transformation" (p. 16). However, giving is prevalent from international Tunisian foundations that have been set up outside of the country. For example, in Tunisia in the past, foundations such as the Zakat Foundation of America have encouraged seasonal giving programs for the Ramadan and Eid holidays and also have provided school backpacks for students as well as winter clothes and supplies for vulnerable communities. Other foundations, such as Islamic Relief, are currently running three education projects that include support for 14 schools and 14 libraries, while its American subsidiary, Islamic Relief USA, is using its donation to fund schools that "will include the procurement and installation of 100 water tanks for 100 schools within 9 governorates across north and central Tunisia. Student bathrooms in 30 schools will also be rehabilitated, and an extensive hygiene awareness campaign will be carried out at 100 schools" (Islamic Relief USA, 2018, n.p.).

Since the 2011 Tunisian uprising, charities have begun to focus locally since the state withdrew from providing social services, and "mosques began to fill the void created by the diminution of the state's welfare provision" (Sigillo, 2016, para. 5). This means that philanthro-stateism is now mostly localized.

Recently there has been a surge in Islamic philanthro-stateism that is part of soft diplomacy aimed at preventing homegrown Islamic terrorism. Since 2011, Tunisia has received state philanthropy, aimed at explicitly being invested in education, from several Gulf states. For example, since 2011, under the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development established in 1961, Kuwait has given an annual average of 200.000 Kuwaiti Dinar to Tunisia while the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, established in 1971, has given over AED 795 million, of which 25% has been delegated to the "other" sector (this includes education costs). Between 2011 and 2013, the Saudi Fund for Development, established in 1974, funded three educational projects totaling 111,500SR and developed a vocational training center costing 60,000SR that was co-financed with the Islamic banks for development to the tune of USD 27 million. In 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pledged USD 20 billion to the governments of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. State philanthropy and soft diplomacy became intertwined in 2016 at the Tunisia 2020 Conference held on November 29 and 30 in Tunis.[3] It was at this conference that the

status of Gulf State aid to Tunisia was settled. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), funded primarily by the Gulf States, and the major Gulf State donors themselves, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, attended the Tunisia 2020 meeting and pledged to give development aid to Tunisia to reach its goals by 2020–21. By 2018, Saudi Arabia committed USD 830 million in assistance to Tunisia to finance the budget ($500 million), foreign finance trade ($230 million), and "other" ($100 million). As Issac (2015) maintains, "Following the outbreak of Arab uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011, the Arab Gulf States were generally rapid and generous in using their petrodollar investments to confront the various security and stability ramifications of these mass events" (p. 262). Thus, in the wake of new perceived threats of securitization, which is concurrently unpredictable, intangible, and intransigent, the post-2011 trends show that Gulf states are more willing to finance economic projects and continue their generosity.

DISCUSSION

The reasons for such generosity in state philanthropy to Tunisia are threefold. First, with the lawlessness in Libya and the defeated Islamic State, philanthro-stateism in Tunisia is being used to secure its borders and keep terrorism at bay. Moreover, a significant amount of effort is being placed upon keeping al-Qaeda terrorist cells in check as local affiliates seek to expand and fill the vacuum that the Islamic State has left. Security is incentivizing the politicization of philanthro-stateism. With the focus on security and terrorism concerns globally and the quiet policy of keeping "others" (the homegrown terrorists) at home, philanthro-stateism is now a globalized global network. In short, philanthro-stateism is booming as the relationship between the state and society changes due to market pressures. As educational governance shifts with the movement from hierarchical bureaucracies to flexible networks, the state's role changes as different actors (state and non-state alike) seek to carve out territory to govern. As such, philanthro-stateism is now evolving as a market mechanism to correct educational policymaking's perceived ills. In an era premised upon deeper securitization, "philanthropy is being reworked by the sensibilities of business and business methods" (Ball & Junemann, 2012, p. 657) as business methods and private wealth are used to solve social problems or "philanthrocapitalism" (Bishop & Green, 2010). The rise of

such practices in Tunisian education has allowed external actors to shape national policy trajectories through advocacy, conception, and negotiation. Moreover, philanthro-stateism moves away from the sociopolitical logic of service delivery and is premised upon developing "contexts of influence" (Bowe et al., 1992) by participating in policymaking at various levels, or philanthro-policymaking.

Second, philanthro-stateism is booming as Gulf countries try to mitigate Iranian and Shiite influences from taking a foothold in North Africa as educational governing has become progressively intertwined between state, market, and philanthropy. In Tunisia, philanthro-stateism is politically driven and done as an investment in securing political stability. Political stability in the region is essential to philanthro-stateism, which is emerging as "the catalyst and driving force for a paradigmatic political change" (Olmedo, 2014, p. 576). In other words, as the role of the state changes, so, too, does the purpose of philanthropy as today's philanthropy is both a subject of change and an agent (Ball & Junemann, 2012). Philanthro-stateism has been progressively intervening in education by taking part in service delivery and influencing policymaking through soft diplomacy. In fact, "Philanthropy in its various forms is currently a key device in the reconstitution of the state and of governance" (Ball & Junemann, 2012, p. 48). As shown above, in the Tunisian context, states giving money are not only instrumental in the delivery of the programs but involved in the negotiation, advocacy, and conception of programs. Unlike Western philanthro-stateism, this neoliberal belief enmeshed within democratic thinking of "human well being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets, and free trade" (Harvey 2007, 22). Arab philanthro-stateism is steeped in religious beliefs, legitimacy, accountability, performativity, stabilization, and cementing Muslim ties in politically and strategically important countries. For example, in Tunisia, with an emphasis on securitization, donors use state philanthropy funds "to create social and political change" (Frumkin, 2006, p. 11) while "project[ing] their values, commitments, and beliefs into the public sphere" (Frumkin, 2006, p. 2). As Sigillo (2016) argues,

> Islamic charities have continued to evolve. Whereas previously they had found it necessary to differentiate themselves from other social actors, more recently they have sought to normalize their status as "agents of civil society." In particular, they have developed new discourses and have begun to compete with secular NGOs in order to attract international legitimacy. (para. 13)

In this way, states are using education to metamorphose into altruistic philanthropists that want to save societies from themselves. In an increasingly networked policy environment, altruistic state philanthropy benefits from technologies involved in governing at a distance. Thus, state philanthropy in education should be viewed as "investments, [which are] encouraging the creation and promotion of well-informed for-profit ventures directed to address social problems" (Olmedo, 2014, p. 587). Consequently, state philanthropy in education is evolving to be governed by a business-like approach to achieve outcomes, pursue innovation, and arrive at common goals.

Third, philanthro-stateism is becoming part of the discourses and ideology of pan-Arab revival and Arabism based on unity. Philanthro-stateism has been instrumental in employing "soft" pressure on national educational systems to observe international "best practices" by way of advising governments. Originally pan-Arab nationalism was a response to the creation of Israel in 1948. However, today it is a reaction to the perceived West's influence on the affairs of Arab countries over the Arab world. A defining feature of philanthro-stateism linked to the pan-Arab revival in the post-2011 period was the increased tendency of Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, to finance economic projects instead of doling out cash transfers as they previously did (Issac, 2015). The pan-Arab revival benefited from the petrodollars invested by various Gulf governments to tackle the numerous security and stability ramifications that arose after 2011. This was evident as Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, non–Arab Spring countries, were promised USD 20 billion in 2011 to be delivered over 5 to 10 years, while Tunisia, home of the Arab Spring, was given a much more modest amount, and Egypt received over $35.5 billion between 2013 and 2015 (Issac, 2015). As Issac (2015) argues, economic conditions and profits drive Gulf investments in philanthro-stateism. The new investments aim to achieve political stability through Arab transformations as countries seek to support new political orders that are not deemed a regional threat. Thus, educational support and philanthropy became linked to state stability and political change as this new period is marked by governance, which is distinctive from government. While the government is hierarchical, centralization, and control, governance is "marked by a proliferation of modes of organization, levels, and decisionmaking authorities" (Smouts, 1998, p. 87).

CONCLUSION

Today education is no longer a statist endeavor, and philanthropy is complementing state efforts on education reforms. Educational philanthropy is purely political and steeped in soft power. There has been a rise in the Western-style private foundation philanthropy model and giving. However, educational philanthropy (both at the individual and the state level) has evolved significantly since 9/11. Before 9/11, educational philanthropic endeavors at the personal level consisted of, for the most part, giving to community charities and occasional giving on religious holidays. However, with the 2008 financial crisis and the explosion of oil prices, educational philanthropy has benefited significantly from religious giving to supplementing educational budgets in recent years. It was also during this period that we saw a rise in state giving for educational philanthropy, which involves a "catalyzing of all sectors—public, private, and voluntary—into action to solve their community's problems" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 20) and blurs the "boundary between state and civil society" (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, p. 42). This new model is driven by the movement from government to governance as the state becomes "polycentric" as the "centre of gravity around which policy cycles move" (Jessop, 1998, p. 32) and "the range of actors involved in shaping and delivering policy" (Newman, 2001, p. 125) enlarges and becomes more diverse. As educational governance evolves and moves away from heterarchical modalities of governance and toward network and "metagovernance" (Jessop, 2002), the national state is not "hollowing out" but is a complex mixture of "hierarchy, heterarchy, and market" (Ball & Junemann, 2012) that is allowing for new educational brokers to pick up the slack left over by governments. At the end of the day, states are philanthropic not out of the goodness of their hearts but because they expect a return on their philanthropic actions. Such return ranges from the enactment of good governance and democracy to keeping homegrown terrorists at bay.

This article has sketched out the new roles and policy structures of state philanthropic ensembles. The rise of states in educational philanthropic policy and the policy process is part of new institutional mechanics. I have argued that philanthro-stateism is the co-opting of educational philanthropy by the state using soft power. The article's main point is that philanthro-stateism in the form of foundations and other entities in countries such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states is co-opting

educational institutions in other Arab countries to serve their own security and stability needs. State-led philanthropic activities are not about collaboration, cooperation, or resource and knowledge transfer but about shaping the recipient's national discourse around wicked problems. Thus, state-led philanthropy, which uses a partnership module, exists because of inadequacy, defects, or government failure to solve wicked problems. In this way, it sits side by side with the activities of "institutional complexes of government, state or public sector on the one hand, and the for-profit or business sector on the other" (Anheier, 2005, p. 4). Philanthropy itself is being transformed in an age of educational brokers utilizing different governance techniques. It has been argued that Muslim philanthropy has moved away from individual giving to social programs (waqf, zakat, and sadaqa) to state giving in order to project foreign influence and govern from a distance in an era besieged by multidimensional issues ranging from terrorism to securitization. Islamic giving has evolved. Disentangling state philanthropic activities and philanthropy-governmental relations from other forms of soft power is often hard to do as they are part and parcel of the same coin. In this way, the recipient country's voice is often stifled as philanthropy's story is often told from the donor's perspective. Thus philanthro-stateism is closely related to different ideological currents.

Notes

1. These include the voluntary sector, nonprofit sector, third sector, independent sector, not-for-profit sector, tax-exempt sector, associational sector, social economy, social enterprise, NGOs, charity benevolence, altruism, civil society, humanitarianism, eleemosynary, and alms (Anheier, 2005; Najam, 2000).

2. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation prioritizes student-facing technologies and spent money on understanding the impact of COVID-19 on educators and families. The City Fund gave $3 million in educational grants in the 14 cities where it works. The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative bestowed over $1.6 million to education groups. Jointly the Walton Family Foundation and the Kauffman Foundation contributed $2 million education initiatives.

3. The UAE did not attend after it halted diplomatic relations due to the fear of the rise of Islamism in Tunisia.

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